Attachment2
NEGOTIATIONS
- 1.
-
The Three Soviet Options. Broadly
speaking, there are now three major options open to the Soviets:
- (a)
- To proceed at forced draft to try to close what they
regard as the missile gap—or, more precisely, the
imbalance in nuclear power—by accelerated programs for
missile submarines, ICBMs, missile defense, weapons or
platforms in space, etc.
- (b)
- To continue current military programs and lines of
foreign policy, with no radical changes, while they tidy
up the worldwide mess they are in and sort out a new
line of strategy and tactics, as after Stalinʼs death,
in the light of their assessment of U.S. and free world
strengths, vulnerabilities, and intentions.
- (c)
- To assess the present crisis as demonstrating that the
effort to extend Soviet power by nuclear weapons and
nuclear blackmail has failed and to turn seriously to
arms control and disarmament, and to more pacific means
for the extension of Soviet influence.
The first or second option could be accompanied, on the
diplomatic level, by no general negotiations; by pro forma
negotiations; by limited agreements that create an atmosphere of
détente, without fully committing the USSR to a particular long course; or by an effort
during negotiations to project to the world that big movements
forward were possible, without, in fact, concluding serious
agreements.
Moreover, the Soviets will not necessarily make an immediate
choice among these options. Should they, for example, have a
preference for 1(c), they might still feel that it would be
better to delay until the impact of the Cuban crisis had been
dissipated, or even until they had succeeded in restoring their
power image.
It is consequently important that the US not treat first Soviet
responses as finally indicative of the path they are willing to
follow. We should, as is proposed below, have in mind a full
“negotiation scenario”, but should be flexible as to the timing
of its inception.
Whichever alternative is chosen, the Soviets are likely to try to
use a phase of negotiations to encourage the West to relax and,
above all, to reduce its military outlays and
alertness.
- 2.
-
Broad Implications for U.S. Policy. The
objective of U.S. policy should be to move the Soviets to
conclude that their interests are best served by pursuing the
course outlined under 1(c). The implications of this objective
for our negotiating posture are discussed in this paper.
Nonetheless, the first requirement of U.S. (and Alliance) policy
is to proceed on the assumption, until firm evidence justifies
another view, that the Soviets may seek by other and more
expensive moves to correct the nuclear imbalance which their
Cuban adventure failed to achieve. U.S. intelligence alertness
to, and an evident willingness to block or offset, such other
Soviet moves to retrieve their nuclear position are required (i)
for purposes of national security, (ii) to maintain the
favorable nuclear backdrop to our current diplomacy, and (iii)
to convince responsible men in Moscow over the longer pull that
the only realistic course open to them is effectively inspected
arms control and disarmament.
As between the second and third alternatives—a standstill or
forward movement towards détente and arms control—only the test
of serious negotiations (or a flat Soviet refusal to negotiate)
can provide an answer.
To some degree, the choice made by Moscow will depend on our
posture. The President has clearly signalled that we are
prepared to negotiate seriously when the commitments made with
respect to Cuba have been fully implemented. A continuance of
that stance is one factor
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which will affect the Soviet choice. In
addition, the choice will be affected by whether the U.S. and
its allies show continued determination to develop their
military strength; to maintain their unity on vital issues; and
to move forward towards European unity and the Atlantic
partnership—developments which the Soviets rank only below U.S.
nuclear strength, in power terms.
- 3.
- Two U.S. Tracks. Should negotiations occur,
we should be fully prepared, in terms of staff work, to move along
either of two tracks: one relatively conservative, the other
representing an effort to grapple more fundamentally with the major
issues of international security.
- 4.
- Track A. This should consist of measures,
already well staffed by ourselves, in many cases familiar to our
allies—and some already explored with the USSR, which would range from a tidying up of the status
quo to limited, but in some cases very significant, movement
forward. Such items are listed below. More detailed negotiating
positions covering these items are listed, where appropriate, in
Appendix A.3
Bilateral US-Soviet
Cooperation
- (a)
- US-USSR Civil Air Agreement.
Should only be signed as part of a larger settlement, since the
disadvantages involved in acting on this proposal in isolation would
outweigh the advantages.
- (b)
- Laos. Action effectively to implement Geneva-Laos accord should be
a prerequisite to broad US-Soviet progress.
- (c)
- “War Against Disease”. Joint US-Soviet or WHO arrangements for combined attack on major health
problems of common interest.
- (d)
- Strengthening the UN. Agreement to
the election of U Thant for a
five-year term and possibly other measures to strengthen the UN.
- (e)
- Joint Space Ventures. US-Soviet cooperation in certain outer space
ventures. Movement along three lines agreed between Dryden and Blagonravov, June 1962.4
Arms Control
- (a)
- Safeguards Against War by Miscalculation.
Installation of direct communications facilities between national
command centers in Washington and Moscow. Exchange of US and Soviet,
or NATO and Warsaw Pact, military
missions. Advance notification of military movements. Commission to
study measures to reduce risk of war by miscalculation.
- (b)
- Denuclearized Latin American Zone.5
- (c)
- Denuclearized African Zone.6
- (d)
- Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons. US and
Soviet declarations not to transfer nuclear weapons and know-how to
individual nations pending attempt to work out more general
arrangements, with explicit proviso exempting true multilateral
arrangements.
- (e)
- Outer Space. Declaratory commitment not to
station weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
- (f)
- Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
- (g)
- Total Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This would
include effective inspection in the USSR for underground tests.
- (h)
- Norstad Zone. Inspection of a limited
European Zone against surprise attack.
A Modus Vivendi on Berlin
- (a)
- Berlin. An exchange of “Solution C” type
declarations which did not purport to be a final resolution of the
Berlin question, accepting East German substitution under existing
access procedures, with various fringe additions—UN presence, ban on atomic arms in
Berlin, dilution of the Wall, etc.
- (b)
- Germany. Mixed commissions to increase
inter-German contacts.
- (c)
- Borders. Declarations of non-use of force
to change demarcation line and external frontiers, contingent on a
satisfactory Berlin arrangement.
- (d)
- Non-Aggression Declarations by NATO and Warsaw Pact powers,
contingent on a satisfactory Berlin arrangement.
- 5.
-
Track B. This should consist of more
radical measures, designed more fundamentally to solve certain
security problems in Europe and definitely to turn down the arms
race. We need to staff out Track B, and to consult with our
allies about at least its disarmament aspects, in order to be
prepared to respond to any evidence that Khrushchev, for whatever
reasons, might wish to deal constructively with such proposals.
Such proposals are listed below, with more detailed negotiating
positions on each in Appendix B:7
- (a)
- Expanded Berlin/Germany
Proposal. This would involve an improved
position for Berlin via either (i) an all-Berlin
solution, or (ii) more secure non-Communist control of
access to West Berlin and a change in the juridical
status of West Berlin which keeps present Western
forces. For Germany, it would provide a stretchout of
the Western Peace Plan from the present 2½ years to 7-10
years, possibly combined with some of the other
Berlin/German arrangements suggested in Track A, to
secure Soviet acceptance of an improved Berlin
arrangement.
- (b)
- Far-Reaching Disarmament. This
would involve limitations on armaments short of general
and complete disarmament.
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If Khrushchev should move
down a more radical track in respect of disarmament, he is
almost certain to do so because he has now firmly decided that
it is impossible to achieve a nuclear balance via the arms race,
in the face of Western resources, without excessive economic
burdens on the Soviet Union, including economic constraints on
its foreign policy.
If he moves down the more radical track on Berlin/Germany, it
might be because he believed that this would contribute to the
reduction of armaments suggested above, or because he wished a
reduction of tensions for other reasons (e.g., to avert an
imminent crisis), or because his thinking had cleared
sufficiently to enable him to appreciate that such a
Berlin/Germany solution would be in his interest as well as
ours.
- 6.
- The Position at the Bargaining Table. In
looking forward to negotiations, it is important that we be clear
about one point: With respect to Cuba and the offensive missiles, we
mounted bargaining power—military and, to some extent,
political—which was capable of producing a dramatic result. Aside
from the new credibility of our military posture and the favorable
military balance we command, we shall bring to the bargaining table
on the issues listed below no such pressures and advantages as we
enjoyed in the Caribbean. Whatever bargaining positions we may
devise, we should be clear that Moscow will be under no great
compulsion to accept formulae which are not evenly balanced as
between our interests and theirs.
- 7.
-
Basic Elements for a Negotiating
Scenario.
Aside from decisions on the substance of the draft negotiating
positions attached in Appendices A and B, there appear to be
three steps required in moving towards negotiation.
- (a)
- An internal U.S. government decision
to negotiate and to approve the concepts, agenda,
and terms we intend to bring to the table. This
is urgent business. Many—if not most—of the items listed
under Track A do not require new US policy decisions.
Track B would generally require new decisions.
- (b)
- Consultation with Allies. We
have handled the Cuban crisis on our own and, broadly,
to the satisfaction of our allies; but we must evidently
correct the notion that we intend to make unilateralism
(or bilateralism with the USSR) a habit. Even if we should be pointed
toward a meeting of the Big Two we must scrupulously
consult in advance. On the other hand, it is our
interest to maintain in diplomacy the unambiguous role
of leadership we assumed in crisis. We should,
therefore, discuss with our allies the possibilities on
arms control and Berlin/Germany proposals in Track A,
although the French reaction may be chilly.
- (c)
- Explorations with the
USSR. After
consultation with allies and assuming agreement to
negotiate, we must explore with the USSR our concept of how
negotiations should proceed and establish a forum both
for quiet bilateral discussion of the agenda and for
preliminary negotiation to establish which, if any,
issues are likely to prove negotiable.
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Essentially, there are three possible points of initial contact and for
subsequent preliminary negotiation: Moscow, New York, and Washington. On
the whole, Washington represents the optimum locus, among other reasons
because we have in the quadripartite Ambassadorial Group a ready
instrument for quick consultation with our major allies.
If it emerges that there is likely to be some serious business to do at
higher levels, the possibility of a Foreign Ministers meeting (either
bilateral with the USSR, or of the four
occupying powers of Germany if Berlin is involved) might be
considered.
Or we might go to a summit; a decision on this point now would be
premature.
Our general posture towards summitry should return to the post-Vienna
formula: We are prepared for a summit meeting—bilateral or otherwise;
but we do not believe that one should take place unless we are assured
that both sides are tolerably clear, before the event, as to the
purposes of a summit—whether it is for specific negotiations (in which
case some prior assurance of significant forward movement would be
necessary) or whether it is a general probing and atmospheric operation
rather than a negotiation.
The purpose of a negotiating summit from our point of view would be
threefold: to ratify agreements roughed out in advance; to permit the
President to explore possible further avenues for negotiation in direct
confrontations with Khrushchev;
and to permit the test of negotiations at the highest level to help
clarify basic Soviet intentions with respect to the three options
presented on page 1 of this paper.
If such a negotiating summit were bilateral, some issues of bilateral
concern to the US and USSR (e.g.,
safeguards against miscalculation) could be agreed and others of broader
concern (e.g., Berlin and Germany) could only be discussed, and the US
and Soviet Foreign Ministers then instructed to pursue the matter with
the other parties directly concerned, i.e., in a Four Power forum.
It is altogether possible that the post-crisis period will unfold in such
a way that the second and third aspects of the scenario cannot be
cleanly separated; that is, explorations with our allies and with the
USSR. Under these circumstances, it
is peculiarly important that we establish soon a flexible and
responsible instrument for steady consultation with our allies, so that
we can keep in step and avoid any further imputation that we are
proceeding from a direct bilateral military confrontation to a bilateral
negotiation, in which Alliance interests are not adequately expressed.
As noted above, the Ambassadorial Group in Washington appears the
optimum candidate.
