Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

290. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, June 8, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Telephone Conversation with Mr. Kaysen on 8 June

1. Mr. Kaysen, working at Mr. McGeorge Bundy’s desk in the White House, called General Taylor on 8 June. He wanted to give General Taylor a piece of information, which was that the President was, at the moment (i.e., 8 June), planning on Monday (10 June) in his commencement speech at the American University to announce that he does not intend to be the first to resume atmospheric testing.¹ Mr. Kaysen said that the President may think about this again—that it was very much a personal view of his (the President’s)—that the President had discussed it with almost no one, only discussion was in writing the speech.² Mr. Kaysen said that the people who knew about this were the Secretary and Under Secretary of State, Bill Foster, and McNamara (Kaysen, at this time, had placed a call to “Bob” but had not yet talked to him).³ Mr. Kaysen said that if General Taylor had a reaction to transmit to the President that he would be glad to transmit it.⁴

2. General Taylor asked if this was atmospheric testing—no implication of a ban on underground testing.

3. Mr. Kaysen said they were; the United States does not now propose to conduct testing in the atmosphere as long as someone else does not do so, the United States will not be the first.

4. General Taylor said that he would suspect that “his corporation”⁵ would feel that any unilateral abstination [abstention] is bad; that his personal reaction is not particularly that way unless it should indeed be a deterrent to underground testing.

5. Mr. Kaysen said the President’s speech went on to say what efforts we are making to conclude a treaty. He (the President) just feels very strongly on it, and that the President had decided that this is a good time to do this. Mr. Kaysen had learned this for the first time yesterday (7 June).

6. General Taylor said that he did not think he should rush in and advise the President on this, but he would like to plant the thought that this is likely to be a psychological deterrent to underground testing. General Taylor asked if he could mention this to Gilpatric.

7. Mr. Kaysen said he would rather call Gilpatric—although there was no problem in talking to him if General Taylor wanted to—but he wanted to call him.⁶ Mr. Kaysen mentioned that this was “secret” until the President made his speech.⁷

CWO Proctor⁸

0. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memoranda. Confidential. Drafted on June 27 by Chief Warrant Officer Proctor of Taylor’s personal staff.
1. For text of the speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 459-464.
2. In his memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting held the morning of June 10, Legere stated that it was not clear whether Kaysen had written the original draft of the speech, but that it was “clear that he worked and reworked it over the weekend. Bundy noted that this projected speech is unusual in that there has been absolutely no leak of its content to the press.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, June 1963, T-223-69)
3. No record of this telephone call has been found.
4. The President left Washington the morning of June 5 for a trip to the Southwest, California, and Hawaii. He arrived back in Washington around 9 a.m. on June 10.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.
6. No record of either telephone call has been found.
7. In a conversation held on June 11, French Ambassador Herve Alphand asked Rusk if the timing of the speech was “tactical or fundamental.” Rusk replied that there was no information from the Soviets pointing toward a detente or a change in their position on nuclear testing, but that “the timing was somewhat influenced by the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese meetings.” If Khrushchev attempted to “close the gap” with the Chinese by adopting unreasonable positions on East-West issues such as Laos, the record would show that the West had been reasonable. (Memorandum by Johannes V. Imhof; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.