Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

265. Memorandum of Conversation Between the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)⁰

Washington, November 15, 1962.

[Here follow 7 pages of discussion on the Cuban missile crisis.]

The conversation then switched abruptly to broader questions involving long-range US-USSR relations. I remarked that once we clear up the remaining elements of the Cuba controversy, it may fairly be said that both countries are moving towards a crossroads of great decisiveness. The next five years might either see a great and costly intensification of the present conflict or a conscientious effort by both sides to negotiate a genuine and lasting settlement.

Dobrynin said facetiously that although he agreed with my general view, he would like to stretch my five years to six years since this was the likely life of the Kennedy Administration, and who could tell what would follow it.

He then asked me to spell out more clearly what steps I felt were necessary to bring about this better relationship. I suggested four points:

1. The Soviet Union must become convinced that its attempts to spread communism throughout the world are no longer worth the efforts and the risks. The policy-makers in the USSR must understand that we Americans view international communism as an ideological instrument designed and directed by the Soviet Union to destroy us and all other independent peoples.

I suggested that this effort is doomed to failure not because the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe prefer a world run by America, but because people are committed to their own futures which are bound to be deeply diversified.

I remarked that I had just returned from Africa and I could assure him that no African wants to be Russianized, Americanized, Sinocized, or Anglicized; they want to become free, independent people in their own right.

In this respect, our task was much easier than the Sovietsʼ because we are striving to give people that opportunity, and we are sophisticated enough to realize that they are not necessarily going to become our devoted supporters in the process.

Indeed, if the Alliance for Progress succeeded, it was possible that Latin American nations would on occasion see the world situation quite differently than we simply because they had developed a greater sense of independence and self-confidence. If so, we would be quite satisfied since it would also mean they were now impervious to subversion from any outside source.

2. The US and the USSR must come to understand each otherʼs commitments and to help each other to disentangle ourselves from situations which are to no oneʼs advantage.

Under no circumstances, however, could the Soviets expect us to turn our backs on our allies, any more than we expect them to abandon theirs.

3. A nuclear test-ban and eventual arms control were vital. An intensification or even a continuation of the present arms race is not only costly to each of us, but also extremely dangerous.

Moreover, if this conflict continues indefinitely, important groups of people in both the USSR and the USA will develop increasing material and psychological stakes in maintaining the present political and military impasse indefinitely. This will mean that each government will gradually lose its ability to change the basic situation.

4. We must cooperate in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers. It would be particularly dangerous if China should secure nuclear weapons.

Dobrynin asked about Germany. I said that while we had no desire to see the West Germans develop a nuclear capacity, we carry major responsibility for their defense, and this can only be assured with a nuclear capacity in the hands of our troops.

Dobrynin added that many of his associates felt we have been encouraging the reactionary elements in Germany. I denied this, stressing that when Stalin armed the East Germans, we had to choose between a much more major U.S. force in Europe or arms for the West Germans.

Dobrynin asked if my views about a summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev had changed. I stated that I saw nothing to change the situation since our last talk,¹ when he and I had agreed that it would be a mistake to hold a summit meeting unless there were clear areas of agreement which we knew in advance could be isolated and announced.

I said that in addition to Cuba, which I hoped we could get out of the way soon, perhaps the most fruitful area for agreement would be in nuclear testing.

Dobrynin replied that while he agreed with my response in general, he would like to have us understand that Soviet concern about underground testing was genuine. The USSR, he said, does not have access to large underground caves, as does the United States, and the cost of preparing such caves is very expensive. In respect to weapons adapted to underground testing, he added frankly, the USSR is now behind and does not want to see its disadvantage further increased.

I suggested that at least we could announce agreement on atmosphere and under-water testing and possibly work out an agreement that would bring our scientists together for a stated period to work out an inspection system that would enable us to agree to a ban on underground testing. I emphasized that in making this suggestion I was speaking for myself, for in no sense was I an expert.

The conversation then switched to India. Dobrynin asked whether I felt the war between China and India was likely to become more serious. I suggested facetiously that he was in a better position to answer his own question since the petroleum products on which the Chinese were dependent must be coming largely from the USSR and, considering the long supply lines, the undertaking must be a major one.

Dobrynin soberly remarked that the Soviet Union is extremely worried about the conflict, that China was an “ally” and India a “good friend”, and that frankly this placed the USSR in a difficult position.

Although his government had not made any specific suggestions as to how the conflict could be settled (he did not know whether the McMahon Line was proper or not), he felt that every effort should be made to end the fighting since otherwise it could spread.

I then asked if Nehru had been correct in stating that the USSR was planning to carry out its commitment to ship MIG-21s to India. Dobrynin said that although he had had no recent word from his government, a commitment had been made and he assumed that it would be carried out. Nevertheless, it was embarrassing since it had been made under quite different circumstances, i.e. before the outbreak of serious fighting between the Chinese and the Indians.

I remarked that it would be my assumption that the Soviets would like to have some kind of truce within the next 30 days which would allow them to carry out their commitment to send the Indians MIGs, without arousing the ire of the Chinese. However, it was my feeling that the conflict would continue at least into next summer.

When Dobrynin asked why I dismissed the possibility of a quicker settlement, I pointed out that Indian public opinion had been greatly aroused, and even Nehru could not turn it off if he wanted to. Indeed, I could image only one way that a truce could become possible in the next few weeks: the willingness of the Chinese to back away completely from their present position, a willingness which could only be produced if the Soviets clamped down hard on Chinese petroleum supplies.

Failing this development, I suggested that the Indians would not be willing to accept a truce until they felt more confident of their ability to handle the Chinese militarily.

In closing, the conversation turned to Southeast Asia. I stated that I had talked that morning with Averell Harriman who was deeply concerned about the situation in Laos. Although, Souvanna Phouma was doing his best, the Pathet Lao were continuing to create difficulties. It was clear to everyone that the main source of trouble is in Hanoi. What could the USSR do to help settle this question?

Dobrynin replied that we could count on the willingness of the USSR to do its utmost in regard to Laos. Mr. Khrushchev felt that he had a specific commitment to President Kennedy in this area which he intended to carry out.

I suggested that the real trouble-makers in Southeast Asia were the Viet Minh. Was it not possible for the USSR to get better control of the situation either through supplies or through other means of dealing with the Hanoi government? As long as the Viet Minh continued to supply the Viet Cong there would be trouble in Vietnam, and we would have to stand our ground.

We could not allow the Viet Minh to upset the South Vietnam government, and we had the capacity to keep them from doing so. However, the sooner we could settle these problems, the fewer lives would be lost, and the less danger would exist of providing an opening for the Chinese.

As we walked towards the door, I again reminded Dobrynin that he must not assume that the views I expressed necessarily represented those of my government; that I had simply expressed my own frank thoughts in the hope that they might be helpful to him in understanding the way we looked at the present situation.

Throughout this two-hour freewheeling, give-and-take conversation, Dobrynin was relaxed and pleasant; he talked with a general air of frankness.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks. Confidential.
1. See Document 246.