Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

19. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President’s Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)⁰

Washington, April 28, 1961.

Dear Jack: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have commented on your “Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations,”¹ which you presented to the National Security Council meeting on 22 April. Their views are set forth in the attached memorandum which they have recommended that I forward to you.

I agree in general with the views expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for their suggestion that weapons tests be conducted on a classified and unannounced basis and if detected, these tests, regardless of type, be related directly to the seismological research program. In our open society, I doubt the practicality and wisdom of attempting weapons tests under the cover of the research program. Rather, I would favor announcing that preparations were under way, with the actual announcement of the weapons test to be made shortly before it happens. Also, it is my understanding that it may not always be technically practicable to use nuclear weapons tests for the rather exacting detonation requirements of the seismic research program in which the yield must be accurately forecast.

It is my view that the President should announce that the seismic research explosion program, including nuclear detonations, will begin at an early date, and that preparations will be made to conduct nuclear weapon tests which will produce relatively insignificant radiation effects. At such future time as the nuclear weapon test program has been formulated and preparations for the first detonation have been completed, the President could then announce the actual resumption of nuclear weapon tests a few days before the first shot.

The course recommended above would permit prompt implementation of Project Vela Uniform, for which preparations are well advanced. It would also allow the necessary lead-time to prepare for a carefully considered and profitable nuclear weapon test program.

Sincerely,

Roswell L. Gilpatric²

Appendix³

Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President’s Adviser on Disarmament (McCloy)

SUBJECT

• Memorandum on Possible Courses of Action Relating to Negotiations with the Soviets on Test Ban Negotiations (U)

1. In accordance with our agreement, following the special NSC meeting on 22 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied your memorandum on special courses of action relating to negotiations with the Soviets on test ban negotiations. They feel that you have made an excellent analysis of the present situation and have come directly to the heart of the problem. They are generally in accord with the questions you pose, and the various courses of action as you depict them.

2. Your evaluation of the Soviet intentions with reference to dragging out the test ban negotiations in order to combine them with the comprehensive disarmament negotiations are believed to be well founded. Perpetuating current tactics appears to be directed toward inhibiting further development of US technological and military capability and causing harassment and embarrassment to the United States through propaganda media.

3. On numerous occasions in the past and as recently as 18 March 1961,⁴ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that valid and pressing military requirements exist to resume nuclear weapons testing. They have also reiterated their concern as to the current self-imposed moratorium which in no way insures that the military power relations between the United States and the USSR have not deteriorated to the advantage of the USSR.

4. While it appears to be prudent that announcement of future tests in the sensible atmosphere not be made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with you that it is now timely to decide upon underground tests, which offer the advantage of both weapon improvement and increased seismic research knowledge. In this light, it appears it would be prudent to announce the resumption of testing to begin at an early date, with particular emphasis on the scientific research program. Weapons tests could be conducted initially under 4.75 seismic equivalent and on a classified and unannounced basis. If detected, these tests, regardless of the type, may be related directly to the seismological research program.

5. The opportunity for the USSR to propagandize this action by the United States is recognized in your memorandum. However, it appears that a carefully conceived and implemented program by the United States could well result in derogatory effect on the Soviets. For example, the fact that the Soviets have repeatedly refused to agree with participation in an over-all seismic research program should offer room for exploitation. Resumption of testing itself may either induce the Soviets to negotiate a treaty, or expose them as merely interested in propaganda objectives.

6. In the absence of any real progress towards agreement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the requirement that nuclear testing be resumed without further delay in the interest of national security.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/4-2861. Secret. A copy was sent to Secretary Rusk. The first attachment to this letter, a forwarding memorandum from Burke to McNamara dated April 26, is not printed.
1. See Document 16.
2. Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.
3. Secret. The source text is marked “Draft” and has no date.
4. Apparent reference to Document 9.