Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

232. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy⁰

Moscow, undated.

I studied with interest your reply to my considerations forwarded through Ambassador Dobrynin on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests.¹

It is said in your reply that a serious effort should be made to work out by January 1, 1963 an agreement on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Well, I can say quite definitely that we will not make you waiting. The Soviet Union in the course of many years has been pressing for concluding an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and we are prepared to make new efforts in this direction for the sake of achieving this aim.

The Soviet Government is convinced that national means of detecting nuclear explosions now at the disposal of the states are quite adequate to ensure strict control over the fulfillment by all states of their commitments with regard to cessation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water as well as underground. And the U.S. too recognizes this now with respect to three types of tests—in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water—and no longer insists on establishing international control over the cessation of these tests. Thus there seems to be no difference between us on this point any longer. There remains the question of underground tests. In the U.S. doubts are still being expressed as to the adequacy of national means for detecting underground tests. We do not have such doubts. Nevertheless we are prepared to use every opportunity to come to an agreement on this question on a mutually acceptable basis, on such a basis that would remove your doubts.

I do not know whether you have noticed a suggestion of British scientists Bullard and Penney put forward at the recent Pugwash conference of scientists concerning the use of automatic seismic stations working without any personnel.² As we understood, the idea of this suggestion is that automatic seismic stations help with their records to determine what is the cause of this or that underground tremor—underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earthquakes. It would be a sort of mechanical control without men. After thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be accepted if this would make it easier to reach an agreement. In this case it could be provided in the treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the nuclear states and 2-3 such stations directly on the territory of the states possessing nuclear weapons—in the areas most frequently subjected to earthquakes.

The Soviet Government agrees to this only because it seeks a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement. We do not intend to violate the commitment that we assume regarding cessation of tests but we also want to make you and the public opinion of the U.S. to feel confident that all sides will display an honest approach in fulfilling this commitment.

If you agree to this then we could without much difficulty come to an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

I would like to view as an encouraging sign the fact that the American scientists who took part in the Pugwash conference—and as I was told, very prominent ones—approved of the suggestion about the use of automatic seismic stations for the purposes of control. The Soviet scientists—participants in the Pugwash conference also approved of this suggestion. So it appears that the scientists are already in agreement.³ Then there is a possibility to move ahead quickly. And as for us, we would like very much to put an end to all that and reach, at last, an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests of all kinds. There have been enough—both for us and for you—of experimental blasts carried out in the atmosphere and underground.

If we can come now to the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests we will make good for the peoples of our countries and for the peoples of the entire world.

We prefer to conclude now a treaty on cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. But if the Western powers are not yet prepared for that even taking into account the suggestions put forward at the Pugwash conference we, as I have already told you, are ready in this case also to make a step toward the Western powers and to conclude at this time a treaty on cessation of nuclear weapon tests in three environments; in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

It would be incorrect in doing that to leave open the question of underground nuclear tests. For it would create a false impression with the world public opinion, a kind of illusion, that an agreement on cessation of tests has seemingly been concluded and that the competition among states in perfecting nuclear arms is coming to an end whereas in fact this competition would continue. The weapons already created would be remodeled on the basis of new scientific data obtained as a result of experimental underground blasts, that is the states would replenish their arsenals with ever more perfect, ever more destructive types of nuclear weapons. With that we cannot agree. I must say frankly and openly that it is impossible to agree to conclude an agreement on the basis of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water if the United States intends to continue underground nuclear explosions. Since in this case we too would face a necessity to carry out experimental nuclear weapon tests and we would conduct those tests, as we are doing now, in the atmosphere.

What is the way out? From our previous exchange of opinion you know how we propose to overcome this difficulty—to agree that after a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in our outer space and under water is signed negotiations on cessation of underground tests as well should be continued and while these negotiations are in progress and until the agreement is reached all nuclear powers should refrain from conducting such tests.

But some people in the West do not want even to hear about any commitment by the states to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. And on the part of some statesmen and in the American press assertions are made from time to time that the Soviet Union has allegedly violated some agreement on moratorium on nuclear tests. However those who make such statements have neither proof nor ground to support them.

And what are the facts? No international agreement on moratorium on underground or any other nuclear tests ever existed and nobody ever signed such an agreement. It can be reminded that as early as March 31, 1958 the Soviet Union unilaterally discontinued tests on all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons and called upon the Western powers to follow its example. But the U.S. and Britain responded then to that proposal of ours with an unprecedented in scope new series of tests of nuclear bombs. In subsequent period since the end of 1958 neither the United States or Britain nor the Soviet Union conducted nuclear weapon tests, but they acted so not because of any obligation coming from an international agreement but because of their own unilateral decisions. However, as early as December 29, 1959 your predecessor President Eisenhower clearly and definitely stated that the U.S. did not consider itself any longer bound by its statement that it had no intention to conduct nuclear tests. As for France—a NATO ally of the U.S. and Britain—it was even at that time conducting one nuclear explosion after another.

All this is perfectly known and he who nevertheless claims that the Soviet Union allegedly violated some moratorium on nuclear tests either has a short memory or simply seeks to torpedo the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree in principle that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to underground explosions be accepted. If this, is so, then it opens certain prospects.

You believe at the same time, as I have understood, that there should be no unlimited moratorium on underground tests. But we do not put the question that way. We do not propose to declare an unlimited moratorium on underground explosions. We suggest to declare such moratorium for a certain period of time, while the negotiations on banning underground tests of nuclear weapons are in progress. For how long those negotiations will go on—it is of course, impossible to say. But we do not think that much time is needed to conclude a final agreement on underground tests, provided, of course, that both sides display interest in reaching such an agreement promptly.

Anyway we are ready to agree on a term for the course of which the states will assume commitments not to conduct underground nuclear explosions, if an agreement banning nuclear tests only in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water is reached. We agree, for instance, on a 5-year term. And during the five years it will certainly be possible to agree on a final solution of the question of banning also underground nuclear explosions though I repeat, I am convinced that it could be done much faster, especially if the idea of use for the purposes of control of automatic seismic stations is acceptable to you. During this period of time, one should assume all American scientists too will get convinced that the national means of detection of nuclear explosions are quite adequate for ensuring a foolproof control over cessation of nuclear tests, underground tests included.

If, however, even during that term an agreement is not reached—what to do in this case? Then the whole question of banning nuclear weapon tests will have to be reconsidered anew. And if the American side then insists on renewing underground nuclear tests, then—I want to say this already now and in plain terms—the Soviet Union will consider itself free from assumed obligations not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

These are considerations which came to my mind in connection with your reply on the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Giving you these considerations I think of nothing else but how to move from the dead point, and out of deadlock the question of cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

If you being concerned about the same are in agreement with our considerations let me know and then the Soviet representatives in Geneva will at once be given instructions to get down together with your and British representatives to practical work of preparing a draft agreement.

One cannot doubt that an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be greeted with tremendous joy by all mankind. The peoples wherever they live—in Europe or America, in Africa, Asia or Australia—desire peace, a lasting peace, they want an end to the nuclear arms race, they want the threat of nuclear war be eliminated.

[Here follows the remainder of the letter.]

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Subjects, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-B, 9/15/62-10/24/62. No classification marking. The portions on Berlin and Cuba are printed in vols. XV, pp. 337–338, and volume X, respectively. The full text is printed in vol. VI, Document 55.
1. Document 229.
2. Reference is to geophysicist Sir Edward Bullard and Sir William Penney, Deputy Chairman of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, who attended the tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which met in London September 3-7, 1962.
3. For text of a document calling for a new approach on the test ban negotiations and including the suggestion of utilizing sealed automatic recording stations, which was signed by three U.S. and three Soviet scientists at this Pugwash conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 863-865.