Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

246. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, November 20, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Recommendations regarding Resumption of Geneva Disarmament Negotiations

Background

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your approval of a series of recommendations regarding modifications and elaborations of the United States position on its program for general and complete disarmament and on a pre-stage disarmament treaty proposal. The Committee of Principals discussed the recommendations outlined below at a meeting, Saturday, November 10, 1962.¹ Although there were differences expressed with respect to the details and tactics of handling the various recommendations, there was agreement as to the fundamental elements of the United States position.

The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which has been in recess since September 8, is expected to reconvene in Geneva on November 26. The four Western delegations (U.S., U.K., Italy, and Canada) plan to meet in Geneva prior to the resumption to coordinate Western positions and tactics. The ENDC will probably continue its meetings until approximately December 21 and then recess again until January 8, 1963.

The Geneva negotiations provide an opportunity for both sides to determine over a period of time whether arms control offers a realistic alternative to the arms race and they give evidence of the willingness of both sides to explore the possibilities of meaningful accords. When the Geneva negotiations resume we should give a signal to the Soviets and to the world which is consistent with our general foreign policy posture as it has developed out of the Cuban affair. This would mean that no changes in position should be introduced in Geneva in the case of a turn for the worse in Cuba or a failure to live up to the agreement contained in your exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev, but that the United States should be prepared to make moves to advance our basic objective in the negotiations when they are appropriate. This basic objective has been, and will continue to be, to determine what constitutes the widest area of agreement in the disarmament-arms control field that might be agreed to even though short of general and complete; whether first or limited steps, such as a non-proliferation, test ban, or outer space agreement can be negotiated; and whether such limited measures represent the outer limits of what can be accomplished. We are not yet in a position to know specifically what might be included in “a widest area of agreement” package, although we can now understand some of the limiting factors of such an area of agreement.

In order to pursue this course successfully, we must not abandon the goal of general and complete disarmament or seek to renegotiate the framework for negotiations represented by the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles.

The measures outlined below are designed to proceed with the objective discussed above. Although the policy modifications proposed in this paper are relatively slight when compared with the differences that exist and will certainly not produce a disarmament agreement, they will be important in signaling to the Soviets and others that the United States is prepared to follow through positively and constructively on the promises implicit in the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and you. Furthermore, the talks at Geneva may facilitate possible later bilateral discussions at a summit or elsewhere which might include disarmament questions.

The papers submitted by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the various agencies on November 6 to be used as guidelines by the Geneva negotiators,² will be modified in the light of the discussion at the meeting of the Committee of Principals and in the light of action taken by you on this paper.

Recommendations

1. Substantive modifications of United States proposals for general and complete disarmament.

a. Possible modifications concerning reductions of armaments in Stage I.

(1) The United States should continue to defend the basic equity of the 30 percent across-the-board approach. It should point out that the U.S.S.R. has now accepted this approach for many categories of armaments, but departs from this approach by requiring much larger reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, which constitute the most important category to the West.

(2) The United States should indicate that the recent Soviet proposal—on retaining “an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ‘ground-to-air’ category until the end of Stage II … ,”—implies a cut in United States strategic vehicles, such as ICBM’s and long-range bombers, by a greater percentage than for the Soviet Union. The United States should know whether the U.S.S.R. is prepared to take larger percentage cuts than does the United States in other categories of armaments, such as IRBM’s, tanks and artillery, where the Soviet Union has the larger number of armaments, before the United States can consider a proposal involving even a modest difference in the percentages. The U.S. negotiators should take appropriate probing action to ascertain the Soviet intentions.

(Comment): The United States would expect to probe the Soviets on what numbers they have in mind as to the amount and types of weapons that would be retained. The United States would also ask the Soviet Union about verification of its proposal. In probing the Soviets regarding their proposal, the United States would not specify any numbers or variations in percentages. Our probing would be an indication we are interested to know what the Soviets have in mind. The probing of Soviet intentions would take place privately, although the United States might outline its position at the conference along the lines of points (1) and (2) if this seems appropriate. Studies will be undertaken within the U.S. Government to evaluate the possibility of reductions greater than 30 percent, especially as they would affect the United States posture vis-à-vis Communist China.

b. Stage I reduction of nuclear weapons.

(1) The United States should be prepared to agree to transfer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of weapons grade U-235 to peaceful purposes if the Soviet Union would make an equivalent transfer of 25,000 kg of weapons grade U-235.

(2) The foregoing proposal should be presented in the context of Stage I and as an alternative to the present United States proposal respecting the transfer of fissionable materials from past production.

(3) The United States should express willingness to consider, within limits, larger numbers at the same ratio if the Soviet Union is interested. The upper limit for the United States [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of weapons grade U-235. This figure could not be mentioned in negotiations without subsequent specific authorization in the light of additional technical studies which are required.

(4) The United States should be prepared to accept an arrangement along the foregoing lines as a separate measure associated with a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials and appropriately verified.

(Comment): Any discussion of ratio other than one-to-one or numbers higher than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of weapons grade U-235 would take place privately with the Soviet Union, although it might be made public at a later date. The initial approach should not be on the basis of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] but should involve a ratio such as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as an attempt to probe the Soviets as to whether it is the ratio problem that is concerning them. The initial approach should be private. The delegation should seek to determine in the first instance whether the Soviets are fundamentally opposed to the idea of transfer of fissionable materials before discussing specific amounts and ratios.

c. Discussion of reduction of military bases in Stage I.

(1) The United States should indicate its willingness to discuss bases by indicating that as regards Stage I, specified countries, including at least the United States and the Soviet Union, would be willing to discuss arrangements for dismantling or converting to peaceful uses some agreed military bases, wherever they might be located, to the extent that this might follow from the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

(2) The United States should indicate that a detailed discussion is not appropriate at this phase of negotiations.

(Comment): The United States would assert its view that it does not recognize any distinction in terms of reductions between foreign and domestic bases. Within 90 days the Department of Defense expects to deliver a base study to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which will evaluate various possible United States positions.

d. Reduction of military expenditures.

(1) The United States should propose the following approach to the reduction of military expenditures:

(a) From the beginning of Stage I, military expenditures should be reduced by percentages from base-period expenditures in such a fashion as to reflect the disarmament process. It follows that these percentages would become progressively larger as disarmament moved forward but they would be so calculated as to reflect the disarmament process, not to act as pressure on it.

(b) Such a measure would be subject to verification by an agreed procedure, including the reporting to the IDO of expenditure, price, and other relevant data and appropriate inspection by IDO personnel.

(c) The parties would allocate to world development, through the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, such proportions of the funds released by the reduction of military expenditures as would be agreed, taking account of the actual development needs, of the contributions of both developing and developed countries, and of other relevant factors.

(2) The United States should also propose the convening of a committee of experts to examine the means of implementing the foregoing proposals, but should first give careful study within the government to the problems involved.

(3) If the progress in the negotiations warrants, it might be possible to work out with the Congress an interim ceiling, effective upon the signing of the treaty but prior to its entry into force, under which military expenditures would be held at the levels then prevailing, if the Soviet Union would also accept such a ceiling and were willing to initiate the exchange of appropriate data.

(Comment): This proposal would permit a positive response to a long-stated Soviet position, namely, that there should be some reductions in military expenditures during Stage I of a disarmament agreement. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has now given sufficient attention and study to this possibility that it feels that we can now proceed to discuss a formula for reductions in expenditures along the lines recommended. ACDA also believes that with a specific proposal on reductions in military expenditures the verification for such a measure will provide information which will be helpful as a supplement to other verification techniques for other disarmament measures.

2. Initiation of destruction of medium jet bombers.

a. At an appropriate time during the next session of the Geneva Conference, the United States should state that while negotiations are proceeding, it is prepared to initiate the destruction of medium jet bombers on the following basis:

(1) Each month, beginning possibly on July 1, 1963, the United States and Soviet Union would each fly 30 medium jet bombers (B-47’s and Badgers) to designated depots in the territory of third (neutral) countries.

(2) Upon confirmation that 30 bombers of each country had arrived at the respective depots, the bombers would be destroyed, and their destruction would be verified by an agreed international group.

(3) The foregoing process would be continued for a period of two years to a total of 720 bombers.

(4) Should a disarmament agreement enter into effect prior to the expiration of this period, the destruction of bombers designated for the foregoing arrangement would be continued in the manner prescribed in the agreement.

b. In presenting the foregoing proposal, the United States should make clear that its implementation would result in a more rapid phasing out of our medium bombers than is currently contemplated.

(Comment): The recommendation outlined above suggests that July 1, 1963 might be an appropriate starting date, but if the Soviets are interested in this proposal our negotiators at Geneva would be prepared to discuss a starting date earlier than July 1, if this can be worked out, not only at the negotiations but at the domestic level as well. The rate of destruction has been increased from what was previously agreed to as a United States position, from 15 to 30 a month.

Other Measures

The subject of this paper has been limited to United States modifications in its program for general and complete disarmament and to a proposal for the destruction of medium jet bombers. Other limited measures which have been and will continue to be the subject of negotiations at Geneva or elsewhere will be handled in subsequent memoranda.³

William C. Foster⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, General, 11/1/62-11/22/62. Confidential. Attached to the source text is a November 20 memorandum by Foster, presumably sent to the Committee of Principals, which states that the paper was a final revision and reflected the discussion by the Committee of Principals on November 10 and comments received by the interested agencies in response to ACDA’s November 13 and November 15 memoranda. A copy of the November 13 memorandum is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/DD Files: FRC 77 A 17, Committee of Principals. The November 15 memorandum and the agencies’ responses have not been found.
1. See Document 245.
2. See footnote 3, Document 245.
3. In a November 21 memorandum to Foster, Carl Kaysen wrote that the President had approved this memorandum with the understanding that the first recommendation went “no further than inviting exploration of possible Soviet willingness to bargain seriously on terms other than uniform across-the-board reduction.” (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, Atomic Energy-Armaments, 62) Four position papers (“Reduction of Armaments in Stage I,” “Reduction of Nuclear Weapons in Stage I,” “Reduction of Military Bases in Stage I,” and “Reduction of Military Expenditures”) representing the final and cleared backup papers regarding modifications of the U.S. position on general and complete disarmament are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Current. Copies of these papers were pouched to the U.S. Delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and the changes in the U.S. position were interpreted and explained in Todis 731 to Geneva, December 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/12-562)
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.