312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy0
SUBJECT
- Conclusion of a Civil Air Agreement with the USSR
You have asked whether this would be a good time for us to go ahead with the air agreement with the Soviet Union.1 After careful consideration, we do not believe that we should proceed now to sign this agreement.
You will recall that at the time the bilateral air agreement was initialed (August 21, 1961) we refused to sign it on the grounds that the international [Page 662] situation made it undesirable to conclude such an agreement. There have been no developments in the international situation which in our view make it any more desirable to sign this agreement now. In addition, a new factor has entered into the picture since August 1961. During the past year and a half the Soviets have been making a concerted effort to extend their civil air lines to and through the underdeveloped countries of the world. We have resisted this Soviet effort, with some success. Our success has been greatest in hampering Soviet efforts to establish a convenient air link with Cuba. The conclusion of the Civil Air Agreement between the United States and the USSR would seriously impair our ability, which is in any case limited, to persuade underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa and Latin America, to refuse overflight and other air rights being sought by the Soviets. Before we sacrifice this position, we should obtain something from the Soviets in return. In our opinion, there would have to be some development representing a major step in improving our relations with the Soviet Union before the air agreement would be in our interest. The conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement or the achievement of a modus vivendi over Berlin would represent such a development. It might then be argued that the air agreement would give added impetus to further improvements in our relations with Moscow and lead to further agreements.
The main arguments in favor of concluding the Air Agreement with the USSR now are (1) that it would improve the international atmosphere and might encourage a more forthcoming attitude on the part of the Soviets on more important issues and (2) that it would facilitate the expansion of Soviet tourism in the United States which is restricted among other reasons by a shortage of foreign exchange. The first of these arguments is of doubtful validity. The Soviets give every appearance of being in a period of reassessment and of having yet to decide what their attitude and policies toward the West should be. We do not feel that at this juncture our willingness to sign the air agreement, which is of relatively minor significance, would tip the scales in the minds of the Soviet leadership, beset as it is with such weighty problems as the Chinese Communist challenge. Indeed, we would be in an awkward position if, after we signed the agreement, the Soviets adopted a harder line toward us as some internal evidence suggests may be in the offing.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, AV 4 US-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Guthrie and cleared in draft by Thompson, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Philip H. Trezise, M, and TRC. Attached to the source text was a memorandum from Tyler to Rusk, recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President and noting that similar considerations influenced U.S. thinking in regard to pursuing a U.S.-USSR consular convention.↩
- This was done in a memorandum from the President, March 29, which reads: “Would this be a good time for us to go ahead with the air agreement with the Soviet Union?” (Ibid.)↩