106. Memorandum From the Representative to the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (Dean) to Secretary of State Rusk0
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Test Ban Conference
On Thursday, November 30 I gave a lunch at the Hotel des Bergues, Geneva, for the Russian Delegation, British Delegation and United States Delegation to the Nuclear Test Ban Conference. Mr. Tsarapkin sat at my left and Mr. Godber, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the British Delegation, sat at my right.
I steered the conversation with Mr. Tsarapkin to the question as to whether it would not be a good idea to assemble the Soviet, United Kingdom and United States scientists in an effort to review the entire treaty control machinery and to see whether we could not work out something which would be acceptable to the Soviet Union from a control standpoint and from an on-site inspection standpoint.
Mr. Tsarapkin turned to me, and, with complete cordiality but nevertheless with complete firmness, said: “Do you really want to know why we resumed nuclear testing on December 1?”
In reply I said I would be very much interested.
He said: “The sole and only reason we resumed testing was because we were concerned lest you actually were ahead of us in this field of nuclear weapons. We know that you had plans to destroy the Soviet Union and its people with the use of nuclear weapons and when we proposed to end the allied rights in West Berlin by the negotiation of a treaty with East Germany requiring the renegotiation with them of these rights, that you said you would respond if necessary by the use of nuclear weapons in connection with West Berlin, and so far we have not been able to convince you that the signing of a treaty with East Berlin and the ending of your military occupation rights in West Berlin was really realistic in 1961 as compared to 1945.
“Since we knew also that you planned to attack the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, we decided to test. We have carried out a well planned and well executed series of tests and now we know that you are [Page 255] definitely not ahead of us in this field and that if you decide to use nuclear weapons, you will get a little worse than you send. You and your country might as well know that in view of the present tensions in this world, there is no possibility whatsoever of any further negotiations on the nuclear test ban agreement.
“The Soviet Union will not accept any control posts on its territory and will not under any circumstances accept on-site inspections.”
He added also that: “We don’t care what safeguards you place around these control posts or on-site inspections or we don’t care how intelligent and reasonable you may be in attempting to work out this treaty”; and he turned to Mr. Godber and said: “I must admit Mr. Dean has been most constructive and reasonable but we just cannot accept his suggestions in view of the present tension of the world.”
I briefly but pleasantly pointed out that he was wrong in thinking we wanted war or that we objected to their treaty with East Germany, but that we did insist on our rights; and kidded him a little bit about his views. I purposely tried to keep the conversation on a pleasant but firm basis.
Mr. Godber then asked a great many questions and Tsarapkin continued to reply, almost as if he were cranked up, that in view of the present state of tensions in the world that nothing could be worked out except general and complete disarmament and then of course there would be no nuclear weapons to test.
I then suggested that we might meet after the Thursday meeting.
At the conclusion of the Thursday meeting, Mr. Tsarapkin and I called on Mr. Godber in his rooms at the Beau Rivage Hotel. Mr. Godber made a strong and rather an eloquent plea to Mr. Tsarapkin for about twenty minutes to reconsider. In substance, Mr. Tsarapkin again repeated several times the substance of what he had said at lunch and he turned to me and said: “In view of the plans of your militarists to destroy the Soviet Union and its people with nuclear warfare, there just can be no effective negotiation between us no matter how constructive until general and complete disarmament has been signed, sealed and delivered. After that there will be no nuclear weapons. They will all be destroyed so there will be no problem of a nuclear test ban treaty.”
I said I didn’t know to whom he referred as the “militarists” but anyhow the policy of the United States is laid down by the President and not by these alleged militarists and said that I could assure him that the President of the United States and the people of the United States had no wish, intention or desire to destroy the Soviet Union by nuclear warfare and that we did want a nuclear test ban treaty and effective disarmament.
[Page 256]Mr. Tsarapkin said: “I know that you make that statement most sincerely but you don’t know what the militarists in your country are planning.”
I said: “Maybe I don’t know what the alleged militarists are planning, but I do know what the President of the United States is planning and I can assure you he has no such plans and that what he was saying did not make sense.”
I again appealed to him to sit down and see whether on a reasonable basis we could not examine the treaty and its annexes, and the control system or any of its provisions to see if we could not get together. Mr. Godber also made a plea along these lines.
Tsarapkin continued to repeat what he had said before with practically no variations, although he said it a great many times.
The meeting lasted about 1-1/2 hours. The tone was pleasant and not disagreeable, but as far as Tsarapkin was concerned, he seemed to regard it as a finality that there could be no purpose in negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty with controls or effective inspection and that we might as well make our plans accordingly. He said they could easily put it [the new Soviet test ban proposal]1 through the UNGA and that if we tested, they would test. I said an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium was out of the question.
He insisted that they did want general and complete disarmament, but he again repeated the substance of what Mr. Zorin had said to Mr. McCloy and me at the disarmament meetings in New York and Washington that there could be no inspection and control of armaments until general and complete disarmament had been thoroughly and completely carried out.
Both Mr. Godber and I pointed out to him that this was not a very realistic or very constructive position.
Tsarapkin said: “Call it what you will, it is a fact, and you must become realistic in view of what is going on in the world.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 397.5611-GE/12-461. Confidential. This memorandum was sent to the President. Another copy is in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Disarmament, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations 4/28/61-3/62. Other copies were sent to Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, Stelle in Geneva, Foster, Ambassador Stevenson at USUN, McNamara, Allen Dulles, and Seaborg.↩
- Brackets in the source text. For details of the Soviet proposal of November 28, see Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 659-664 and 674-677.↩