Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

185. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-389-62

Washington, May 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Request for Comments on Aspects of the US Draft Disarmament Treaty Outline Tabled at Geneva on 18 April 1962 (U)

1. This memorandum is in response to memorandum I-4487/62, dated 17 April 1962, and I-5522/62, dated 8 May 1962, from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA),¹ which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on seven issues relating to the draft treaty outline on disarmament. These views, along with comments on other related aspects, have now been formulated with one broad criterion in mind: What effect the measure, if implemented, would have on US National Security.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that disarmament without full verification of retained armament would jeopardize our national security. They believe that verification can only be achieved by unhampered inspection. The fact that such inspection is anathema to the Soviets and will render negotiations more difficult does not warrant concession to a point that places the safety of the United States and of the West in question. There is no evidence that the zonal inspection system as presently conceived will fulfill security requirements. However, if this zonal system is so designed as to permit rapid and unimpeded inspection of any zone by a well trained inspection team which is fully loyal to the side desiring this inspection, the zonal system might be capable of insuring positive verification.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that since late 1961 there has been continuing pressure to negotiate the reduction of the US nuclear capability in isolation of other proposed disarmament measures. Success in this effort would seriously reduce the major military advantage we now enjoy and drastically alter our military posture. Further there is danger of US positions being weakened by proposals which have been submitted in attempts to make them more “negotiable” by approaching the Soviet positions (see Appendices D through I).² Despite Presidential approval that reductions would be made on an across-the-board basis, there still appears to exist a continuing effort to single out the US nuclear capability for reduction in isolation. Dispatches from Geneva reveal that discussions now are centering on reduction of the nuclear “threat”. Rather, the initial phase of a disarmament agreement should be regarded as an evaluation period in which the Soviets must conclusively demonstrate good faith prior to continuance by the United States. The degree of good faith demonstrated will determine the rapidity with which continued disarmament steps can be safely taken. Measures included in the latter part of Stage I or beyond should be contingent on this demonstration of good faith and a concomitant reduction of international tensions.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have grave misgivings as to the proposal that verification in reduction in armaments would be accomplished by the International Disarmament Organization. Our experience with the complete inability of international control organizations to function in Korea, Vietnam and in Laos raises questions regarding the effectiveness of such an organization.

5. It is recommended that the appended views on the seven issues contained in the memoranda from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) and two additional issues be used as bases for DOD positions relating to the draft treaty outline.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer³
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Gen. 388.3, Jan-July 62. Top Secret.
1. Neither found.
2. None of the attached appendices, A-I, totaling 28 pages, is printed.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.