170. Editorial Note
On April 9, 1962, the U.S. and British Governments sent a joint statement on nuclear testing to the Soviet Government, and a day later Prime Minister Macmillan sent a short letter to Chairman Khrushchev, asking Khrushchev seriously to consider the proposal set forth in the U.S.-U.K. statement.
Both the joint statement and Macmillan’s letter were developed in a series of personal letters and telephone calls between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy and meetings between Kennedy’s aides and British Ambassador David Ormsby Gore in Washington. The suggestion of a joint appeal to Khrushchev was contained, for example, in Macmillan’s March 20 letter to President Kennedy, which also contained a draft text for such a message. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) See the Supplement. Regarding the draft text, see footnote 2, Document 166. Additional documentation on the preparation of this joint statement is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons, Joint US/UK Statement on Nuclear Testing, 4/10/62, and Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, M-K and K-M, 1961-1962.
The joint statement reiterated the British and U.S. view that international inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union was required in [Page 426] any nuclear test ban treaty in order to determine the nature of unexplained seismic events which might be nuclear tests. The statement asserted, “For nearly three years this need was accepted by the Soviet delegation at Geneva,” but in the most recent negotiations had been “repeatedly rejected” by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Zorin, the Soviet representative at the talks. The joint statement also rejected national detection systems as adequate protection against clandestine tests. “In the present state of scientific instrumentation,” it continued, “there are a great many cases in which we cannot distinguish between national and artificial seismic disturbances as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance and locating its probable epicenter.” The statement concluded with the hope that the Soviet Government might reconsider its position and accept the principle of international verification; but if there was no change in its position, “the [U.S.] test series scheduled for the latter part of this month will have to go forward.” For text of this statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, volume I, pages 292-293.
Macmillan’s April 10 letter personally appealed to Khrushchev “to give the most earnest consideration to our proposal. After all, the object of verification is not to increase suspicion, but to dispel it, to identify an event as a natural one so that confidence may not be threatened. I feel sure that once the principle of international verification is accepted, there will be a real chance of reaching an early agreement as to its application.” For text of the letter, see ibid., page 294.