313. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk0
I am becoming increasingly concerned that the Soviets may be tempted to shoot down one of our many flights along the periphery of the Soviet Union. While I have been clearing plans for such flights, I am not in a position to weigh the advantages with the risks involved, but they seem to me to be far more numerous than is justified by the present political situation. I would doubt that the Soviets will use force against any flight which does not actually cross into Soviet territory, pending Khrushchevʼs return to Moscow. I think, thereafter, there are two factors that might cause them to attack a plane which came close but did not actually violate Soviet territory.
The first of these factors is what I suspect to be the frustration of the Soviet military over what they probably consider as a series of humiliations. These include the forced withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, the intensive and close surveillance of Soviet shipping, buzzing of Soviet ships, firm actions of Western military forces in Berlin, continual overflights of Soviet installations in Cuba (obviously many of these actions were brought on by Soviet initiatives, but this would not necessarily affect their reaction) etc.
The other factor is that Soviet foreign policy appears to be on dead center and should the Soviet Government decide on a harder course, I suspect that at least some of the Soviet military would press for action against these flights.
I understand that at some time in the past a survey was made attempting to assess the value of these flights against the risks involved, but I wonder if a new assessment is not in order.
- Source: Department of State,S/AL Files: Lot 67 D 2, Thompson Memos. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson and also sent to Ball, Deputy Under Secretary of State Johnson, and Thomas Hughes, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.↩