Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

368. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-776-63

Washington, October 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Criteria for Militarily Acceptable Comprehensive Arms Control and Disarmament Proposals (U)

1. In April and May 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed provisions of the US “Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World,” the treaty outline which was tabled by the United States at Geneva on 18 April 1962.¹ In JCSM-389-62, dated 19 May 1962,² the Joint Chiefs of Staff delineated certain deficiencies in the treaty which made it contrary to US interests. In August 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsidered their previous positions and observed that, although subsequent studies might cause them to alter these views, the positions remained valid. Concurrently, they considered criteria for determining the military acceptability of any disarmament proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it is timely to correlate these actions and state their current views on the tabled draft treaty outline.

2. In addressing arms control and disarmament proposals in the past, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have found that certain carefully considered criteria have proved useful when applied to specific proposals. Such criteria which pertain to a comprehensive disarmament treaty are listed in the Appendix.³ (These criteria would not necessarily apply unmodified to a limited disarmament treaty.) When the principal provisions of the US treaty outline are evaluated against these criteria, they are found deficient in supporting the national interest in the following respects:

a. There is no specific provision for participation in Stage I by Communist China or all other militarily significant states.

b. There is no provision for an effective control organization to be operational prior to start of Stage I reductions or limitations.

c. The treaty outline describes a verification system (Zonal Inspection Concept) which has not been tested, evaluated, and proved reliable even on a limited test basis.

d. Armaments are listed by categories in a manner which could be disadvantageous to the United States; that is, the categories highlight strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (Cat. 1 and 2) and AICBMs (Cat. 5).

e. Stage I limitations on armaments production preclude modernization of authorized retained armaments and the testing of prototypes of new armaments.

f. The treaty outline does not contain a withdrawal clause which would permit US withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay.

3. It is noted that at the end of Stage III, the United States would be dependent upon the United Nations for defense against aggression. The extent of this treaty far exceeds any measures the United States has been willing to take in the past in its relations with other nations of the world. The negotiations conducted to date suggest that General and Complete Disarmament (GCD), with its very serious limitations on sovereignty, is not attainable within the foreseeable future and should not be the objective of a proposed treaty text at the present time. It appears rather that GCD should stand as an ultimate goal and that we should turn our attention toward the achievement of more feasible agreements. In the present state of the world, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to entrusting the defense of the United States to the United Nations or any outside agency.

4. As interest in GCD has waned, the interest in negotiating separate measures has grown. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have long advocated that disarmament should progress by phased and safeguarded measures designed to approach disarmament gradually, and to provide the USSR an opportunity to display its sincerity. Such partial steps would be conducive to the decline which must precede substantial disarmament. Any effective arms control measure must have a verification system capable of insuring compliance with the provisions of the agreement, and this system must be in operation at the time the agreement becomes effective. Risk of war (ROW) measures which might be acceptable to both sides could constitute the beginning of an inspection system, one which could later be extended to the verification of disarmament meas-ures.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that arms control proposals could be planned which would meet their criteria, be acceptable to our Allies, provide a basis for subsequent agreement on an arms control program, and be more negotiable than the treaties now dormant in Geneva. Such proposals could commence with an agreement on an observation post plan. If this plan could not be negotiated in its entirety, other ROW measures could also be considered. The following list might be suitable subjects for negotiation with the Soviets:

a. Observation posts with limited mobility.

b. Partial aerial surveillance.

c. Mobile observation teams.

d. Full aerial surveillance.

After these measures had been in effect and tested for a sufficient period, both sides would have the nucleus of an inspection system for arms control agreements. If verification is accomplished in small steps through the successful implementation of the ROW measures then other arms control measures could be considered.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in its totality, the US treaty outline presents unwarranted risk to the security of the United States because of the vague, incomplete, and untested safeguards described therein, and consider that entering into such a treaty would be detrimental to US interests. They suggest that some limited disarmament measures could be undertaken after a framework for verification has been established and preferably after ROW agreements have proved effective.⁴

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Maxwell D. Taylor⁵
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament. Secret.
1. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 351-382.
2. Document 185.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. In a November 7 letter to Foster, McNamara agreed that general and complete disarmament was not attainable within the foreseeable future and that the United States should turn its attention toward the achievement of more feasible arrangements. He also supported the JCS arguments that controls needed additional study, that the proposed zonal inspection system was inadequate, and that the treaty outline should contain a withdrawal clause that would permit U.S. withdrawal for reasonable cause and without undue delay. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Brubeck Series, Disarmament)
5. Printed from a copy that indicates General Taylor signed the original.