Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

367. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to the White House⁰

Washington, October 4, 1963.

Following is a summary of the meeting yesterday evening, 6-8 p.m., between the Secretary of State, Gromyko, and Lord Home.¹

They first discussed the banning of nuclear weapons in outer space and rapidly agreed to tell the press that agreement on this had been reached in principle and that the appropriate form of the agreement² would be worked out later. Gromyko then asked that an agreement on a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw powers be concluded “in the spirit of the Moscow treaty.” Home pressed Gromyko on the possibility of the Soviet Government making a parallel declaration guaranteeing the security of West Berlin but Gromyko reacted strongly against this. He said Berlin was part of a bigger problem and that it was totally unacceptable to the Soviet Government to specify West Berlin, or any other individual problem. Gromyko then said “under any circumstances, whether an NAP is concluded or not, we insist that we must move forward with the task of signing a peace treaty for Germany.” He repeated that signing a nonaggression pact would create a more favorable atmosphere for the solution of other problems which had not yet been solved, and he mentioned specifically Laos. The Secretary and Lord Home continued to press Gromyko on connecting Berlin with an NAP, without success. It was then agreed to leave the matter for the time being.

Gromyko then raised his proposal for the reduction of military budgets. The Secretary of State and Lord Home pointed out the major difficulty of establishing a basis for a realistic comparison of items listed in different budgets. This would need an elaborate system of checks and inspection. Gromyko continued to insist that there should be proportionate reduction. Home suggested to Gromyko that further studies might be made to see if it were possible to find a basis for comparison of budgets. Gromyko said that if the questions of verification and control were introduced this would complicate matters hopelessly. The Secretary suggested that the best way of bringing about the reduction of military budgets was to make a real progress in disarmament and hoped that Gromyko would give some thought to the US proposal for the mutual destruction of certain weapons, e.g.: bombers. Gromyko objected that this was a different subject and came under the heading of “reduction of armaments.” The Secretary said that he was prepared to ask Mr. Foster to come to New York to have confidential talks with Soviet officials to see whether progress might be made on finding a basis for comparison of budgets. He said the US could not just agree to a percentage reduction, such as Gromyko had suggested.

The Secretary then referred to observation posts and said these were being considered carefully in NATO. He asked Gromyko what he had meant by saying that these should be “coordinated with other measures.” Gromyko said flatly that observation posts would only be useful if accompanied by certain practical measures: (1) reduction of forces, and (2) denuclearized zones. Altogether, he said, these measures would be effective in promoting confidence. Otherwise it would not be useful to have observation posts. To have observation posts separately would just create suspicion, and “this would be one-sided and not objective.” Lord Home maintained that observation posts would have value by themselves but Gromyko said that to maintain great concentrations of troops at the same time would not be statesmanlike. The Secretary spoke on nuclear-free zones and said that there were two areas, Latin America and Africa, which could be considered to meet the criteria for genuinely free zones: (1) no launching sites for nuclear weapons, and (2) the zone would not be a likely target for nuclear weapons. He said that for Germany to be really nuclear-free we must first solve those very problems which make Germany a likely target area.

Nondissemination was briefly discussed. Gromyko said it was a serious problem and that the MLF was a serious obstacle, so it was not possible to say anything publicly which would make it seem as though agreement had been reached on nondissemination, whereas in reality there was disagreement.

Gromyko said he regretted that the United States and the UK had not advanced any new proposals on Germany which would facilitate their task. As for disarmament, “the general state of this problem could not be worse.” He said that sometimes the Soviet Government wondered whether it was worthwhile continuing discussions in Geneva. He said there were nothing but speeches there and that everybody went round in a circle. He asked that his remarks not be interpreted as meaning that the Soviet Union intended to withdraw from the Geneva talks. He said Western powers were not approaching the problem of disarmament seriously. Even when the Soviet Union raised the possibility of a reduction of military budgets, Western powers immediately raised objections.

The discussion concluded with arrangements as to what the press should be told.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-9. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates Ball saw this memorandum.
1. A 15-page memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Akalovsky, is ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
2. According to Akalovsky’s memorandum, Rusk told Gromyko that while there was agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union not to put “weapons of mass destruction” on the moon or in outer space, the United States had “the problem of form” because it had “just gone through the test ban debate in Congress.”