Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

245. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 10, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Committee of Principals, November 10, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list¹

The Secretary asked if there were any recent developments regarding the Soviet ships en route from Cuba. Mr. McNamara said that 42 missiles had been counted out. It had been thought the total was 43 on the basis of initial Soviet reports that 6 were aboard one of the ships which subsequently proved to be carrying only 5. The Secretary asked if the photos were convincing. Mr. McNamara said he thought so; they just showed long cylindrical tubes but he was personally convinced they were missiles.

The Secretary said that on the matter of resuming the disarmament discussions, any arrangements were contingent on developments in Cuba. If the IL 28’s and inspection should become major issues and the situation heated up again, he would agree that we should not talk about disarmament while the temperature was so high. On the other hand, if there were progress on the Cuban situation, the President in his public statements has committed the United States to explore possibilities in disarmament. He personally saw no change in the Soviet attitude on inspection and in this sense the outlook for fruitful disarmament discussions was somewhat gloomy. But if progress can be made on Cuba there are two major issues to be explored. First, the President is determined to see if there is any way to move ahead on the test ban and second, the question of non-dissemination might be worth going into to the point of eliciting a Chinese rejection. The question of whether to attempt this depends primarily on the Germans and whether they would accept the simplified formula we have been discussing with Gromyko. The British and the French are prepared to go ahead if the Germans are agreeable. From our standpoint there would be some advantage either in getting the Chinese Communists into a non-dissemination agreement or in eliciting a rejection from them. As to the relationship of disarmament matters to Cuba, the Secretary said he was not sure whether or not Mr. McNamara had seen the communication in which the President had instructed USUN firmly not to get into other matters until the Cuban matter was under control.²

Mr. McNamara said that two issues relating to Cuba remained open, first, that of the IL 28’s and second, safeguarding against the presence of offensive weapons. He saw no prospect of progress on verification and safeguard procedures. The Soviets say nothing of a check on nuclear warheads, nor of assurances as to whether they have been there or have been removed. There is no evidence of Soviet acceptance of safeguards on these matters and this indicates there is little basis for disarmament discussion.

The Secretary inquired as to the date on which negotiations would be resumed at Geneva. Mr. Foster related Ambassador Dean’s discussion with Mr. Zorin in which Zorin had suggested November 26 as the reconvening date.³ Mr. Foster said that we recognized that whether or not we can go forward now with the actual presentation of proposals, there is a need to arrive at decisions regarding possibilities to be used at an appropriate time. Mr. Foster said that Gromyko had expressed a significant change in the Soviet position at the General Assembly in his proposal to retain certain nuclear delivery vehicles to the end of Stage II.⁴ We did not know what it means; we need to search this meaning out. At least an intellectual case can be made for disproportionate reductions, at least as a possibility to be suggested in ascertaining the Soviet attitude. The meeting has before it this and other proposals which ACDA considers to be in the national interest.⁵

The Secretary inquired whether we assumed the Russians were aware of the figures on strategic delivery vehicles published in the newspapers a few days ago by the Institute of Strategic Studies.⁶

The consensus was that the Soviets had been aware of this information and that the figures themselves were highly questionable in certain respects.

General Taylor said that as a newcomer to this table, he would like to inquire if we had decided how to verify the initial inventory of arms against which a 30% reduction would be calculated. The Secretary commented that underlying any of our disarmament proposals there was a need for their verification. Dr. Wiesner said that initial declarations would be required but that our unilateral intelligence was sufficient for seeing whether or not these declarations were in the ball park. Mr. Foster said that the United States is believed to have, through unilateral intelligence, a good approximation of inventories on major items such as bombers, launchers, ICBM’s and IRBM’s which are the subject of the proposal before us. Dr. Wiesner said that inspection increases as the amount of disarmament progresses, and that many of us still think the United States is asking too much verification in the first stage. Mr. Foster said that increasing verification proportionate to risk is the basic philosophy of the U.S. approach. The Soviets do not accept this approach and do not want any inspection until after everything is destroyed. This, of course, is completely unacceptable.

The Secretary said that he assumed that ACDA’s first proposal is to find out what the Soviets mean by their proposal. He asked Mr. Foster whether he envisaged large or small variations from the 30% norm. Mr. Foster said we had prepared an earlier paper which included percentages⁷ but they had been subject to strong objection, and accordingly, had been deleted from the present proposal. On the basis of our internal studies, however, it seems logical to think of disparities as great as 50% to 10% in some categories. Mr. Fisher said our effort, as pointed out on page 7 of the paper before the meeting, is basically to ask the Soviets for their ideas on this subject. Our recommendation asks for no percentage. Mr. Nitze had disagreed with specific proposals and we had revised the paper accordingly. We must, however, recognize that merely asking the question as to the acceptability of asymmetrical reductions carries the implication that we are ourselves prepared to consider acceptance of reductions on that basis. Mr. Nitze asked why we should make a distinction between ICBM’s and MRBM’s. He could not see the logic in our reducing more ICBM’s in relation to Soviet reduction of more MRBM’s. It was the reverse of what ought to be done. The ICBM’s are the thing we want to protect. The Secretary said that the present proposal is for reductions of 30% in each category. He did not think the Soviets would be interested but he considered that a variation to a 40% reduction for us as compared to a 30% reduction for them would not change the present balance to an unfavorable one for us. Mr. McNamara said that he agreed, but asymmetries in the range of 50% to 10% were a different matter.

Mr. Foster said that projections show we are likely to move toward a smaller margin of superiority in the larger categories of nuclear delivery vehicles if no agreement is reached. Mr. Kaysen said this is a reasonable interpretation of the information available, but not the only possible one. Dr. Wiesner said the Soviets may be laying their production plans on a different basis from those reflected in the figures upon which we are building our projections.

Mr. Foster said that it is our belief that the Soviets are not satisfied with their present forces, and will build up in the places where they are weakest. The Secretary said a 30% reduction already means that we would destroy a larger number of ICBM’s and that the Soviets would reduce a larger number of MRBM’s. Thus there is a certain amount of asymmetry even in the single ratio. The question is whether we can accept some modification of that ratio. He could not see how we could accept equivalence or parity until we see a different basic pattern of Soviet behavior from that displayed over the past 15 years.

Mr. McNamara reiterated that we might accept variations of the order of 40 to 30, but not of 50 to 10, and certainly not to parity. Mr. Foster said looking at the projections for 1967 one might conclude that disproportionate cuts could be in the United States interest. Dr. Wiesner said if you take the present proposal for reduction percentage wise, the Russians and some others think the side that is weakest is placed at a disadvantage. Our thesis is that proportionate reductions will have a stabilizing effect in maintaining the balance. The Soviets argue that the smaller force suffers more. The Secretary said he thought the smaller force might in fact suffer more. Dr. Wiesner said if we want an agreement we cannot offer one that increases our advantage to their disadvantage. Mr. Foster said the fundamental thing is whether it is in the United States interest for both sides to continue to build up nuclear delivery vehicles. If it is not, we need to look at ways of securing an agreement to reduce them.

Mr. McNamara said he fully agreed that it is not in the interest of the United States to build up nuclear vehicles all over the world, but it is also not in our interest to weaken ourselves vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Secretary said perhaps we can agree that we need not adhere invariably to the 30% formula, but that we can’t go very far toward asymmetry. We can, however, indicate enough flexibility to see what the Soviets have in mind.

Mr. McNamara asked whether we can ask these questions without committing ourselves to move from our present position. Mr. Kaysen said we should include an ad referendum element in the instructions as regards any change in position or discussion of any specific ratios. Mr. Foster said that is always understood.

The question arose as to what Gromyko is in effect offering in his new proposal. Dr. Wiesner said that Gromyko appears to be suggesting an approach to parity in nuclear delivery vehicles at a low level. One might say he seems to be offering the Foster Plan at a lower level. Mr. Nitze said Gromyko may be leaning not toward differential reductions so much as to a definition of the end product of disarmament, namely the balance of deterrence which would remain. Mr. Foster said he thought we could ask questions without compromising our position and at the same time indicate some willingness to discuss differentials. Dr. Wiesner said that asking what they mean to aim for and how they expect to get there are two separate questions. Mr. Foster said that what we are asking is to be able to indicate some change in Stage I that shows we have taken into account looking down the gun barrel in the Cuban situation and want to explore means of moving toward a more stable world. The Secretary said we have to distinguish between good countries and bad countries in the light of the past 15 years of history. We cannot consider parity with the USSR.

General Taylor asked if we could trade off future weapons instead of present ones. Both the US and USSR are about to enter into extensive and costly anti-missile programs. Maintaining the present balance would serve the interest of stability. Mr. Foster said preventive disarmament of this kind is the thing we are trying to do already in outer space. Mr. McNamara said we have already agreed in the total treaty to do just what General Taylor had proposed and recalled that the decision to do so had not been viewed favorably by the Joint Chiefs. Dr. Wiesner said it is also conceivable that we can increase our own reductions above 30% instead of just limiting the reductions of the Soviet Union to lesser amounts. The Secretary said we have to take Red China into account in making any increase in United States reductions.

Dr. Wiesner said there are other dimensions we can explore, for example, whether we can shorten the three-year period of Stage I. The Secretary said he was afraid it would take three years to get the treaty through the Senate.

The Secretary said in conclusion that we can contemplate a modest shift in percentages in certain broad categories in the direction of greater proportional cuts in categories where the U.S. is strong. We can do enough to find out what the Soviets have in mind, but the negotiators should realize that Washington would be extremely nervous if the disproportions should exceed a 30 to 40 ratio.

Turning to the next proposal for reduction in nuclear weapons, the Secretary commented that the world thinks we have a larger amount of fissionable material, while the Soviets will not admit they have a smaller amount. Again, as in the case with nuclear delivery vehicles, maybe we should see whether the Soviets are opposed categorically to the idea of limited reductions or whether it is the ratio of reductions that is bothering them. Mr. Foster said this is the purpose of our proposal. The two-for-one proposal does not call for an admission of weakness on their part, since we are no longer asking them to suggest a ratio. Mr. McNamara asked if this is associated with the cut-off of production of fissionable materials. Mr. Foster said this proposal would be added to the cut-off and inspection proposals already contained in Stage I. We were not proposing it now as a separable measure. Similar proposals had, however, been separable in the past and might be again. The proposal takes into account our best estimates of Soviet stockpiles and the margins of error associated with those estimates. If this were advanced as a separable measure at some later date, it would nevertheless be associated with the cut-off and with the verification requirements for the cut-off.

The Secretary said that page 8 of the paper before the meeting seems to make this clear. He asked, however, whether from a negotiating standpoint it would be desirable to begin with a two to one offer. If we start that way the Soviets would insist on four to one, whereas if we start with a 60-40 ratio, they might come back with a proposal of two to one. Mr. Foster stated that we should consider this possibility as a matter of negotiating tactics. He also stated that the Joint Chiefs had opposed the suggestion of a 60 to 40 ratio at an earlier date. Mr. McNamara said the proposal looks like a gimmick. The Department of Defense could, however, support this amount and this ratio for reductions if it was deemed useful in negotiations. General Taylor said it seemed to him we might be giving away important resources. Mr. Foster said part of it could be given to IAEA and could be useful in various development programs. The Secretary said he thought it was worthwhile to try to find out whether the Soviets were interested in this subject.

Mr. Barber asked whether there would be a public or a private discussion of ratios. Mr. Foster said he envisaged a private discussion. The Secretary said he would be reluctant to put forward this proposal publicly because it might cause domestic repercussions with no offsetting gain if the Soviets were not really interested. Dr. Wiesner asked why the Soviets should be interested in a proposal which we are told privately is unbalanced. Mr. Foster said they might be interested because the alternative for them is greater imbalance. The Secretary said even the smallest beginning is worthwhile in avoiding a 100 billion dollar defense budget. Mr. McNamara said he was willing to go even to 100,000 vs. 50,000 kilograms if we can get a stop on production. He was one hundred percent in favor of the proposal but the important part of it is the cut-off. The Soviets will otherwise expand production enormously while ours remain frozen at present levels.

Turning to the question of bases, the Secretary said the important consideration is one of geography. He asked whether this contemplates cuts in bases within the USSR. Mr. Foster said the base structure is an integrated structure, and cuts in armaments would result in base reductions. We cannot, however, accept the validity of a distinction requiring reduction of foreign bases while excluding domestic installations. Mr. McNamara said we had never used the authorization we had to discuss bases, so why go further? Mr. Foster said we did not in our view have authorization to discuss bases. General Taylor said that until we define a base it would be difficult to evaluate the proposal. We would, of course, have to close a lot of installations if forces were reduced by several hundred thousands. But the Soviets are not worried about military concentration of men. They are interested in bases from which they might be struck. Mr. Barber asked if the present position were not adequate. We can, under the present instructions, discuss bases after progress has been achieved on other aspects of Stage I. Mr. Fisher said we would shortly be reaching this point on the agreed agenda and asked what in the view of the group our negotiators should be instructed to say at that point.

Dr. Wiesner said he thought the proposal before us was desirable. If the Soviets, for example, should say they were willing to discuss a 30% reduction in arms provided we were willing to discuss a reduction in bases, we should be able to say we would be willing to make concomitant reduction in bases. Mr. Barber said it seemed to him we cannot in fact discuss bases except in the light of previously agreed reductions. Mr. Foster said he thought discussions of the two matters should proceed in parallel and that was what we were recommending. We would not accept the proposal of the Soviets that we discuss foreign bases apart from domestic ones. Mr. McNamara said that the United States Government has not developed a plan that we would be willing to discuss for reduction of bases. It concerned many of us that we should be opening discussions in the absence of such a plan. General Taylor again asked what is the definition of a base and how can we discuss the matter in the absence of such a definition. Dr. Wiesner said that we must force ourselves to face this question if we are interested in disarmament.

The Secretary said the difficulty is that our last forces to be reduced would probably be those overseas. General Taylor said the reduction process doesn’t work quite that way. We need men at home too. We need a 60 to 40 or not less than a 50-50 ratio between men at home or abroad. Mr. Kaysen said the question is whether we are worse off in raising the base question when we are not prepared to pursue it fully or in letting the Russians hammer at us for not being willing to discuss it at all. The Secretary said we can’t avoid talking about bases and that the other side would certainly hammer it. The question is only what we say about them. Mr. McNamara said we could hold to existing instructions for 90 days while the U.S. Government works on the question of dismantling bases, how, what, when and where. Mr. Fisher said he did not consider it in the U.S. interest to have a forbidden subject for even 90 days. Dr. Seaborg asked whether we could have an intermediate position. Could the U.S. respond on the question of the bases without proposing reductions as suggested on page 8 of the paper under consideration? The Secretary said we should get a fuller expression of what we have in mind. There was an apparent contradiction between paragraphs (1) and (2) of the proposal as described on page 8. He said he was convinced that we could not avoid the subject, but we can bring the wording of the present instruction into conformity with the views expressed at the meeting.

Dr. Seaborg asked whether we could sharpen up the decision on a previous topic as it regards dismantling weapons in connection with reduction in fissionable materials. Mr. Foster said he believed it would be useful to be able to dismantle weapons, not merely to make offers of fissionable materials as we had done in the past. Dr. Seaborg said that he would prefer to stay with the idea of reductions in fissionable material as such. The Secretary asked if it would not be easier to inspect a cut-off of production of fissionable materials than to inspect a cut-off of weapons production. Mr. Foster said this would be the case. He believed, however, our proposal in the form recommended had more persuasive value than if it were confined to fissionable material alone. The Secretary asked if we had not already put forward estimates as to equivalent destructive power of 50,000 kilograms of fissionable material in terms of weapons. He thought we might take this question up privately with the Soviets to see whether they contemplate a cut-off and reduction of fissionable materials in any form. We need to know whether the problem is one of the ratio, or whether it is more fundamental.

Turning to the topic of military expenditures, the Secretary asked whether it was possible to check military expenditures in the Soviet system. Mr. Foster said this can be done to a satisfactory extent. We have consulted with Mr. Marengo in CIA on this problem. There are differences in accounting and in the price basis of the respective budgets, but we do believe it is practical to verify reductions if we have sufficient access. A high degree of access would certainly be required. A proposal for reductions in military expenditures was one of eight partial measures proposed by Gromyko in a memorandum of 1961⁸ and we think it would be useful to be able to respond to this proposal. The Secretary said unless this is merely a resultant of other reductions, its impact may be specific upon matters we are handling in another way under the agreement. Mr. McNamara said he thought the budget limitation could simply be a translation into financial terms of proposed reductions. Mr. Foster said that a budget limitation could also have a separate limiting effect, since we do envisage agreement on a percentage reduction of the budget. Dr. Wiesner said that our expenditures under a 30% reduction of armaments might easily drop even faster than 30%. The Secretary commented that this proposal had value in verification of agreed disarmament measures. Mr. McNamara said he did not think it could do much harm, and he would be willing to see it advanced if it would help our negotiators.

Dr. Wiesner raised the question of the desirability of a provision for an agreed proportion of funds to be released for development purposes. Mr. Foster said the recommendation on this point was consistent with statements of U.S. intentions made over a period of years in the United Nations and elsewhere. The Secretary said that we are concerned as to whether for example a 30% reduction in budgets might by cross action necessitate a 40% reduction in some types of armaments contrary to treaty requirements. Mr. McNamara said that, as a part of verification procedure an exchange of information on budget would appear to be useful. Mr. Marengo said it would require a great deal of access. Mr. Barber said if we intend the proposal as essentially a verification measure, we may be asking for more access than it is practicable to obtain. Mr. McNamara said he would like very much to get as much access as possible. The Secretary said he was not sure to what extent the proposal as formulated at the top of page 9 goes beyond a truism, and asked whether it does envisage going beyond merely consequential reductions. Mr. Foster said it would be handy in verification to have this kind of access, that it would not impose restrictions beyond those agreed upon as regards armaments, and, that in his opinion, it could do nothing but help us. Dr. Wiesner said that we should seek economic data in connection with any disarmament agreement as an aid to verification, and a provision of this kind in the treaty would help us to obtain such data. The Secretary said we did not want to be unable, for example, to put in an Army pay bill because under our budget ceiling in the treaty we needed the money for bombs. He would like to be clear that we were talking only about result-ant reductions in budget. Mr. Foster said this understanding was correct. It was a measure which comes along behind disarmament, and permits us to see more clearly what the other side is doing. He read Mr. Gromyko’s proposal of September 1961, indicating we were not agreeing to do this as a separate measure, as Mr. Gromyko had proposed, but rather as a Stage I measure along with verification. The Secretary said on that basis he could see no objection to it, but it does not turn out to be a very significant proposal. Mr. Foster agreed, saying he had already indicated that none of these proposals were considered to be major ones.

Returning to the question of bases, Dr. Wiesner read a draft he had formulated which he hoped might reconcile the views that had been previously expressed.⁹ Mr. McNamara said the draft still seemed to say that we would reduce bases in Stage I. He was not willing to say that we will reduce bases, but is willing to discuss the matter. A treaty may well be unacceptable to the Soviets if it does not contain provisions for base reductions, but a treaty will be unacceptable to us if it requires such reductions. The Secretary reminded Mr. McNamara to give us plenty of notice before getting out of any bases or destroying any bombers while these matters were subject to negotiation. Mr. Foster said that, in his view, we have to discuss bases. We should be able to sound intelligent in doing so. He also believed we would, regardless of any treaty requirement, be reducing military installations in conjunction with any widespread arms reductions. Mr. McNamara said he was not sure we would decrease our bases at all. We had not increased bases proportionately as we had built up armaments and armed forces. Mr. Foster said if the problem is that of a definition of base or that of a plan for reduction, we should bend every effort to arrive at such a definition and such a plan as quickly as possible. Mr. Nitze said the problem is even deeper. If Mr. Gromyko wants to define a minimal nuclear deterrent in an agreement, we might want to increase conventional forces and the bases upon which they depend in order to de-fuse the nuclear threat. Mr. McNamara reaffirmed that he was perfectly willing to discuss base reductions but not to propose their reduction.

Turning to the question of proposed reductions in jet bombers, Mr. Foster said we think at some point, if there is progress in the negotiation, this proposal might be useful. We had previously been authorized to offer 15 bombers per month. Now that a certain amount of time had elapsed, he believed the figure might be raised to 30, in view of our plans to deactivate a number of these bombers in any event. Mr. McNamara said that he could accept a reduction of 30 a month. Again, it seemed to him to be a gimmick, but it was acceptable if it would help the negotiators. The Secretary said he saw another advantage in the proposal—it helps get these bombers out of circulation.

As the meeting concluded, the Secretary said that it might be desirable to rewrite the covering paper for presentation to the President in light of the discussion here.¹⁰ Mr. Kaysen said that no major revision would be required. Mr. McNamara said he wanted to be sure we were clear on the first proposal. He was in accord with our desire to probe and find out what Gromyko meant. He did not want to initiate a proposal on numbers or even a proposal for asymmetry in reductions. The Secretary said it was very hard to draw this kind of a line. It is hard to inquire about a proposition without hinting that it is not obnoxious. Mr. McNamara said he realized that, but he urged that we ask the questions with the least possible implication of acceptability of the idea. Mr. McNamara asked whether we can propose that the base reduction study be completed within 90 days. The Secretary said that instead of postponing authorization of the ACDA proposal for 90 days, let us agree to work out the study within 90 days. Dr. Wiesner asked whether the meeting had decided that the percentage reduction could go above 30%. The Secretary said we could think in terms of 30 or 40% in certain categories but a large percentage such as 50% would certainly raise the question of whether we could proceed without China.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret; Restricted Data. Drafted by Baker.
1. The list of the 19 participants is not printed.
2. Not further identified.
3. Telegram 1728 from USUN, November 9, reported that Zorin told Dean that the “USSR would not object to reconvening at Geneva Nov 22 or 23,” but because of the ongoing disarmament discussions in the U.N. General Assembly, he thought November 26 was a “reasonable” compromise. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/11-962)
4. In the course of his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, Gromyko remarked: “Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 904-905)
5. For this meeting, ACDA drafted and forwarded to the Committee of Principals, under cover of a November 6 memorandum, a general paper and five attachments (A-E), detailing ACDA’s proposals for U.S. positions to be taken at the resumption of the Eight-een-Nation Disarmament Committee. The general paper outlined the approach to be taken by the U.S. Delegation at Geneva and also listed recommendations regarding modifications in the U.S. position. Attachment A concerned reductions of armaments in Stage I, Attachment B covered nuclear weapons and fissionable materials, Attachment C treated military bases, Attachment D treated military expenditures, and Attachment E concerned pre-treaty bonfires. A sixth enclosure, Attachment F, consisted of the minutes of the meeting of the Deputies of the Committee of Principals on November 1, at which these papers were first discussed. None of these papers is printed. (Department of State, S/S-RD Files: Lot 71 D 171)
6. The estimates of the Institute of Strategic Studies were summarized in The New York Times, November 9, 1962.
7. Not found.
8. Reference is to the eight-part Soviet memorandum submitted to the U.N. General Assembly on September 26, 1961. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 496-504.
9. Not found.
10. See Document 246.