Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

21. Record of Meeting⁰

Washington, May 4, 1961.

RECORD OF MEETING ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN ISSUE 4 MAY 1961

PRESENT

• The President, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCloy, Dr. Wiesner, Mr. Dean, Mr. Komer

The first subject taken up was Mr. McCloy’s draft press conference statement for this Friday.¹ The President wanted the significance of the new Soviet demand for a triumvirate spelled out a bit more, perhaps with an example. Certain other minor amendments were made.

Mr. McCloy cited his talks with Walter Lippmann² to buttress his view that the “triad” was a fundamental Soviet concept. The Soviets realized that the Secretary General had now acquired a major role and begun to operate; he just wasn’t an administrative officer as was contemplated in 1945. McCloy could understand the Soviet position and felt that we too would have objected in 1945 if the Senate had thought the Secretary General would become such an important figure. The question of the triad runs across the whole spectrum of international issues—it is absolutely central to an effectively functioning UN as well as all sorts of disarmament measures.

Mr. McCloy felt that this and other political issues were more important than the military arguments with respect to test resumption. The Soviets think that we don’t have the nerve to test. Mr. McCloy felt that Moscow still wanted a test ban but on an essentially uninspected basis.

The President indicated that Mr. Dean must go back and see. We must also get the UK to say something. They consistently try to put us out in front. Mr. Rusk thought they would be reluctant to say anything positive.

Mr. Dean described how he had raised with Dr. Scoville of CIA the idea of his suggesting to Tsarapkin that the Soviets let us come in and see that they are not testing, say at Osh. Dr. Scoville was opposed on two grounds. First because the Soviets might ask to see our Nevada test site in return and second because if we went in and saw nothing the Soviets would get a big propaganda gain. The President opined that the Soviets wouldn’t let us in anyway if they were testing. He regarded the resumption issue as a really tough one. The Soviets had us right on the propaganda hook. Our only hope for an agreement was if they feared proliferation enough. He felt that we have got to begin building our psychological case, and saying that we hope all those who favor disarmament will join us in putting pressure on the Soviets. Secretary Rusk felt that we should attempt to generate such pressure only in diplomatic channels for if we got public opinion stirred up it might turn on us if we resumed testing.

Mr. Bundy, replying to the President’s query, urged that the President submit to the JCS briefing so that no one could say, especially on the Hill, that the military had not been fully consulted. The President agreed that the JCS should have their day in court.³

Mr. Bundy outlined the need for an immediate and systematic analysis of test resumption options, bringing everybody into the act, and ending up with recommendations. He saw no harm if various departments took different positions. The President mentioned that if we must start testing, we might wait until some international event occurred, e.g. a Berlin crisis, which would appear to justify it. Alternatively, we could start with seismic tests only, contending that these tests were in fact devoted to the purpose of achieving an adequate verifiable test ban.

Mr. Dean brought up the need to decide this issue before the test ban talks got merged with the comprehensive negotiations scheduled to begin on 31 July. The President felt we might even say to the Soviets that we did not see much point in comprehensives unless the fundamental issue of the triad were settled. Mr. McCloy felt that we should vigorously probe the Soviets along these lines in the forthcoming bilaterals.

RWK⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA Disarmament General, 4-5/61. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer.
1. McCloy’s draft is ibid. For Kennedy’s statement at the May 5 news conference, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 142-143.
2. The talk is not further identified.
3. See Document 24.
4. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.