291. Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)0
Atmospheric Testing Moratorium
Mr. Carl Kaysen of the White House Staff called me on June 8th to inform me that the President was planning to announce on June 10th in his speech at the American University that the United States does not intend to be the first to resume atmospheric testing. Mr. Kaysen indicated that if I had any strong feelings against this action I should communicate them to the President, either directly or through Mr. Kaysen.
I replied that I felt sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be opposed to any unilateral abstention from testing since they were on record as to the requirement to test—preferably in 1963. My principal personal concern would be that the proposed atmospheric moratorium might act as a psychological deterrent to underground testing. I indicated that I would not attempt to contact the President, but would like his intention [attention] invited to the possible effect on underground testing.
I did not feel inclined to make a special appeal to the President because the Chiefs’ views on the requirement for testing were well known and presumably had been taken into account. Since the United States did not intend to be prepared for atmospheric testing until spring 1964, and since there was considerable evidence that the Soviets were about to resume testing, we stood to lose nothing by the declaration, and indeed might gain some advantage by an announcement which might have the effect of holding back the Soviets.
- Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memoranda. Secret.↩