104. Editorial Note
Seaborg’s journal for November 30, 1961, reads in part as follows:
“From 5 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. I met with President Kennedy in my capacity as Chairman of the NSC Committee on Atmospheric Testing. Bundy, Wiesner, Bill Foster, Harold Brown, Jerry Johnson, Phil Farley, John Foster, Norris Bradbury, Carson Mark, General Betts, Lee Haworth, Vice President Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone and Spurgeon Keeny were present.
“We presented our case for atmospheric testing, using the criteria laid down by the President. Arguments emphasized the need to test the effects of weapons to develop the AICBM and to test the vulnerability of [Page 251] our weapons, as well as to develop an increased yield to the weight ratio so that our weapons can include protective material to decrease their vulnerability without increasing their weight. Every aspect of confining our testing to underground was explored and the consequences of our not further improving our weapons as much as the Russians were explored to see if this is a tenable position.
“The President finally concluded that the U.S. should resume atmospheric testing, but it would not be announced until shortly before we proceeded with the three-month series to begin about April 1st. The President directed that the presented list be reduced in number. He also directed us to continue negotiations with the U.K. for use of Christmas Island, although we will also use the airdrop method with some instrumentation based on Johnston Island.” (Seaborg, Journal, volume 2, pages 440-441)
According to Colonel Ewell’s account of the White House daily staff meeting held on December 1:
“d. Mr. Bundy said there had been a long discussion on atmospheric testing yesterday. The President was carefully non-committal. However, preparations for same are proceeding, and State has been asked to prepare some public statements to be used when a formal testing program is approved. Mr. Bundy thinks that Bill Foster will probably get the job of preparing these statements. Mr. Bundy said that the problem is that no one test is extremely important in itself, rather it is the cumulative effect. (This represents a definite shift in Mr. Bundy’s understanding of this problem. Previously he has taken a very hard line that because no one test is important we shouldn’t make any.) Bundy then posed the political problem: Is there any conceivable value in an atmospheric test ban which has some type of policing arrangement. He implied that he felt not, due to the possibilities for Russian chicanery, and felt that the proper ploy is to start talking about something else. What ‘something else’ would be was not discussed. My guess would be general disarmament.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Daily Staff Meetings 9-12 61)