Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

105. National Security Action Memorandum No. 116⁰

Washington, December 1, 1961.

TO

• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
• Secretary of State
• Secretary of Defense
• Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

The following instructions are issued by the President as the result of a discussion on November 30.¹

1. The list of atmospheric tests presented in letter from the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing to the President dated November 29, 1961,² is approved for the purpose of proceeding with preparations, subject to the following provisos:

A. The list will be reviewed with a view to reduction in the numbers of atmospheric tests, in the length of time of the test series, and in the resulting radioactive fall-out. The NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing should promptly indicate to the President which tests can best be omitted from these points of view.

B. In cooperation with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Dr. Wiesner, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission will at once pursue technical conversations with the British, with a view to a prompt assessment of the likelihood of British consent to effective use of Christmas Island. It will be appropriate in this connection to make available to the British the sort of information contained in the letter of November 29. Such conversations should be so conducted that the Secretary of State can pursue the matter with the British Foreign Secretary in Paris about December 11, if desirable.

C. Preparations will proceed for conducting the series both with and without Christmas Island.

D. Preparations should be based on the assumption that Eniwetok will not be available.

E. A close study and interim report will be made on the question of the practicability of using a Nevada site for a one-KT or two-KT electromagnetic effects test, and conceivably for other particularly appropriate low-yield tests.

F. The Secretary of State, or his representative, is requested to serve as Chairman of a sub-committee of the National Security Council Committee on Atmospheric Testing. This sub-committee should promptly make plans for the best possible program of explanation and justification for a resumption of atmospheric testing on the lines described in the letter of November 29 from the Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing. Representatives of other agencies, such as USIA, should be added to the sub-committee at its Chairman’s discretion.

G. The plans for this test series will be reviewed in the light of the President’s strong desire that the whole series, if ordered, be begun and ended as soon as is consistent with sound planning and satisfactory results.

H. Plans for these tests will also be reviewed in the light of the possibility that further atmospheric testing after this series may become undesirable for political reasons.

I. The Atomic Energy Commission will give urgent attention to the expansion of its long-run capability for underground testing at levels of yield up to a megaton.

J. It must be understood that the President has reserved judgment on the final decision for or against the resumption of atmospheric testing.³

McGeorge Bundy

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 116. Secret; Restricted Data.
1. See Document 104.
2. Document 102.
3. A December 1 memorandum from Gilpatric to the JCS, communicating to them the decisions reached on November 30, reads on this point: “The President has not made the decision whether or not to conduct atmospheric tests. The decision will be reached at the time it is necessary to make a public announcement or about two weeks prior to the first readiness date.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Atomic 400.112, 8 Apr 61 (Dec 61))