Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

372. National Security Action Memorandum No. 269⁰

Washington, October 31, 1963.

TO

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense
• The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
• The Director of Central Intelligence
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
• The Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
• The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

SUBJECT

• Procedure for Approval of Certain Nuclear Tests¹

The President has directed that the following procedure be instituted for the review and approval of nuclear tests that might violate or be regarded as violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A nuclear test that is intended to be fully contained underground will be included in this category if there is a significant possibility that the test will place measurable amounts of radioactive debris beyond the boundaries of the United States under circumstances in which the debris could be credibly related to the test. Any other nuclear test which by its nature could reasonably give rise to domestic or foreign charges of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty will be included in this category even though the sponsoring agency believes that the charges would prove to be unfounded.

1. In planning the nuclear test program, the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Defense will make every effort to avoid tests that might be regarded as being a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It is recognized that this will be a matter of judgment since the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty does not contain precise technical criteria as to the nature of prohibited tests.

2. If the Atomic Energy Commission or the Secretary of Defense believes after careful study that a particular test should remain in the program despite the possibility that it might give rise to a claimed violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sponsoring agency will submit the test for review by a committee, under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, composed of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, or their designated representatives.²

3. In support of the proposals for each nuclear test of this type, the sponsoring agency will prepare for the reviewing committee a detailed study of the importance of the proposed test and the possible direct or indirect effects associated with the test that might be regarded as evidence of a violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The study of effects associated with the test will include an analysis of a) the anticipated distribution of particulate and gaseous radioactive debris under the full range of possible meteorological conditions; b) the extent to which blast, electromagnetic, and other direct radiation phenomena associated with the test will occur in the atmosphere; c) the possibility that various foreign countries would be able to detect the anticipated level of radioactive debris and other phenomena associated with the tests with their detection instrumentation; d) visible phenomena in the vicinity of the test site; and e) planned or expected publicity.

4. The reviewing committee will be given sufficient notice of proposals for nuclear tests of this type to permit adequate consideration by the committee and any necessary action with minimum impact on the program in question.

5. If the committee finds that the proposed test is acceptable under the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the committee will submit its recommendation to the President for his approval. No test of this type will be conducted without the approval of the President after the procedure prescribed in this memorandum.³

McGeorge Bundy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 269. Secret.
1. In a May 15 memorandum to holders of NSAM No. 210, McGeorge Bundy stated that the President had approved [text not declassified] for FY 1964. In an August 30 memorandum to the same group, however, Bundy stated that Kennedy had requested a review of that program. (Both ibid., NSAM 210) Regarding NSAM No. 210, see Document 259.
2. In a November 6 memorandum to holders of NSAMs No. 210 and 269, McGeorge Bundy stated that because of the close similarity of the composition and functions of the committees established under those NSAMs, they would be combined into one “Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests.” Members were to be the same as those designated above, with the addition of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget.
3. [text not declassified] The paper describes at length measures taken to make the underground tests conform with the Limited Test Ban Treaty. (“AEC Actions To Insure Weapons Tests Will Be Conducted Within the Terms of the Partial Test Ban Treaty”; Johnson Library, National Security File, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, General, Volume I)