Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

261. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 7, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Dobrynin (USSR)
• John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had been instructed by his government to raise two questions with the Secretary, the first dealing with the Franco-German Treaty (see separate memcon)¹ and the second with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Ambassador then proceeded to deliver an oral démarche on the latter subject, the text of which is attached.

In commenting on the Ambassador’s statement, the Secretary said that he wished to underline again the difference between proliferation of national nuclear capabilities and multilateral arrangements which did not increase national capabilities either to produce or to control nuclear weapons. In his press conference today, the President has said that we intend to find a way by which Europe will take more interest in the political direction of NATO without increasing national nuclear capabilities.² It is not possible now, the Secretary continued, to be exactly precise regarding the arrangements we have in mind for a multilateral force since this arrangement will depend to some extent on discussions within NATO. However, he could say that it was a basic interest of the United States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As for Canadian forces and discussions with Canada to which the Ambassador alluded, the Secretary pointed out that Canada is part of NATO and of North America. The Soviets have weapons capable of striking North America and our arrangements for the defense of this area are no different from arrangements which we have with many other countries. These arrangements are, furthermore, long-standing and well-known. As for the concern expressed by the Soviet Government over the Franco-German Treaty, the Secretary noted that the French Government has already called public attention to the agreement of 1954 wherein the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to renounce the right to manufacture nuclear weapons.³ Such reference was made by the French Foreign Minister speaking before the National Assembly on January 24 of this year. The President also referred to this question today.⁴

As for the Soviet contention that the multilateral arrangements in NATO will provide the Federal Republic of Germany with access to nuclear weapons, the Secretary said this is not what we are talking about. He told the Ambassador he completely rejected the notion that the United States on the one hand professes interest in non-proliferation to the Soviets while on the other hand it is taking steps which actually lead to proliferation. He assured the Ambassador that there was no deception on our part and again noted the fundamental difference between national nuclear forces and multilateral arrangements. As he had already told the Soviet Foreign Minister, if the Soviets wished to make arrangements with their allies similar to those which we hope to make with ours, the United States will not object. After protestations from Dobrynin that the Soviet Government did not like any such arrangements, the Secretary pointed out that since Western arrangements have yet to be made, the Soviet Government does not really know what it is protesting about and at the moment is “boxing shadows”. The Secretary also pointed out that the United States is not the only Western nation possessing nuclear weapons and that the United States could not guarantee control over weapons possessed by the United Kingdom and France. He assured the Ambassador that the statement of the Soviet Government which had just been made to him would be studied and that he hoped to talk further with the Ambassador on the subject of non-proliferation. He reiterated that what we were seeking in our multilateral arrangements was not just a legal formula but an arrangement which would exclude the possibility of those not now possessing nuclear weapons from firing such weapons. Finally, the Secretary said that it would be better not to tell the press that he and the Ambassador had discussed this subject since in the Secretary’s view the differences between the two governments were not so great as the Ambassador professed and we should not complicate the problem by bringing it to public attention.

Attachment⁵

ORAL STATEMENT MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO SECRETARY RUSK

February 7, 1963

In the course of exchange of opinion between the USSR and the U.S. on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons both sides stated that they are interested in reaching an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. As a result of the negotiations the positions of the USSR and the U.S. have come somewhat closer although there still remains differences in approach to the question of not allowing transfer of nuclear weapons to the countries not possessing such weapons by indirect means—through military alliances. The considerations of the Soviet Government on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons were most recently set forth in detail to Secretary Rusk on January 10 this year.⁶ Up till now we have not received a reply from the U.S. Government.

Meanwhile, events have occurred recently which are directly related to the subject of the exchange of opinion between the U.S. and the USSR. The Government of the United States is speeding up the implementation of its plan of creating multilateral nuclear forces of NATO which in fact provides for access to nuclear weapons of armed forces of all countries—members of NATO including also the FRG. American representatives are conducting talks with representatives of those countries concerning the place and role of each of them in the question of managing rocket-nuclear weapons. Judging by reports a considerable role in this matter is being assigned to military units of West Germany.

We are told that West Germany although it will be a participant of the multilateral nuclear forces of NATO which are being planned will not become a full and equal master of rocket-nuclear weapons and that the U.S. will ultimately retain in its hands control over the use of these weapons.

The Soviet Government cannot agree by any means that such kind of “limitations” with regard to access of the FRG to rocket-nuclear weapons allegedly exclude the possibility of use of nuclear weapons by the West German revenge-seekers for their own purposes with all the dangerous consequences which ensue from this.

In obvious contradiction with the task of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the treaty concluded recently between France and the F RG which provides in particular for a comprehensive military cooperation between these two countries and does not exclude the possibility of direct transfer of nuclear weapons to the FRG. Appraisal of the consequences of this treaty dangerous for the cause of peace was given in the notes of the Soviet Government to the Governments of France and the FRG the contents of which were brought to the attention of the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare again that transfer of nuclear weapons to the West German armed forces irrespective of the manner in which this is carried out would greatly complicate and aggravate the situation in Europe. The world would be confronted with a new danger and the Soviet Union naturally would be compelled to take all the ensuing measures.

I have been instructed to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that the situation which has now developed cannot be regarded as normal. It turns out that, on the one hand, the U.S. tells us that it is interested in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and is having talks with us concerning an agreement on this question while, on the other hand, it takes practical steps directed one way or another to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, it is also necessary to mention a recent statement by the Canadian Minister of Defense to the effect that negotiations have been going on for the last two or three months between the U.S. and Canada with regard to supplying American nuclear warheads to Canadian Air Force units placed at the disposal of the joint Canadian-American command—North American Air Defense (NORAD).

It is quite obvious that all these plans and actions of the U.S. and other nuclear powers—whether it is creation of multilateral nuclear forces of NATO or bilateral agreements on nuclear armaments—lead in the long run to one end—to proliferation of nuclear weapons which not only does not facilitate but, on the contrary, hampers, if not makes altogether impossible, reaching an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government would not like to face the situation when the U.S. Government would have confronted us with the fact of a deal within NATO saying: here is our position agreed upon with our NATO allies, let us discuss an agreement on this basis.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state that if the U.S. Government actually proceeds with proliferating nuclear weapons to other states participating in NATO and the number of states possessing nuclear weapons is increased the Government of the Soviet Union will be compelled to draw from this necessary conclusions and will respond in kind, that is, will see to it that appropriate countries friendly towards the USSR will receive nuclear weapons.

The position of the Soviet Union is clear: we conduct negotiations guided by the desire to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and we will not agree with any proposals which do not ensure actual solution of this task.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on February 10.
1. The Franco-German treaty was signed on January 22. The memorandum of conversation is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I.
2. For text of the President’s remarks at his press conference on February 7, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 152-154.
3. Under Protocol No. III (and annexes), October 23, 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany agreed not to manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons in its territory. For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 979-984.
4. In his press conference.
5. Secret. The source text is a condensed version of Dobrynin’s statement. In a February 8 memorandum to the Secretary, William R. Tyler noted that his staff had prepared “a slightly condensed version” of Dobrynin’s oral démarche at the Secretary’s request. “The condensation,” he noted, “consists primarily of elimination of reference to a Soviet statement of January 10 this year and to ‘negotiations’,” presumably to head off possible criticism in case the Secretary decided to give the French Ambassador and the British Chargé copies. On February 9, the Secretary gave copies of the condensed text to French Ambassador Alphand and British Chargé Greenhill and asked for their governments’ comments. (Memorandum of conversation, February 9; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) See the Supplement. Copies of the marked-up longer version as well as Tyler’s memorandum are attached to this memorandum of conversation. Also attached is a February 11 note from Swank to Tyler, stating that Secretary Rusk commented that both the oral statement and the revision thereof should be classified “confidential.”
6. See Document 257.