314. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to the President, April 3, 1963, Attorney General Kennedy reported that he had received that afternoon from Ambassador Dobrynin a lengthy “talking paper” that was “ostensibly to me from the Ambassador” but in fact “from Khrushchev to the President.” The Attorney General indicated that he had returned the paper to Dobrynin because “it was so insulting and rude.” However, he summarized its major points in his memorandum to the President. Regarding the test ban, he stated that Khrushchev wanted it “clearly understood” that “the Soviet Union will not go above their offer of two or three inspection sites. There was absolutely no need to go above that figure as our [U.S.] scientists had clearly demonstrated.” The United States, Khrushchev asserted further, was “trying to obtain a greater number in order to commit espionage. In these efforts we were treating the Soviet Union as inferiors—as if we could dictate to them. The United States had better learn that the Soviet Union was as strong as the United States and did not enjoy being treated as a second class power.” Regarding Cuba, Khrushchev stated that “the continued pressure on the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of troops from Cuba was not going to be effective.” He claimed, however, that the Soviets “had already withdrawn twice as many troops as the largest number that had appeared in the newspapers here in the United States.” For text of both Kennedyʼs memorandum and Khrushchevʼs message, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VI, pages 250–265.