Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

172. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Committee of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• See Attached List¹

The Secretary asked Mr. Foster to present the issues for discussion.

1. Methods of Reducing and Limiting Production of Armaments

Referring to the ACDA draft “Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World” (April 11, 1962),² Mr. Foster noted that differences between ACDA and Defense proposals respecting methods of reducing and limiting production of armaments had been substantially narrowed as a result of Defense’s modified presentation of its proposal. However, ACDA continued to regard its proposal of reduction and production by categories of armaments as preferable to Defense’s proposal that armaments be reduced by types and produced by categories.

Mr. Foster saw two advantages in the ACDA proposal. First, it permitted greater freedom to “vary the mix” of armaments during the uncertain first stage of disarmament. Second, it avoided negotiating problems which would arise from the Defense proposal which, although proposing reductions by types, would, as a result of production allowances, lead to increases in certain types. Defense’s presentation of its proposal had been improved, but the negotiating problem remained essentially the same.

The Secretary thought it unlikely that the two sides would wish to turn each other loose to make their own “mix” and that the “mix” would probably have to be negotiated. He asked Mr. Gilpatric whether Defense would be comfortable letting the Soviet Union make its own “mix”.

Mr. Gilpatric believed that by 1963, the earliest time a disarmament program such as that being discussed could realistically be initiated, our own “mix” of inter-continental weapons would be good and that Defense would prefer to freeze the “mix” at that point. Defense considered a production allowance in Stage I as primarily important from the standpoint of being ready to turn around if Stage I did not work. If a way could be found to keep production lines ready to go again and to allow only the production of parts during Stage I, Defense would prefer to hold the “mix” on the 1963 basis rather than to reduce and produce by categories which would permit a change in the “mix”.

Mr. Foster asked whether by 1964 the “mix” would not be further improved from our viewpoint. Mr. Gilpatric affirmed that this was so but thought the 1963 “mix” a good one and considered it preferable to negotiate and inspect on the basis of “knowns” rather than “unknowns”.

Dr. Wiesner agreed with Mr. Gilpatric and thought that reduction by types was a more understandable approach, one that the neutrals could be expected to understand.

Mr. Foster doubted that either approach was simple and commented that, on the basis of experience to date at Geneva, it would be necessary to explain matters time and time again. Referring to the problem of maintaining the readiness of production lines, he recalled that Mr. McCone had pointed out that production could be resumed more quickly in a controlled economy than in a free economy. Mr. Foster thought the problem needed to be weighed.

The Secretary recalled that Mr. Gilpatric had expressed the view that perhaps production during the first stage could be limited to production of parts. From the standpoint of disarmament, small production during the first stage would be better than large production. However, as Secretary of State, he also had to be interested in the combat capability of the retained 70 percent of armaments. He wondered how a small production allowance would affect this.

Mr. Gilpatric replied that production of parts would be required throughout disarmament in order to maintain the retained armaments. In so far as maintaining production in readiness to turn around was concerned, he believed we had learned a good deal from experience during the past decade about how to control the flow of military production. We should not stop every wheel from turning during Stage I, but he did not think a large production allowance was needed to maintain production lines.

The Secretary reaffirmed his view that it would in fact be necessary to negotiate the “mix”. Vast increments of power could not be applied on a free-wheeling basis.

Mr. Kaysen believed that reduction by types would provide a tighter framework and that the variation of the “mix” resulting from production would be smaller than in an approach based on reduction and production by categories. Reduction by types tended to control shifts resulting from subsequent production although the degree of control was sensitive to the amount of production allowed.

Mr. Foster stated that he would agree with Mr. Kaysen if he were certain that security during disarmament could be preserved by maintaining the same relationship among types. Reductions by categories would ensure that higher quality armaments could be retained during the uncertainties of Stage I. Moreover, there were new armaments we would want to produce.

Mr. Gilpatric, however, thought it safer to freeze the “mix” at a known point. He said Defense was willing to look at the question of what specific production allowance should be provided and was willing to keep production low but not cut it out.

Dr. Wiesner wondered whether in view of the foregoing discussion agreement could not be reached on the Defense proposal. However, the Secretary and Mr. Foster believed that although it would be appropriate to include the Defense proposal in the next draft of the “Outline”, the President should be acquainted with the basic issues and that ACDA’s proposal should also be presented for this purpose.³

Dr. Wiesner asked whether it would not be desirable to advise Ambassador Dean of what limits on production the U.S. contemplated.

Mr. Foster thought the percentage should be small but that it was difficult to decide.

The Secretary asked whether Ambassador Dean could be authorized to say that production would be not more than 10 percent a year? This should be sufficient for maintenance.

Mr. Kaysen noted that this would make the production allowance equal to the proposal percentage for reductions. Although any additional production would be carried out within the ceilings established by the reductions, it would be good to have two figures with the figure for production substantially lower than that for reductions.

Dr. Wiesner recalled a suggestion made by Dr. Haworth on another occasion that production might be limited to ten percent over a three year period.

After some discussion of a formulation to the effect that production would be “substantially lower than 10 percent a year”, the matter was left unresolved.

2. Application of percentage reductions to launching pads

Mr. Foster then called attention to Dr. Wiesner’s proposal that fixed launching pads as well as missiles should be subject to reduction during Stage I. The proposal was a recent one, and there had been no opportunity to examine it in detail. Although the proposal concerned fixed launching pads, Mr. Foster wondered how, for example, Polaris submarines would be counted and noted that since they were already included within a category of armaments subject to reduction, there was danger that they might become subject to a double reduction. He also understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were troubled by the proposal⁴ and feared that it might lead to opening up the issue of foreign bases in Stage I whereas it was now proposed to discuss their reduction as a Stage II measure.

Mr. Gilpatric thought there were definite advantages in getting the concept of reducing launching pads in at the beginning. The availability to the Soviet Union of higher yield missiles magnified the value of their launching pads. Moreover, he thought it easier to inspect the destruction of launching pads than missiles.

Gen. Lemnitzer did not see how Polaris could logically be excluded from a discussion of launching pads and confirmed Mr. Foster’s understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the possibility that the foreign bases issue might be raised if the U.S. proposed a Stage I reduction of launching pads.

Dr. Wiesner acknowledged that the proposal had been advanced only recently. However, it had been realized that we had left a loophole, which he thought it important that we should try to close. It was his understanding that at least in the case of medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union had produced back-up missiles for each launching pad. Consequently, if missiles alone were reduced, the Soviet Union could merely keep filling up the launching pads, and no effective reduction of their capability would take place. He believed that the fact that Polaris submarines were already subject to reduction would eliminate them from consideration in connection with the launching pad problem.

The Secretary saw some advantages in destruction of fixed launching pads if Polaris submarines were not subject to double-counting. He thought that it was desirable to move targets such as launching pads away from populated areas and out to sea and did not understand the point of view of some of the Europeans who apparently felt more comfortable living by the side of strategic targets. Development of the concept of open cities might be one way to save the human race from destruction. He wondered how CIA felt about the matter.

Mr. Marengo responded that unless the proposal were adopted, we would seek to control only missiles, which were easier to hide than launching pads. He confirmed Dr. Wiesner’s understanding that the Soviet Union did keep more than one missile per pad. Consequently, Soviet salvo capability might be untouched by a reduction of missiles alone.

The Secretary concluded that, on balance, the proposal to reduce fixed launching pads should be accepted.

3. Elimination during Stage I of armaments for reserve forces

Mr. Foster noted that the Soviet Union had introduced a new proposal calling during Stage I for the elimination of armaments for reserve forces. ACDA did not feel too strongly about the matter but believed that it might be advantageous to take the Soviet Union up on its offer.

Gen. Lemnitzer recalled that he had at an earlier time been concerned about what might be done with respect to Soviet reserve forces. The new proposal might be a way of getting at this problem, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were worried about its practicability. They did not see any clear way of determining what amounts of armaments were for reserve forces.

The Secretary thought the matter was complicated by the fact that certain reserve stocks are maintained for active forces. He thought it would be difficult to differentiate between such stocks and other stocks for reserve forces.

Gen. Lemnitzer agreed and said that he did not know how this could be done.

Mr. Gilpatric recognized that since the Soviet Union had raised the issue, it was bound to come up. However, he thought it undesirable for the United States to put the proposal in its own “Outline.” Since the matter would come up, it should be studied further.

Mr. Foster agreed not to put the proposal in the “Outline” but noted that we would have to be prepared to respond to the Soviet proposal.

4. Restraints on replacement of armed forces by civilian personnel

Mr. Foster noted that the Soviet Union had proposed that civilian personnel be subject to the Stage I reduction of force levels. The United States could not accept this, but at the same time in view of the greater flexibility of the Soviet Union in replacing military personnel with civilians, it did not seem desirable to leave the matter untouched. ACDA had proposed language which was intended to restrict the replacement of military personnel by civilians.

Mr. Fisher commented that we did not wish to leave room to change the “mix” of civilian and military personnel.

Mr. Gilpatric thought a restriction of this character would prove difficult to police, but he considered the ACDA proposal acceptable.

5. Stage II production

Mr. Foster pointed out that ACDA had proposed that Stage II production be limited to replacement in kind on a one-for-one basis and that Defense had proposed that parts only be produced. ACDA was prepared to accept the Defense proposal if Defense had concluded that production of parts only would meet needs during Stage II.

Mr. Gilpatric confirmed that this was Defense’s conclusion.

The Secretary and Mr. Webb departed at this point.

Mr. Fisher called attention to the fact that in order to provide an opportunity for the President to examine the “Outline” before the meeting scheduled for the next afternoon, it would be necessary to make a revised draft available to the White House by 10:00 a.m. in the morning. Accordingly he requested that any additional comments on the present draft be made available to ACDA as rapidly as possible. In this connection, he inquired whether AEC had had an opportunity to review the language on Stage II proposals respecting nuclear weapons which had been revised in the light of staff level discussions (the proposals referred to appear on p. 48 of the draft of April 11). Dr. Haworth confirmed that the new language was acceptable to AEC and asked, with respect to another matter, whether language respecting the coming into force of the Treaty could not be modified to preclude the possibility that failure of a single state (other than the United States or the Soviet Union) to ratify the Treaty would delay its coming into force. Mr. Fisher agreed to modify the language to preclude this possibility.

Mr. Kaysen then summarized the results of the meeting as follows:

1. Both the Defense and ACDA approaches to the problem of reducing and producing armaments would be presented to the President. In this connection, the question of how to handle the B-47 and the Badger continued to be in disagreement. It should be made clear to the President that the size of the production allowance plays a central role in the merits of the two proposals. If the production allowance were large, there was little difference between the two approaches.

2. Fixed launching pads would be subject to reduction during Stage I.

3. Reduction of armaments for reserve forces would not be proposed but the matter would be studied.

4. Restraints on replacing military personnel with civilians would be proposed in Stage I.

5. Stage II armaments production would be limited to production of parts.

In closing the meeting, Mr. Foster noted the Delegation’s desire that “will” rather than “would” be used in the “Outline”. He thought the drafting and clearances of the “Outline” had proceeded to the stage where it was difficult to adopt the Delegation’s suggestion.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/4-1162. Secret. Drafted by Gathright and approved in ACDA by Foster on April 16 and in S by Emory C. Swank on April 20.
1. The list of 17 participants is not printed.
2. Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 383, ACDA/D Files: FRC 77 A 23, Eighteen Nation Committee)
3. See Document 173.
4. See Document 171.