Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

16. Airgram From the Department of State to the Delegation to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests⁰

Washington, April 22, 1961, 8:10 p.m.

G–14. Nusup. Following is text memorandum from McCloy to be used as basis White House discussion next steps in nuclear test negotiations:¹

“MEMORANDUM ON POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

I. The Situation:

It now appears clear that the intent of the Soviet negotiators at Geneva is to avoid a prompt conclusion of a Test Ban agreement. Mr. Arthur H. Dean, our negotiator, will return sometime after the first of May to report. The indications are that the Soviet Union will not take the responsibility of breaking off negotiations, but will drag them along to a time when it would seem appropriate to suggest that they be merged into the comprehensive disarmament negotiations now set for July 31.

The best estimate is that the Soviets are trying to put the US in a position in which it goes into the July 31 talks with the present unenforceable moratorium still in effect, a position which would make it increasingly difficult for the US to exercise its freedom of action with respect to the resumption of testing.

At the outset of the negotiations on March 21, 1961, the Soviet negotiator proposed that there should be substituted for the concept of a single, impartial Administrator, to which it has previously agreed, a three-man Council with one representative each, for the Soviet Union, the Western powers, and the uncommitted countries. No action could be taken without the concurrence of all three. Moreover, the Soviet Delegation continues to insist on other provisions, tantamount to self-inspection, which could not be accepted. The Soviet position on the three-headed Council has now been re-affirmed and emphasized in several Soviet declarations, including Mr. Khrushchev’s interview with Walter Lippmann.² The Soviet position is linked to its campaign in the UN against the single Secretary-General. As it is, in effect, a nullification of the concept of an independent inspection or verification system, it would have very far-reaching consequences. Not only does it critically affect the control system proposed for the nuclear Test Ban but it would also, if applied to controls for general disarmament, render these unreliable and unnegotiable. We could not accept such a concept without abandoning the fundamental Western positions on disarmament and permitting the foundation to be laid for a serious attack on the United Nations.

The attitude of the Soviet Union developed at Geneva presents a problem which has to be faced in the very near future. This Government has consistently taken the position that, though a serious effort was to be made to reach a Test Ban agreement as promptly as possible, it would have to review this position if it became clear that the Soviet Union was not disposed to enter into an agreement on terms reasonable and fair to all. The President of the United States (letter to Thomas E. Murray of October 10, 1960)³ has indicated that he would favor another serious attempt to conclude such a treaty, but that if it became clear that one could not be reached within a reasonable period of time, he would consider the resumption of underground tests in the field of peaceful uses, seismic research, and weapons improvement under such controls as may appear appropriate in the light of the situation then existing. Similar declarations and projections were made by Government officials before committees of Congress prior to the resumption of negotiations on March 21, 1961. The time has now come to consider what steps should be taken to give effect to these declarations.

II. Two questions must be decided:

A. Should the US decide now to resume nuclear weapons tests if the deadlock in Geneva continues for more than a few weeks in spite of further approaches direct to Khrushchev?

B. If not, should the US decide now to conduct nuclear detonations for seismic research programs, withholding a decision on weapons tests until this action has been taken?

III. Arguments Pro and Con Resumption of Tests:

A. Pro-Resumption

If we continue to negotiate on the present basis without bringing matters to a head, we shall be in the position of extending our moratorium on nuclear testing for a further indeterminate period without any control or inspection of Soviet tests. This not only creates a condition in which the Soviets may be conducting undetected tests while we are not, but it also weakens the whole emphasis on the vital importance of appropriate inspections and controls.

If we assume that the Soviet Union is engaging in clandestine tests and we do not test, we are not only excluded from testing for peaceful purposes and for perfecting the means of detecting clandestine tests, but also our failure to test weapons would eventually put us at a serious military disadvantage. Scientists differ as to the full significance of the continuance of this condition, but it must be recognized that continued testing on the part of the Soviet Union and a failure to test on our part would in time produce real weapon advantages for the Soviet Union. Moreover, there is a possibility, if not the probability, of achieving some major break-through which would never be disclosed to the non-tester.

A plan to resume testing, moreover, may be the only way to get an agreement since, otherwise, the USSR will be convinced that there is no need to accept controls. Finally, permitting an unenforceable moratorium to continue indefinitely (something we have said we would not permit) cannot fail to have an adverse effect on US credibility.

B. Arguments against resumption of Weapons Tests

We can be quite certain that any resumption of testing, particularly in the weapons field, would be attended by a heavy propaganda barrage on the part of the Soviet Union, as well as by unfavorable criticism on the part of many important sectors of world opinion on the grounds that the US was taking the first step in renewing the arms race. Although the American case as presented at Geneva has now received favorable support in world opinion, we should have to expect a substantial reversal of that opinion if we resumed tests, even if limited to underground tests. If the US did resume testing, the Soviet Union might either resume testing itself which presumably would be to its advantage, or prefer the psychological advantage it would gain by announcing that it would not engage in testing even if the US did.

A general and continued resumption of testing will make it almost impossible to prevent a proliferation of nuclear capability to other powers who do not now possess such a capability. If the great powers are themselves engaged in testing, their ability to dissuade other countries which have the means and incentive to test from doing so is seriously impaired.

Resumption of testing would result in a further deterioration in the relations between the USSR for which the US will be held responsible. It would relieve the USSR from the pressure to which their adherence to their position with respect to the tripartite administrator might otherwise expose them.

If both sides resume testing, moreover, the Soviets would at least have a renewed opportunity to overtake us in the fields in which we lead, a possibility which must be seriously regarded in view of the forward leaps in their technology. This opportunity would be given them without their having to take the trouble and risk of clandestine tests and without any political liability on their part from testing openly.

C. Possible Alternative Course of Action

A possible alternative is to decide, at this time, only on the detonation of nuclear devices in a seismic research program for the purpose of improving the ability to detect clandestine explosions, withholding a decision on weapons tests until this action has been taken. This might well tend to diminish the unfavorable results from a resumption of testing which have been mentioned above, especially if the detonations for seismic research were accompanied by appropriate safeguards. It would also be more consistent with our purpose of continuing to seek a treaty. If, however, the prospect of the US resuming testing in the weapons field is expected to exert any substantial pressure on the USSR to come to an agreement, this pressure would be diminished if the tests were limited to a seismic research program.

According to informal estimates of the AEC, the first of a series of seismic research tests could be conducted in about ten weeks after a decision to prepare for it was made. Weapons proof tests could be conducted in about the same time. It would be approximately a year before tests could be conducted which would look toward major improvements or radical changes in weapons design.

IV. Communication with Mr. Khrushchev

In accordance with the decisions taken with respect to the foregoing courses of action, and, in any case, in advance of any public announcement of a decision to resume tests, the President and Prime Minister should address a communication to Mr. Khrushchev, framed with a view to eventual publication. This exchange should, at the least, declare US and UK concern at the highest level with the implications of the tripartite control concept and its possible implications. In degree, depending upon the decisions reached with respect to resuming tests and to the kind of tests, it should foreshadow announcement of the decision which has been made.

The communication should give Khrushchev opportunity to alter his position or, if not, it should serve to marshall world opinion in support of Western attitudes toward inspection and control and the whole matter of international organization and peace-keeping machinery.

An exchange of this character between the Heads of State should probably precede any effort to proceed to detailed exchanges between Governments in regard to the constitution of the negotiating body and the site of the negotiations, or upon any statement of general principles upon which they might proceed after July 31, 1961.

Recommendation:

This paper is solely for the purpose of discussion. No recommendation is made at this time.”

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/4-2261. Secret; Limit Distribution.
1. NSC Action No. 2408, taken at the 478th NSC meeting held April 22, reads: “The Geneva Test Ban Negotiations: [The NSC] noted and discussed an interim report by Mr. McCloy on the current state of negotiations in Geneva for a nuclear test ban. It was agreed that Mr. Dean will soon be recalled for discussion, and that a strong preliminary US-UK effort should be made to create an effective international environment for a possible show-down on these negotiations.” (Ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
2. Reference is to Lippmann’s interview with Khrushchev at Khrushchev’s dacha at Sochi on the shores of the Black Sea on April 10. Lippmann’s published account of this interview is in The Coming Test With Russia (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).
3. For text of Kennedy’s letter to Murray, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 287-289.