264. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
SUBJECT
- Soviet Information Policies
The Embassy recommends that the Department, in any appropriate discussions of outstanding problems with the Soviet Government which might follow satisfactory resolution of the Cuban missile problem, place Soviet information policy high on the agenda as the greatest single cause of misunderstanding between the two countries.
In calls on Soviet officials, I have made a practice of raising our concern over Soviet jamming of U.S. broadcasts, stating I find this the most shocking single reminder of the past in the Soviet Union. Some, although not all nor necessarily the most influential, Soviet officials are sensitive to criticism of jamming. Certainly many Soviet citizens resent jamming.
I have placed great emphasis in official conversations here on the Presidentʼs belief in effective communications with the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of our efforts to preserve peace. This means both private and public communications. As regards public communications, I think we are at the moment in a good tactical position to press for modification of the practically total censorship of U.S. foreign policy statements by the Soviet press, radio, and television. If the Soviet Government had earlier allowed wide dissemination of U.S. statements on Cuba (specifically, the Presidentʼs September statements), it could hardly have gotten itself—and the world—into the predicament it eventually found itself in.
It may be helpful to point to the fact that at the height of the tension during the first week of the Cuban crisis, the Soviet press finally published two statements by President Kennedy. This presentation of the other side of the question clearly aided the Soviet Government to explain its own actions. We should press for this kind of presentation. We do not object to criticism or press attacks on our position as long as our position is made known.
The Embassy is not sanguine that drastic modification of Soviet information policy is likely to be obtained. It is even more probable in the difficult period of stress and policy review which can be expected to take place here that Soviet information policy will be even more rigid. But the vivid examples of the need for better communications at all levels is there [Page 573] to be used, and the Embassy suggests it should be exploited in discussions of outstanding problems with the Soviets.
American Ambassador
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/11-962. Confidential. Drafted by Eugene S. Staples, USIA, cleared in draft with Davies, and approved by McSweeney.↩