233. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy0
Attached is a copy of the “black box” proposal that prompted the recent discussions about unmanned seismic stations.1 It proposes that a number of tamper-proof automatic seismic detectors with built-in recorders be provided by an International Control Commission and put in place by the host country. They would be returned to the Commission when needed to help resolve an ambiguous seismic event which had previously been detected by the proposed national seismic system. The only statement in the paper concerning the number of such black boxes is, “the number of sealed automatic stations in the network should be large enough so that it provides a good check of the seismic data supplied by all stations.”
I have talked with Professor Rich of MIT2 who participated in the discussions and learned from him that the number of such stations considered ranged from 20 to about 200 with general agreement that a large number was needed. The Russian scientists were unwilling to put any numbers in the paper, so the first draft read “a high density net” but in subsequent drafts they pulled away from that statement and said successively, “large number of stations,” “number sufficient to insure multiple records of events,” etc.
We have made a hasty evaluation of the proposal and have come to the tentative conclusion that such stations would not eliminate the need for some on-site inspections. This is also recognized in item 4 of the London statement.3 It is impossible to judge just how much good such additional stations would do because we don’t know enough about the characteristics of earthquakes in the Soviet Union. Statements made by Soviet seismologists lead us to believe that they don’t have the needed information either. This is not surprising, because a large fraction of the Soviet earthquakes occur in the remote, wild Kuriles Islands-Kamchatka Peninsula area where there are very few seismic stations. We don’t have sufficient data about earthquakes in the United States to [Page 581] resolve similar questions here. Some properly placed stations, possibly as few as a dozen, might make it possible to resolve half of the ambiguous events that we might have previously expected. We had previously predicted that in an average year there would be approximately 70 to 100 such events in the Soviet Union, so that there would still remain a substantial residue to be inspected. At this time we cannot say whether or not a much larger number of unmanned stations would reduce the residue substantially. A further study of this is being made, and I will report any new results to you as they occur.
There is a further difficulty. We believe that the stations could only be trusted if they were inspected by representatives of the control commission after installation and such inspection might be regarded as a more serious infringement of Soviet territory than a few obligatory inspections.
I believe that the reports of Sir Edward Bullard’s attitude on nuclear test detection problems has been garbled. Sir Edward Bullard (he owns a large interest in the Brewery of the same name) is a world renowned geo-physicist on the faculty at Cambridge University. He was one of the U.K. members of the original Committee of Experts and is an important governmental adviser. I have learned that Bullard did not participate in the discussions of the black box plan, nor was the black box plan discussed by the Pugwash Disarmament Group at Cambridge in which Bullard did participate. This plan emerged later, at the London Conference and was a result of conversations among American and Soviet scientists who had previously been at the Cambridge meeting.4
The talks on test ban issues at Cambridge focused on the need for on-site inspection, and it appears that Bullard was the most outspoken proponent of the position that the Soviet Union should accept the principle of mandatory inspection and that the West should accept a very few inspections. The Working Group paper on nuclear test problems prepared at Cambridge is also attached.5
It seems likely to me that the discussion of inspection requirements and the black box proposal have become mixed up in re-telling to your informant. With your permission I would like to call Sir Edward, whom I know quite well, and see what I can learn about his present views directly from him.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Testing, 8/62-12/62. Secret.↩
- Not attached, but the reference is to the statement signed by U.S. and Soviet scientists at the Pugwash conference; see footnote 3, Document 232.↩
- Professor Alexander Rich, one of the three U.S. scientists who signed the Pugwash statement.↩
- Item 4 of this statement mentioned only the manufacture or procurement of the sealed automatic seismographs, but the first sentence of the following paragraph stated: “We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the International Control Commission will need to request very few on-site inspections.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 864-865)↩
- Another account of the London meeting is in a memorandum from George W. Rathjens to Fisher, December 21. Rathjens attended the meetings with Soviet and U.S. scientists in London but not in Cambridge. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/RIC/R Files: FRC 77 A 10, Conferences, Pugwash (COSWA))↩
- Not attached and not found.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩