Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

173. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 12, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament Issues

1. The attached draft outline treaty, the final result of a long process of discussion between ACDA and other interested agencies, is submitted for your approval. (Tab B)¹ It is now all agreed; except for one major issue left for your decision.

2. The open issue is the way which we specify for reducing armaments. The treaty draft (Stage I, Section A, pp. 8 through 13) is organized in terms of reduction by types and production by categories. This is the alternative preferred by all the principals save ACDA. Defense, JCS, AEC and the White House Staff prefer this alternative strongly. At the Principals Meeting yesterday,² Secretary Rusk indicated that he shares this preference. CIA and USIA have indicated no strong position on this point. The ACDA method (Tab C)³ is drafted in terms of reduction and production by categories.

3. As you will remember, this is a problem which has been discussed at some length before, and specifically in your last meeting with the Principals on April 6.⁴ In the first stage, reduction by types involves a 30% cut in the inventory of each individual type of weapon (e.g., B-52, Minuteman, Atlas, etc.). During this stage, there would also be a production allowance for each category (e.g., long-range strategic delivery vehicles, which includes all the types listed above). This allowance could be used to offset the reduction in, or even increase the numbers of, any type, provided that the numbers of some other type within the same category were reduced correspondingly to maintain the over-all 30% reduction for the whole category. In the second stage, when there is no production except for maintenance, reduction proceeds by types, and categories are no longer significant. The alternative formulation of reduction and production by categories means that the reduction of 30% is charged against a category as a whole, and can be taken in terms of any specific weapons within the categories, i.e., the whole reduction could be charged against a single type of weapon if it constituted 30% or more of the category. The production allowance is treated similarly. Tab A gives a model computation which illustrates the difference between the two methods.⁵

The most significant difference between the two methods lies in the extent to which they permit a change in the mix of armaments. For any given rate of reduction (e.g., 30%) and any given production allowance (e.g., 10%), reduction by types permits a much smaller change in the mix than reduction by categories. Of course, the larger the production allowance, the less important this difference becomes, but all parties to the discussion agreed that we should be thinking in terms of a small production allowance. Further, under reduction by types, changes in mix cease after the end of Stage I, when production ceases except for maintenance requirements. Reduction by categories, however, permits the change in mix to proceed until complete disarmament is reached.

4. There are two arguments in favor of reduction by types. First, it is desirable to stabilize the mix of weapons on both sides, from the point of view of our security interests. A method which allows only small and relatively predictable changes in the mix leaves the military balance more or less where it is now. Even if we could foresee a balance of advantage in the game of changing the mix, that balance in fact is very sensitive to the boundaries of the categories. These would be a matter of negotiation and accordingly it is difficult to predict where we would come out. In yesterday’s meeting, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer and Rusk all stated clearly that they considered a more or less stable mix more desirable than a situation in which each side tried to take advantage of its freedom to vary the mix substantially.

Further, despite the complications introduced by production allowances in Stage I, reduction by types, carried through the three stages of the treaty to the eventual goal, corresponds more nearly to the simple notion of disarmament across-the-board than does reduction by categories. Accordingly, it will be easier to explain and defend in Geneva.⁶

5. On the other side, the arguments of ACDA for reduction by categories are also two. First, they assert it is an important strategic advantage to be able to vary our weapons mix considerably. Second, they fear that the problem of explaining reduction by types during the first stage, when there is a production allowance, is such that we might give the impression that our offer is deceptive. ACDA does agree that the present language on this point (see p. 8, A, I, a.) has minimized this problem, although they do not think it has disappeared entirely. USIA is of the view that there is no significant difference in ease of explanation between the two. It should be observed, however, that there is in fact more room for a large increase during the first stage in the numbers of a specific weapon, e.g., Polaris missiles, under the ACDA alternative than under reduction by types.

ACDA’s presentation of its view on this point is attached at Tab D. Note that in the computation on page 3, they have included B-47’s in the intercontinental strategic category, although their proposal (Tab C, pp. 1-2, items 2 a, b) put them in a separate category.

6. The treaty is long. The more important provisions which you might wish to scan are listed on the first page of Tab B. Those that are starred (*) are especially significant.

7. Tab E contains a brief chronology that I prepared of the steps to the agreed document.

Carl Kaysen⁷

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Basic Memoranda, Memorandum to the President 4/12/62. Secret. Copies were sent to Bundy and Wiesner.
1. This attached draft, April 12, is not printed.
2. See Document 172.
3. Tabs C-E are not printed.
4. See Document 169.
5. For text, see the Supplement.
6. A summary of the Department of Defense views on reductions by types and categories as well as on other issues is in a memorandum from Gilpatric to McNamara, April 11. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 3470, McNamara Records, NATO-NSC Meeting)
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.