262. Editorial Note
On February 8, 1963, from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m., President Kennedy presided over a meeting on U.S. test ban policy in the Cabinet Room of the White House, attended by Vice President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, McNamara, Seaborg, Gilpatric, Nitze, Foster, Fisher, McCone, Wiesner, and McGeorge Bundy. Seaborg recorded the following account of the discussion: “At the beginning of the meeting I informed the President that the four underground tests today, that is, the two pairs of tests, took place without apparent incident. In response to questions by the President, I explained the timing of the tests and the purpose of such timing, including the study of the capability for detection of simultaneous tests.
“Foster then began to discuss the U.S. position in the test ban negotiations, for which he is going to Geneva tomorrow. He said that the U.S.-USSR test series had not upset the balance, and that the key to any test ban is underground tests because the detection of the other types is easy and not at issue. The only way in which some imbalance might be introduced through testing is in the yield-to-weight ratio and in the development of pure fusion weapons.”
Dean then described his talks with Kuznetsov on on-site inspections; see Document 251. The meeting continued:
“Foster said that the number of automatic seismic recording stations is another issue. He said he would like to have authority to go eventually to six on-site inspections as a fall-back position. He traced the reasoning [Page 645] by which 450 seismic events in the USSR can be reduced to 45 or 50 suspicious events, and thus we would be inspecting one out of six or seven. He thinks that this number can be further reduced to 25 or 30 by unilateral intelligence.
“Nitze said that the people in DOD regard the number of suspicious events as being larger than that stated by Foster. McNamara felt that this matter ought to be studied by a group to examine the range of numbers, and that he would like to be a member of that group.
“I pointed out that the conditions for the on-site inspections are important. I said that the people in AEC feel that 500 to 700 square kilometers of area should be subject to inspection, rather than 300-500. I also mentioned the concept of an elliptical area for inspection, which could allow a smaller area to be adequate than is the case for a circular area.
“Foster said he feels that five to ten automatic recording stations at the right locations might be adequate. He pointed out that the USSR is offering to furnish data from their 73 seismic stations daily, and that we would offer daily data from our 76 seismic stations. These do not include, in either case, the classified seismic stations.
“The President asked whether McNamara would agree to six on-site inspections, with about a 500 square kilometer area of the shape that I suggested. McNamara said that he would support the six, but he needs to go into the matter in more details.
“Rusk said that we should get other matters, such as the shapes of the areas, etc., nailed down before we go into the numbers. The President said he thinks six should be the rock-bottom position and that it should be left to Foster how to present it, and as to when to bring out the number six. He asked whether this could all be worked out in the next few days. McNamara thought it could, with representatives of DOD, plus Wiesner’s, McCone’s, Foster’s and my people working on it.
“The President said we should proceed on the assumption that the USSR will cheat, and then work out the advantages, that is, compare what they might gain by cheating with the advantages that banning tests would have with respect to the Chinese situation. He thought that a government briefing book should be prepared, which we could all stand on. Wiesner raised the question whether the automatic stations in the USSR would be good or bad. He said he understands that Nitze thinks they would be bad from our point of view.
“Foster indicated that he thinks we should declassify the AFTAC work because the American people don’t know how good this is. It would then be possible to refute Hosmer’s arguments. He also said that he, personally, thinks we need stations in the USSR.
[Page 646]“Rusk said he thinks they are a technical necessity and he is surprised that some think they are not. He has been basing his public statements on his understanding that they are a technical necessity.
“Nitze indicated it would be much better to have some U.S. personnel in the Soviet stations. McCone said that the USSR at one time had agreed to such stations which would include U.S. personnel. The question was merely whether the number should be 17 or 21. He pointed out that the people on the Hill are concerned about the continual lowering of our numbers. He recalled that at one time Killian argued that 100 on-site inspections per year was the absolute minimum.
“The President said that, in his opinion, the whole reason for having a test ban is related to the Chinese situation. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be worth the disruption and fighting with Congress, etc.
“Nitze said that, if the French kept testing during a period of a test ban treaty, the Russians would abrogate anyway. The President raised the question whether we could give information on weapons to the French and hence encourage them to stop testing. Nitze said he feels the Russians would then worry about Germany’s getting the information, and this would lead to a bad situation. Perhaps it would be better to get the Russians to agree ahead of time to accept the French testing situation.
“The President then asked about the procedure for getting material ready in the next few days. Bundy said there are materials on hand which he thinks could be circulated tomorrow. Then we should sit down with a minimum number of people and this could be worked out after the President leaves the meeting.
“The President felt that we shouldn’t discuss the number six on-site inspections with the JCAE at this time. The President asked what the neutral nations prefer in this regard, and Foster said that they are pushing for three to eight on-site inspections.
“Rusk again said that we should work on all aspects of the treaty, except the numbers, at the start.
“After the President and Vice President left, the group met further. It was decided to work up in the next few days a briefing book, along the lines discussed at the meeting. This book, for example, would trace in detail how the 450 seismic events per year are reduced to some 45 or 50 suspicious events.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 5, pages 140-142)
Neither the briefing book mentioned in Seaborg’s account nor later references to it have been found.
Seaborg, Fisher, Long, Scoville, Nitze, Keeny, Wiesner, and others attended follow-on meetings on February 9 and 15 to define the U.S. positions at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, including the number of unidentified seismic events in the Soviet Union each year, the number of on-site inspections, and the kind of inspections required. (ibid., pages 142 and 156) These meetings were preparatory for a meeting [Page 647] of the Committee of Principals with the President on February 18; see Document 264.