169. Minutes of Meeting0

Minutes of Meeting with the President on April 6, 1962, on the ACDA Draft Outline of Provisions for a Basic Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament

Secretary Rusk stated there was an urgent need to provide the U.S. delegation at Geneva with an outline of our proposed treaty for general and complete disarmament. He noted that the Soviet delegation had already tabled a draft treaty and that there was considerable pressure on our delegation to begin a detailed discussion of the Soviet document. Therefore, unless the U.S. delegation can table a treaty outline by the end of next week, we will be faced with a serious negotiating problem. He suggested that there be another meeting with the President on Friday, 13 April, following a Principals’ meeting on 11 April, to obtain final agreement on the treaty outline.

The President asked if interagency agreement on all controversial points in the treaty could be obtained by April 13 so that the document could be tabled in Geneva at that time. Mr. Foster responded that agreement could not be expected by that time on all points. The JCS had, for [Page 423] example, asked for more time to consider the military issues involved in the treaty. After the U.S. delegation received the document, it would also have to coordinate it with other delegations. In addition, it was estimated that at least an additional week would be necessary to coordinate the document with the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Rusk stated that he wished to be able to table something in Geneva as soon as possible even if we have to leave some portions of the document in general terms.

The President asked why it was that we were not further along with the treaty draft at this point since we presumably had been working on it for the past several months. Mr. Gilpatric stated that the DOD would have to share some of the blame with ACDA since they had been slow in replying on some policy issues.

Mr. Foster, referring to the attached memorandum to the President,1 stated that the most basic substantive issue to be resolved was the manner in which reductions of armaments and limitations on production could be controlled. He noted that there were now two alternative proposals: (1) percentage reductions by broad categories and limited production within the same categories: (2) percentage reductions by specific types of armaments and limited production within broad categories. He stated his strong preference for the first approach. Mr. Gilpatric stated that the DOD considered the second approach, i.e., reduction by types and production by categories to be the preferable approach. General LeMay said that he was not sure of the consequences of either method, and wanted to reserve judgment pending study. Dr. Wiesner stated that he also endorsed the second alternative. He noted that reduction by types provided a simple, direct approach to the basic problem of treaty which would continue through all stages leading to general and complete disarmament and avoided dangers that might arise from the definitions of categories that we do not at present entirely understand. At the same time, the use of broad categories for limited production in the first stage would permit some flexibility but would not become a matter of over-riding importance in the treaty. Mr. Fisher provided a numerical example of the two approaches and pointed out that from the negotiating point of view he preferred categories since the total number would be progressively reduced for the entire category while under the second approach the total number of items of certain specific types would increase. Dr. Wiesner pointed out under either alternative the total number of items in certain types would increase and that paper categories would not obscure this in the eyes of world opinion. He further emphasized that since production would presumably only take place in the first stage, this would not be a continuing problem.

Mr. Kaysen pointed out that the use of categories was further complicated by the requirement that “destructive capability” as well as numbers [Page 424] be considered in determining reductions and limitations on production. General LeMay commented that the essential problem was to cut the combat potential of both sides and he was not sure how to measure this; it was not simply a counting matter. Dr. Wiesner observed that, considering the problems we were having defining categories within our own government, it would be most difficult to obtain mutually satisfactory definitions with the Soviets since they would obviously try to modify the category definitions to their maximum advantage. Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was his conclusion that, for both the purposes of ourselves and our allies, we should stick to the concept of reduction by types and base continued limited production on some form of categories. Secretary Rusk stated that he continued to feel that the position based on the reduction by types and production by categories would present problems to the negotiators. The President stated that on the basis of what he had heard that, if he had to make a decision today, he would pick the second alternative of reduction by type and production by categories. Dr. Wiesner observed that it was his opinion that this approach was to our advantage from the point of view of security. Mr. Foster stated that he could not accept this conclusion. Mr. Gilpatric stated that alternate drafts covering both approaches be prepared.

Mr. Foster recommended that we incorporate a provision in our treaty calling for the destruction of conventional armaments intended for reserve forces since this provision was included in the Soviet draft treaty of March 15 and would, he believed, be substantially to our advantage. While this would affect our mothball fleet, it would have an even more significant effect on the very large Soviet stockpiled tanks and artillery. Mr. Gilpatric said that the DOD was willing to accept this as an item for bargaining at Geneva.

Mr. Foster recommended that consideration be given to the earlier ACDA proposal to deposit a certain number of B-47’s for destruction provided the Soviet Union deposit an equal number of medium jet bombers. Mr. Gilpatric said that the DOD would go along with this proposal if it were incorporated in the U.S. position. General LeMay objected to a one-for-one trade of B-47’s for Badgers, but agreed that some other ratio might be acceptable. He also raised the question of whether this did not accept the Soviet position on verification of disarmament. Mr. Wilson stated that Mr. Murrow felt that this proposal was actually very transparent since it was generally known that we were going to destroy the B-47 aircraft in any event. The President agreed that this proposal could be made if it were subsequently decided to be desirable in connection with the Geneva negotiations.

The President asked that a small interagency task force be formed to prepare a final draft of the treaty. It was decided that the drafting committee be made up of representatives of ACDA, Defense, JCS and White House.

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Mr. Kaysen observed that the present treaty draft makes very extensive use of the mechanism of the so-called experts commission. He considered this undesirable since it focussed undue attention on secondary problems such as BW-CW and implied a lack of general knowledge on the subjects in question. He suggested that it would be more appropriate to give the IDO general powers in the treaty to study the problems and to discuss any commissions and annexes or appendices to the treaty outline. The President stated that the drafting committee should deal with this recommendation.

Dr. Wiesner stated that the present draft did not specify the states that would have to be party to the treaty in order for the first stage to come into effect or the states that would have to adhere to the treaty as a prerequisite to the transition from Stage I to Stage II. Mr. Foster agreed that this was an important point that had not yet been dealt with in the treaty. The President asked whether adherence of China was a requirement for the second stage. The Secretary said he felt it most certainly should be. Dr. Wiesner suggested that the original parties should include all of the NATO and Warsaw Pact members although it might be adequate to have only the U.S. and USSR as initial parties to the treaty.

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, 18-Nation Conference, Geneva, 4/1/62-4/11/62. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of 14 participants on the last page of the memorandum is not printed.
  2. Not attached, but it was probably Foster’s April 6 memorandum to the President; see footnote 2, Document 168.