Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

243. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 8, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Test Ban: Black Boxes, Khrushchev, and China

A. We are taking the following four actions to straighten out the record on the black boxes:

(1) Through technical channels to Zuckerman, we are asking the British scientists to make clear publicly their privately expressed conviction that the black boxes can reduce, but cannot eliminate, the requirement of on-site inspection of unidentified events.

(2) I have spoken to David Ormsby Gore to ask that the British Government give attention to the same problem, if possible in the immediate future—in any event, during the disarmament discussions at Geneva now likely to resume November 19th.¹

(3) We are asking ACDA to do some press education on this same point, and of course to be ready with public argument in Geneva.

(4) We have an opportunity to argue on the technicalities of this with the most knowledgeable of the Russian scientists, who is likely to be here informally in the near² future, and arrangements are being made to try to brainwash him.

Meanwhile Kuznetsov yesterday made a black box offer in New York: three on Soviet territory, and a right to place them and remove them under international supervision. This does not meet the main point, but it does help a little and ACDA is sending experts to talk directly to him on the issue.

B. Our last message from Khrushchev is absolutely categorical in its “unequivocal and frank” rejection of any inspection.³ This leaves us in a logical box, because there is no way that we can get Senate consent to a treaty covering underground tests that does not provide for inspection; obviously events in Cuba make this point more compelling than ever. Thus, on the surface I see no alternative to a heavy and direct argument to Khrushchev that a very modest amount of inspection is a worthy price to pay. We could certainly indicate in such a discussion that you yourself would expect to exercise the right of inspection in a minimal way—because indeed it is the right of inspection and not the fact of many inspections which is essential to our position.

There is one other slightly hopeful possibility in the inspection issue. The Soviets have partly agreed to what the neutrals call “invitational” inspection. We insist on what we call “obligational” inspection. If there were a quiet agreement that some small amount of inspection would in fact occur, we might be able to find language to cover both our points of view (though the Senate would be very wary); I think we need time before we can press this discussion.

C. One other possibility, which we have not explored in the past, is to raise with Khrushchev directly the question of Chinese Communist agreement to a test ban. Without the Chicoms, after all, the agreement is not going to mean much, and there may be advantage in pressing with Khrushchev the inescapable relevance of this problem; he has never hesitated to press with us the parallel and lesser problem of France. We might say that for us any agreement would be valuable, and concessions worth considering, only if there could be some assurance about Red China. My own impression is that the Russians would reply first with self-righteous surface answers: “these are peace-loving people with whom you need normal relations before you can ask about their intentions,” but we might also get interesting hints that only a test ban would give leverage for both of us against Peking. It’s worth asking about, and at your level, I think—but again not immediately.

D. To put it another way, is it really worthwhile for us or the Russians to go around and around the test ban issue without facing squarely up to the question of Chinese Communist participation? A Red China nuclear presence is the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years.

And in passing let me say that our uncertainty of Chicom rates of progress is an urgent reason for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

E. An alternative means of dealing with the Chicoms is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This in my view deserves real study, with all its obvious hazards. But we need information first.

McG.B.⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Secret.
1. Because of prolongation of discussions on non-diffusion and general and complete disarmament in the U.N. General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee did not reconvene in Geneva until November 26.
2. The word “near” has been added by hand.
3. The quotation is from Khrushchev’s long message to President Kennedy of October 30, in which he discussed disarmament and nuclear testing, among other matters. It is printed in vol. VI, Document 70.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typewritten initials.