20. Editorial Note

At its 482d Meeting on May 2, 1961, the National Security Council discussed the Geneva test ban negotiations. NSC Action No. 2419, approved by the President on May 16, reads:

  • “a. Noted and discussed a report by the Adviser to the President on Disarmament and the U.S. Representative, Conference on Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Test, on the progress of the negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban.
  • “b. Agreed that the Adviser to the President on Disarmament, with the assistance of an interdepartmental group, should prepare recommendations on future U.S. policy with respect to nuclear testing.
  • “c. Noted that the Department of Defense would make a presentation to the President on the military factors involved in the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.” (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1961) Concerning followup to paragraph c., see Document 24.

The account of the NSC meeting in Seaborg’s journal reads as follows:

“At 5:15 p.m. I met with the National Security Council at the White House. The President, Vice President, McNamara, Gilpatric, Bell, Rusk, Edward Murrow, Bundy, Wiesner, Dean, McCloy, Dulles, Admiral Burke, Zuckert, Nitze, Fisher and others were also in attendance.

McCloy gave a brief summary of the present situation and ended by suggesting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might want to brief the President on the possible accomplishments of testing with the Secretary of State and me present.

Arthur Dean then gave a status report. He said that he had presented the complete U.S. test ban proposal and expanded upon it from day to day and finally tabled the complete text of the treaty on April 18th. He told them that President Kennedy would recommend to Congress necessary legislation to allow inspection of the devices in connection with the seismic and peaceful uses aspects of the program. He said that for the first time many newspapers in Europe were commending our stand and our action in tabling the complete text. Tsarapkin continues to say that they would be reasonable if they had the tripartite method of administration and he says we want to conduct the decoupling shots in order to learn how to cheat. We have agreed to the possibility of veto of the overall budget, but not on individual items. We are still demanding 20 inspections and they are only offering three.

“In answer to the President’s question as to what Dean recommends, Dean said that he wouldn’t break off negotiations now, but that he should go back and continue and perhaps the President and Prime [Page 57] Minister Macmillan should send a letter to Khrushchev pinpointing some of the difficulties and suggesting they get down to brass tacks. We probably can’t give in on the tripartite demand because this would be giving in on their attack on Dag Hammarskjold. Perhaps the Kennedy-Macmillan letter should be sent about May 22nd, allowing ten days to two weeks for a reply. During that time we could work out a policy as to what the contingencies are. Maybe the President should then announce that we intend to start nuclear weapons testing. This would bring us to about June 15th.

“The interested agencies should prepare for the President a comparison of the relative United States-Soviet gain from testing. The President said that we might state publicly that we have evidence that the Soviets are testing. Dulles, when asked, said that we can’t exclude the possibility on technical grounds that they are conducting underground tests, but he doubts they are, due to the risk; the Air Force dissents from this point of view. Bundy suggested that McCloy and an interdepartmental group should work up a statement of the pros and cons of our resuming nuclear weapons testing. The President wondered whether he should make any statement before Dean returns to Geneva and Dean thought that he should highlight the problem. It was concluded that the President might express a hope for progress, etc., at his Friday press conference.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 1, pp. 238, 241. Page references are not continuous owing to interpolated materials in the journals as published.)

For the President’s statement on the Geneva Conference at his news conference on May 5, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pages 142-143.