Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

371. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Missions⁰

Washington, October 15, 1963, 6:57 p.m.

691. Paris deliver Durbrow 8:00 a.m. October 16. General Assembly resolution being introduced probably sponsored by 17 active members ENDC, which would, in effect, call upon states to refrain from placing nuclear weapons or other weapons mass destruction in orbit around earth, from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, and from stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner.¹ In connection consideration of matter by General Assembly both U.S. and Soviet Union will make statements supporting resolution.

As appropriate and emphasizing such points as may be most useful locally, addressees may draw on following points in such public and private explanations of our approach this matter as may be considered necessary:

1. Resolution does not represent new policy for U.S. Our intention not to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit was first made clear in statement by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric September 5, 1962,² and has been confirmed by President and other U.S. spokesmen on number of occasions.

2. Our policy reflects our assessment that for foreseeable future placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction would not give military advantage to either side and that both sides have a mutual interest in avoiding race for such weapons. Following considerations are pertinent:

a. Chief problem presented by orbital vehicles carrying weapons mass destruction would for some time to come be psychological. Such weapons might be “terror” weapons but more costly and less effective militarily than ballistic missiles. We have neither need nor desire this type weapon and can safely rely on deterrent strength afforded by hardened and dispersed ICBM’s and mobile systems such as Polaris.

b. In building our deterrent forces, we have emphasized importance of eliminating any possibility of accident. Earth-based delivery systems are more reliable and are more readily controlled than would be case with orbital systems. Accordingly, deployment of latter might increase risk of accidental war. All countries have interest in avoiding this.

3. Although we made our own intentions clear some time ago, Gromyko’s statement of September 19 before the General Assembly³ (a year after Gilpatric’s statement) was first clear indication Soviet intentions and of their willingness separate matter from other aspects arms control and disarmament. Since we not going to place bombs in orbit, it is in our interest and that of other countries to get Soviet Union clearly on record. While resolution would be a recommendation only and would not be legally binding, it would express view of GA that placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit undesirable. Since impact of such weapons would be primarily psychological rather than military, we think resolution will be useful political barrier to such a Soviet extension of arms race.

4. If the Soviet Union should, in violation of its declared intent, place bombs in orbit for psychological purposes, they would have to reveal presence of such weapons and would, of course, have to pay political price. Therefore, resolution is to some extent self-policing. We have capabilities for detecting presence of objects in orbit although without inspection it is not possible to be certain whether a particular object is carrying a weapon of mass destruction. We could detect any suspicious build-up of vehicles in orbits which might be suitable for deploying weapons mass destruction. Accordingly since threat is low, we prepared at present to rely on own capabilities.

5. It should be recognized that in rapidly advancing field such as exploration and use of outer space, unforeseen events might make it desirable have additional assurance at a future time. We would feel free seek such assurance as might be necessary and would, of course, retain freedom of action if satisfactory assurance were not forthcoming. FYI. In this connection, if asked why U.S. Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World calls for inspection of space vehicles whereas inspection not provided in resolution, you should point out that if deterrent forces were being substantially reduced under disarmament program, it would be important have full assurance weapons of mass destruction were not being placed in orbit. End FYI.

6. Since we did not plan to place weapons of mass destruction in orbit, resolution would not cause any alteration of our space activities. Nor would resolution relieve us of necessity of taking such precautions as may be necessary from standpoint our security, such as research and development on possible orbital systems which other side might at some time deploy and on appropriate countermeasures. Although we do not, therefore, intend let down our guard, we expect resolution will be a useful step in avoiding extension of arms race to outer space.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18 UN. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Cathright and cleared in the Department by G/PM, ACDA, UNP, EUR, RPM, and P and by DOD/ISA, AEC, and the White House. Approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to the capitals of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bonn, Brussels, Canberra, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Taipei, Tokyo, Wellington, Geneva, and USUN.
1. See Document 369.
2. See Document 226.
3. See Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 509-524.