Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

244. Editorial Note

With the conclusion of the U.S. atmospheric nuclear tests in early November 1962 and the Soviet announcement in early November that their test series would end shortly, Kennedy administration officials began to discuss the need for an internal assessment of these tests on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities. Glenn Seaborg noted in his journal some of this thinking in a telephone conversation with Carl Kaysen on November 8:

“Kaysen called and said, now that the U.S. tests are completed and the USSR tests are drawing to a close, the President is interested in an evaluation of the results. In conversation with Bundy, the thought was generated that perhaps a committee should be organized, consisting of one representative from AEC, DOD, CIA, plus Jerry Wiesner. This committee would not take over the functions of existing groups, such as the Bethe Panel, but rather would pull together inputs from all these sources to produce one comprehensive report for the President which would answer the questions: what have we learned from our tests, what have the Russians learned, the significance, etc. I asked whether the committee would be asked to address itself to the necessity of further tests. He said that this would be a very important input for consideration, but the committee itself would not be charged with this responsibility. I asked whether there would be any representation from the White House. Kaysen said that, except for Wiesner, they would not come into the picture until it is time to see what should be done with the document. He has already talked with Gilpatric (in McNamara’s absence) and with McCone, and both agreed this committee would be a good idea, and they named as their representatives Harold Brown and Dr. Herbert Scoville, respectively. He asked my opinion, and, if I agree, whom I would designate to represent the AEC. He hoped it would be Dr. Haworth. I agreed that such a committee could provide a very useful function and said that Dr. Haworth would be my choice too; however, I would check to be sure he could take on this project. He emphasized that the job is not to supersede the existing machinery but to draw together the output of all sources and consolidate it so that the President will have only one report containing all the views. As to the timing, this will not be a crash program, but, on the other hand, neither is it expected to proceed at a leisurely pace. The committee should be organized immediately, should start functioning and should present its report to the President at the earliest appropriate time. Kaysen said that shortly there will be a NSAM addressed to McNamara, McCone, and me, putting all this in writing.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 4, page 425)

On the following day, November 9, President Kennedy signed NSAM No. 205 on nuclear testing. Addressed to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and Wiesner, NSAM No. 205 stated:

• “1. Our 1962 atmospheric test series has come to an end. The Soviets have announced that their test series will end shortly. It is a matter of first importance to review carefully the effect of these two test series on the relative balance between U.S. and Soviet capabilities.
• “2. In order that we arrive at the best possible evaluation, I think all information and assessments should be brought together and examined in a single channel. Accordingly, each addressee should select a single technically qualified officer of his agency to sit on an inter-departmental committee to make the evaluation. I should like the representative of the CIA to chair the committee, and my Scientific Advisor, Dr. Wiesner, to sit as a member.
• “3. Each member agency will continue to use such internal processes of evaluation and advisory panels as it thinks appropriate. However, all such reports and evaluations should be funneled through the central committee, which alone should be responsible for a final evaluation.
• “4. The committee should address itself not only to the specific question of what has been learned by testing in terms of the design of nuclear weapons, their effects, and defense against them, but also to the broader question of the military significance of what has been learned and its probable effects on the present and prospective military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
• “5. All the material which this committee handles should be treated as sensitive, and every member agency should take fullest precautions against unauthorized disclosure of either information or evaluation. If any such disclosure occurs, I would like the head of the responsible agency to report to me personally on it.
• “6. The target date for the report is 20 December 1962. Examination of information not now available may require addenda at a later date.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 205)

The committee members were Herbert Scoville, Jr. (CIA) (Chairman), Harold Brown (DOD), Leland J. Haworth (AEC), and Jerome B. Wiesner (White House). The report has not been found, but in a December 20 memorandum transmitting the report to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, the committee members explained their methodology in preparing the report and “emphasized that much of the information on these tests is still quite preliminary.” (Ibid.) In a December 24 memorandum to the President, Carl Kaysen summarized several features of the report and concluded, “The best crude one-sentence summary statement is: The information learned from the tests has been of moderate importance, but it has little prospect of affecting the strategic balance one way or the other.” (Ibid.) An addendum to this report, dated February 27, 1963, is attached to a memorandum from Scoville to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, February 27. (Ibid.) A second addendum, dated August 15, 1963, is attached to a memorandum from Scoville to McNamara, McCone, Seaborg, and McGeorge Bundy, August 19. (Ibid.) Both addenda are in the Supplement.