258. Editorial Note
When Prime Minister Macmillan learned about the upcoming meetings between Foster and Soviet envoys Tsarapkin and Fedorenko, he sent a message to President Kennedy on January 13, 1963, approving of these “private talks” and requesting British participation, “if that is [Page 633] agreeable.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Macmillan’s Correspondence with Kennedy, 1962-63, Vol. II) President Kennedy responded later the same day, “I entirely agree that we should stick together on the test ban and I am asking Rusk and Foster to concert most effective way of arranging this at first meeting tomorrow.” (Ibid., Kennedy’s Correspondence with Macmillan, 1962-63, Vol. II) Both letters are in the Supplement. From the outset of these U.S.-Soviet discussions on January 14, Foster sought the inclusion of British representatives, but the Soviet Union did not formally accept their participation until after the fourth meeting on January 18. Thereafter, British Ambassador Ormsby Gore or Peter Wilkinson, First Secretary of the British Embassy, took part in these talks.
The two sides held 10 meetings on January 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, and 31. The four meetings between January 22 and 25 were held in Washington; the others took place in New York.
During the meetings, the U.S., U.K., and Soviet representatives expounded on their positions on on-site inspection procedures, national seismic detention networks, and automatic seismic detection stations. Some specific information was exchanged. At the January 16 meeting, for instance, Fedorenko handed Foster a list of 73 permanent seismic stations in the Soviet Union, and Foster read a statement entitled “Suggestions for Automatic Recording Seismic Stations Within the USA.” A copy of the Soviet list and the U.S. statement, which Foster gave the Soviet side the next day, are attached to a memorandum of conversation of the January 16 meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/1-1663) On January 22, Foster also gave the Soviet representatives a list of proposed locations for automatic seismic stations in the Soviet Union and data on noise levels at sites for automatic seismic stations suggested by the United States. A copy of the list and the noise level data are attached to the memorandum of conversation of the January 22 meeting. (Ibid., 700.5611/1-2263) Moreover, at their meeting on January 31, Tsarapkin gave Foster and Ormsby Gore a paper specifying the noise levels at the three seismic stations proposed by the Soviet Union on Soviet territory. The Soviet paper is attached to the memorandum of conversation of the meeting. (Ibid., 700.5611/1-3163) These memoranda of conversation and attachments are in the Supplement.
Memoranda of conversation of all 10 meetings are in Department of State, Central File 700.5611, or ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Substantive differences remained between the two sides, however. On January 18 in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed his disappointment to Ambassador Kohler at the U.S. approach in the initial meetings. (Telegrams 1765 and 1766 from Moscow, January 18; ibid., Central Files, 397.5611-GE/1-1863) Finally, at the January 31 meeting, [Page 634] Fedorenko stated that the Soviet Government was terminating the talks and intended to continue the test ban negotiations at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, which was scheduled to resume in Geneva on February 12. Likewise, the U.K. and U.S. representatives complained during the talks about Soviet unwillingness to clarify views on a verification system and maintained that they had shown flexibility on the several dimensions of the subject. A briefing note, forwarded under cover of a February 1 memorandum from Clement Conger (ACDA/D) to David Howe Henry, II (EUR/SOV) “for possible inclusion in the Secretary’s briefing materials for his meeting today with the President,” briefly analyzed the Soviet position:
“Our preliminary assessment of Soviet motivations is that their latest move [of ending the private meetings] is a tactical one designed to bring pressure upon the U.S. by transferring the talks to a large forum in which the USSR hopes other members will exert pressure upon the U.S. to alter its present position on verification requirements. We do not consider it reflects a change in the basic desire of the USSR to reach a test ban agreement, but rather an effort to secure agreement on more favorable terms.” (Ibid., DEF 18-4)
Secretary Rusk, Kohler, Thompson, and Tyler met with the President at the White House from 12:25 to 12:50 p.m. on February 1 (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book), but no record of their conversation has been found.