231. Memorandum of Conversation0
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September, 1962
PARTICIPANTS
- US
- The Secretary
- Mr. Akalovsky
- USSR
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Sukhodrev
SUBJECT
- Test Ban
The second subject the Secretary raised in his post-lunch conversation with Mr. Gromyko was that of a test ban.
The Secretary observed that both the US and USSR were now conducting nuclear tests, but stated that our first choice was to reach agreement on a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments. At the same time, from our standpoint we did not see how such a treaty could be agreed upon without adequate arrangements for on-site inspection in case of suspicious underground events. The Secretary stressed that we were unable to understand why the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the minimum arrangement which would make it possible to stop all nuclear weapons tests. He went on to say that if no agreement on a comprehensive treaty were now possible, agreement could be reached on a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, pending further negotiations on a comprehensive treaty. He [Page 573] pointed out that such a limited treaty would not require any inspection mechanism because not national but international means existed by which atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests could be detected. He said he hoped very much that the Soviet Union could accept such a treaty and noted that as far as the US testing program was concerned, it was such that there would be some time ahead during which both sides could work diligently on a comprehensive treaty.
The Secretary then said he wished to raise one point, noting that he was doing so in all seriousness and not with any desire to be frivolous. He said that some two weeks ago he had seen an article published in the People’s Daily in Peiping in which it was stated categorically that under no circumstances would Peiping accept a nuclear test ban, non-proliferation arrangements, or any other arrangements inhibiting the development of a nuclear capability by Peiping.1 Since any treaty banning nuclear weapons tests would have to contain the provision that tests by a third country would terminate the treaty, the Secretary said it had occurred to him that the current lack of interest on the part of the USSR with respect to a test ban might be motivated by this attitude of Peiping. He stressed that he did not insist on Mr. Gromyko’s answering this point, but that he simply wondered whether this might not be at least a partial reason for the current Soviet attitude. He emphasized that as far as the United States was concerned it wished to make progress in Geneva with the hope that a report about the conclusion of an agreement could be submitted to the General Assembly.
Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Government had been and still was very serious about the problem of stopping nuclear tests. The Soviet Union was resolutely in favor of stopping all types of tests. It wished to reach agreement on this matter with the United States, the UK, and France. It believed that this would be the best solution, serving the best interests of all. However, the USSR was prepared to agree that no further atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests would be conducted and that during the negotiations on a comprehensive treaty no party would conduct underground tests. He asserted that this was a compromise solution because it would provide for a ban on tests in three environments and for negotiations with respect to the fourth environment, but with the understanding that no underground tests would be conducted during such negotiations. Without such an understanding an atmospheric ban would be of no use because, as the Secretary knew, from the standpoint of nuclear weapons development it did not really matter in [Page 574] what environment one tested. He wished the US Government would think about this point.
As to the Secretary’s remark about Peiping, Mr. Gromyko said that test ban and proliferation were two different things. The USSR was in favor of having a test ban agreement signed by the four existing nuclear powers—the US, the UK, the USSR, and, of course, France—because no other nation was known to be a nuclear power at present. Thus, the Soviet Union was in favor of proceeding on the basis on which negotiations on this subject had been taking place so far. As to proliferation, Mr. Gromyko recalled that he and the Secretary had discussed this matter in Geneva and that subsequently the Secretary had sent him a letter to which he had given an appropriate reply. He said that the Soviet Union believed that it would be useful if agreement could be reached with regard to non-proliferation and that the Soviet position on this point remained unchanged. He noted, however, that of course any country, including the socialist states and the Chinese People’s Republic in particular, were fully entitled to express their own views. As the Secretary knew full well, the CPR did not participate in disarmament negotiations and was not in the UN as a result of the US position. Mr. Gromyko thought it was dangerous to prevent the CPR from taking part in those activities. Thus the CPR must speak for itself and if the US was creating obstacles in the path of reaching agreement on a test ban or non-dissemination this was not the fault of the USSR but its own.
Referring to the Secretary’s remark that the current Soviet lack of interest in a test ban was perhaps motivated by Peiping’s attitude, Mr. Gromyko asserted that this was not correct and could not be applied to the Soviet position. He said he wished to state once again that the USSR had believed and continued to believe that a test ban would be a great contributing factor toward relaxation of tensions and progress in disarmament, although in and of itself it would not constitute disarmament. He reiterated that any implication the Secretary had made with regard to the Soviet position being influenced by the Chinese attitude did not hold water and was contrary to the facts.
The Secretary said he was glad to hear this, but wished to add just one more point. He stated that an atmospheric treaty accompanied by an agreement to forego underground tests pending negotiations on a comprehensive treaty was something that could easily become a comprehensive treaty without inspection. Now, during the period when both the US and the USSR were testing, a comprehensive treaty could be reached; on the other hand, refusal to agree to a comprehensive treaty under conditions suggested by Mr. Gromyko could become a prolongation of an uninspected moratorium with regard to underground tests, and this was something the US could not accept. The Secretary then expressed the [Page 575] hope that both sides would give full attention to the sub-committee meeting in Geneva so as to work on a comprehensive treaty.
The Secretary then said that he disagreed with Mr. Gromyko’s remarks with regard to the value of a limited test ban. He said that the most dramatic and costly advances would require atmospheric or outer space tests. Although underground tests did make some difference, a ban on atmospheric, outer space and underwater tests would place a useful ceiling on testing.
Mr. Gromyko said that with regard to inspection he could only reiterate the Soviet belief that both the US and USSR, as well as some other states, had means of ensuring the observance of a treaty by all. This had been and remained the Soviet position on this question.
The Secretary suggested that Mr. Gromyko might perhaps think over the possibility that on this point the difference might perhaps be over facts rather than policy. He though scientists from both sides might consult in order to resolve this problem. Noting that as far as the US was concerned its position stemmed from facts rather than policy.
Mr. Gromyko failed to respond and changed the subject.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on September 26. The meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. The source text is labeled “Part II.” A memorandum of conversation on Laos, the first subject of their talk, is not printed. (Ibid.)↩
- An attachment to a memorandum from Foster to Secretary Rusk, August 11, which summarized the attitude of the People’s Republic of China on the development and testing of nuclear weapons and on nuclear-free zones, contained extracts from and summaries of articles from People’s Daily on these subjects. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/EX/C-R Files: FRC 77 A 8, State Department, Memoranda to the Secretary)↩