Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

259. Editorial Note

NSAM No. 210, December 12, 1962, established an interagency working group on underground nuclear tests, which would be chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and would be comprised of representatives from the White House Office of Science and Technology, Department of State (including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget. The purpose of the group was “to review the schedule of tests for the remainder of FY 1963 and for FY 1964, and the policy and technical justifications therefor, and to determine if the schedule is consistent with the requirements of national security and with foreign policy.” It would send its conclusions and recommendations to the President “as soon as possible and no later than March 4, 1963.” (Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 210)

The first two meetings of the working group took place on January 3 and March 21, 1963. At the January 3 meeting, the working group considered the AEC proposal for 19 underground nuclear tests as part of Operation Storax at the Nevada Test Site for the first 3 months of 1963. The first two phases of this test series, which began in early July 1962, were completed by the end of 1962; those for the first quarter of 1963 were called Storax III. In formulating its recommendations for Storax III, the members of the group agreed that the major factors guiding their review would be “the President’s stringent budget policy; the need for maintaining a level of testing sufficient to keep the laboratories viable; an adequate rate of testing in relation to weapons development requirements as viewed in the context of the general military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and finally, consistency between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in testing and its public posture with respect to other major international issues, including the forthcoming disarmament negotiations.” Because the President had imposed a budgetary ceiling for FY 1964, beginning July 1, 1963, that would allow only about 25 tests per year, the working group agreed to reduce the rate of testing for the first 6 months of 1963 to the level authorized for FY 1964. The group also agreed that the AEC should submit a request to the President for domestic tests for the next month and present to the working group a proposal for the testing program for the rest of FY 1963. (Record of meeting by Carl Kaysen, January 4; Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Jan.-Mar. 1963)

Several memoranda from Glenn Seaborg to McGeorge Bundy from January to early March 1963, requesting the President’s approval for specific tests and the expenditure of certain nuclear materials for the testing program, and memoranda from the President or Bundy to Seaborg approving these requests are ibid.

Before Storax III began, President Kennedy raised the prospect of a postponement of the shots for the duration of the private discussions with British and Soviet officials on testing in New York and Washington (see Document 258). McGeorge Bundy raised the possibility of a 2-week postponement with Seaborg in a telephone conversation on January 21. Seaborg told Bundy that he preferred no delay while the talks continued but agreed that 2 weeks would do no harm. (Seaborg, Journal, volume 5, page 74) At the NSC meeting the following day, the President stressed the importance of a test ban. “He said,” Seaborg recorded in his journal, “a test ban involving only the Russians and the United States wouldn’t be worth very much; but, if it affects China, it will be worth very much indeed. It is, therefore, much more important than it was a year or two ago. He indicated that McCone agreed with this point of view.”

Following the NSC meeting, the President met in his office with Secretary Rusk, Bundy, Foster, Kaysen, Seaborg, and Wiesner: “The President indicated that he would like the AEC to defer underground testing for two or three weeks while the possibility of a test ban on the basis of the exchange of Kennedy-Khrushchev letters is explored by Foster and his group. I indicated that this would have an adverse effect on the laboratories, and possibly on some Commissioners because of the feeling that this might be the first step toward an unpoliced moratorium. I indicated that it might be better if an actual length of time for this deferral not be designated. Foster indicated that he might learn the prospects for a test ban before two or three weeks’ time. It was recognized that the AEC had not been testing during the last week or two because of labor troubles; thus, a month has passed since the last test, and the announcement of a test at this time would be particularly unfortunate so far as the negotiations are concerned. There was general agreement that the AEC should defer its next underground test until an assessment could be made of the prospects for successful negotiations.” (ibid., page 78)

On January 26, President Kennedy announced the postponement of the Nevada underground tests during the private talks but indicated that the United States was prepared to resume testing at any time. For the President’s statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, page 104. After the Soviet Union broke off the talks, U.S. underground testing resumed in early February.

At its March 21 meeting, the working group reviewed the proposed AEC list for 27 AEC and DOD tests for the balance of FY 1963. It decided to limit the number of tests to 20 but to allow the agencies to select them from the list of 27. The working group also agreed to an intensive review of proposed tests for FY 1964, chaired by Jerome Wiesner, before presentation to the President. (Record of meeting by Kaysen, March 21 (revised on March 26); Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171, Jan.-Mar. 1963) In a March 27 memorandum to Secretary Rusk, Foster forwarded Kaysen’s record of the meeting, which he called “an accurate report of the conclusions reached.” He added that although he had little to contribute to the working group on technical matters, on the question of the political impact of an intensified test series “it was my belief that this would aggravate the situation at the Geneva test ban discussions, whereas a series including fewer tests per month could be explained as a continuation of the series started after the Soviets began their new tests in the fall of 1961.” He noted that it was on this basis as well as budgetary considerations and the practical question of how many tests per month could be conducted effectively that the decision of 20 tests was made. Further, “It was also stated that in planning for tests to be run in 1964, the rate would be further reduced to total between 25 and 36 for 12 months of FY 1964.” (Ibid.) In a March 26 memorandum to Seaborg, President Kennedy approved the 20 tests and the expenditure of specific amounts of nuclear materials for them. (Ibid.)

Storax III and IV (for the second quarter) consisted of 29 tests, from February 8 to June 25. Of these, 9 took place before the March 21 meeting; the remaining 20 after it. (Announced United States Nuclear Tests, pages 25-27)