Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

262. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 9, 1962, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Communication to the Secretary from Lord Home

PARTICIPANTS

• British
  • Sir David Ormsby Gore
• US
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Cash

The Secretary began by saying that the US has no difficulty with paragraphs 1 through 7 of the communication from Lord Home.¹ This is about how we see the situation. It would be a great mistake for any of us to draw general conclusions from the Cuban affair, and the British paper makes this very clear. We had overwhelming conventional capability in the Cuban area, and this is not true in other areas. The big question we must think about is what effect the Cuban crisis will have on Moscowʼs thinking. The Secretary said that before Cuba he had thought we were in for some bad months ahead. This had not been based on anything very precise. We would suppose that during the Spring the Soviets must have had a review of their policy. They had a lot of problems and had to decide whether they should embark on a period of rather inactive peaceful coexistence, or whether they should press hard. The decision was probably taken to follow the bolder line. We donʼt really know who drew guns on whom in the Kremlin during the Cuban crisis.

Sir David asked if the Secretary meant that the Soviets had decided to pursue a forward policy, and the missiles in Cuba were a part of this.

The Secretary said yes, the Soviets must have made their missile decision by the first of July. This was a major operation.

All of this may mean, the Secretary continued, that the Soviets will now go in for a crash program in building up their nuclear strength. Had the Cuban venture worked, it would have achieved some of this at a cheap price. But the Soviets may well now take a breather before their crash program. They might go in for a thoughtful reassessment, tidying up here and there, seeing what they can do, but not making too great an effort. Or they might decide that this is a more dangerous world than they had thought and consequently be more serious about disarmament and settling various questions. We just donʼt know what they will do, but it would be a great mistake to assume that they are routed. It is very important that the Chancellor not feel that now is the time to push the Soviets into a corner. We wonder how much margin Khrushchev has left. He may have used up a good deal of his political capital, and we should not try to “rub his nose in it” at this time. Whether the Soviets are going into a crash buildup or into a period of reflection, they might be more disposed toward a modus vivendi on Berlin along the lines of the “principles paper.”² They might be interested in a pause—a further delay.

Sir David said there was some difference between an actual modus vivendi and a pause. A pause might not be too good for the West. The British prefer an actual modus vivendi.

The Secretary said he did not wish to exaggerate what would be changed by a Soviet crash buildup. They would have to have an almost unbelievable first-strike capability. The present situation almost passes rationality in terms of the damage both sides can inflict. The Cuban affair must have disturbed the Sovietsʼ thought that we are too sane to go to war. The predictors of US reaction in the Kremlin must be confused by this episode, and this may be all to the good.

At the moment, the Secretary continued, he did not see any Berlin settlement that would be acceptable to the West and that would appear to be acceptable to the Soviets. We ought to look hard to see if such a settlement might be worked out. The Germans may have some new ideas. But if Khrushchev has really passed a divide in Soviet policy and has won out in not really risking war, there may possibly be some chance of a settlement giving us what we need and leaving him free to sign his treaty.

Sir David said that the British paper dealt with the situation where the Soviets had raised the Berlin issue. The British wonder if there is anything we can now do to influence the Kremlin to make the right decision.

The Secretary said that we would like to find points where this is possible, and disarmament is high on the list. Cuba was basically a part of the arms race and an excellent example of what can happen if it goes on. We donʼt know whether we can get anywhere on nuclear testing. Maybe we can get somewhere if we can make on-site inspection invitational. We would have to be the judge of unreasonable refusal. We could not run any risk.

Sir David said a distinction should be made between a policy to encourage Khrushchev and the kind of policy that should be followed if it is discovered he has taken up the right option. Some of what is in the British paper assumes that Khrushchev will come to the decision to attempt real coexistence and might wish to reach a modus vivendi. The question is how we can save his face. This might be more easily done in the NATO-Warsaw Pact context.

The Secretary said that the US in the public exchanges on Cuba had used very general language concerning NATO-Warsaw Pact arrangements. One thing we can now expect is a lot of political and propaganda effort against foreign bases. We are in for a real battle on this. If Khrushchev is looking for a way to put Berlin on ice, this should not be too difficult. We could use the modus vivendi approach.

Sir David agreed but asked whether this should be done simply in the Berlin context.

The Secretary said the “principles paper” provides a much broader context. The US would be glad to have further Foreign Office thoughts on further revisions of the “principles paper.”

The Secretary said he wished to give Sir David the latest information on Cuba. The best judgment of the US is that the Soviets have made a real effort to remove the missiles, but we still have the problems of the bombers and on-site verification. It may be that Castro is the problem, but if the Soviets insist, he would have no other choice. Our problem is that we cannot settle just for the missiles. We must get the bombers out and have verification.

Sir David asked if this verification must continue forever or be for a limited time.

The Secretary said we must have assurance for a considerable period of time that this venture is not going to be repeated. Air surveillance can accomplish a certain amount. Perhaps the Brazilian proposal for an atom-free Latin America³ opens the way. One reason that verification is necessary is that if the deception is repeated, it will be hard to avoid war. We have the impression that Mikoyan is trying to get Castro to go along with the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.⁴

Sir David said that otherwise it would be hard to explain the length of time Mikoyan is spending in Havana.

The Secretary said we had had a report yesterday from a Soviet member of theUN Secretariat to the effect that the Soviets would take the bombers out of Cuba but would then embark on an intensive campaign against US bases everywhere. Our impression is that the Soviets wish to leave Berlin lying there. There is danger in thinking we have to rush to please Khrushchev.

Sir David said the question is whether there is now an opportunity to make Europe less explosive. We should look at the disarmament side. The messages exchanged indicated that we would. This could be kept separate from Berlin or Central Europe. Sir David said his impression was that the Secretary thought we should wait awhile.

The Secretary said “Yes.”

He said he had been giving further thought to convincing NATO that we must have available to us in a crisis the maximum range of possibilities. We must pay attention to our conventional forces. We must avoid having to make a choice between a nuclear response or capitulation.

The Secretary said he was also a little more impressed with the necessity of trying to create a pause in a crisis. This had been critical in the Cuban crisis. It had been felt that the Soviets had to be given a period of time in which to rectify their mistake.

Sir David said his impression was that London was wondering whether a broad East-West exchange should now take place into which Berlin would be subsumed. This might include surprise attack, war by miscalculation, nonproliferation, etc. Within this general exchange we might find that the Soviets were prepared to leave Berlin alone. The Soviets could say that all the other arrangements had lessened the dangers of war. Sir David asked whether this was a good approach—whether we should leave Berlin to stew for a while and turn to disarmament.

The Secretary said that this gets involved in the question of freezing the status quo. Unless the Soviets abandon their doctrine of world revolution, any NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty would be very unilateral indeed. They would go ahead and do what they want, and we would be fixed. It would turn out to be a very lopsided arrangement. The Secretary added that he really didnʼt see yet that the Soviets were ready to abandon their theory of world revolution.

Sir David agreed but said they could practice this theory in two ways—play it long, or take risks.

The Secretary said he believed the Soviets were losing faith in the inevitable triumph of Communism, and this might make them turn to a more active program.

Sir David said they could play it either way.

The Secretary said there had been times in which he had thought Khrushchev might be appealed to as being the man who really built up Russia, but every so often he was reminded that Khrushchev was really an old Bolshevik. Cuba had set things back a long way.

Sir David said the British wondered how we could set about finding out what kind of a disarmament package might be possible. In view of the total lack of confidence on both sides, no one really believed in disarmament. Cuba makes strict verification and control necessary. It is probable that we can make progress only on collateral measures such as the test ban, nonproliferation, and perhaps outer space. The Soviets might be interested in this field. If so, how do we discover what they are interested in? It might be far more sensible to have a private US-USSR discussion.

The Secretary said this was possible, but it would be extremely uncomfortable for the US if our friends were sitting on the sidelines not giving us their confidence. In this connection he had in mind the Germans, the French, and others.

Sir David agreed. He added that he supposed the Secretary would be talking to the Germans about nonproliferation.

The Secretary said he would be talking to Schroeder about this. The German anxiety, he added, was not so much concerned with the Soviet Union but with their prestige vis-a-vis the British and the French.

Sir David said when it came to the test ban the Russians would not come forward unless there were some indication that the French were prepared to come along.

The Secretary said that outer space could be taken care of by a common US-USSR declaration.

Sir David said this might be an example of East-West agreement with verification on both sides.

The Secretary said if we could give the Soviets full knowledge of our information concerning them, they would be a little surprised. We could say that the Soviets could forget about their obsession with secrecy because we already know so much.

Sir David said we must remember the 1959 agreement of the Soviets to inspection.⁵ The wheel might turn again. The thing the Soviets probably fear most is Westerners bringing back stories about the level of the standard of living in the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said the Soviets may underestimate our knowledge and overestimate the value of secrecy.

Sir David said he took it that the Secretary was not too happy about sounding out the Russians as to the question of in what areas progress might be made concerning collateral measures.

The Secretary said this was certain to occur, but it was an uncomfortable position.

Sir David asked how the French might be brought in.

The Secretary said he didnʼt know whether there was any possibility of doing so.

Mr. Tyler said much would depend on the results of the French elections.

The Secretary said that personally he would think it might be advisable to have a NATO-Warsaw Pact military center where strange phenomena could be checked as to their meaning—movements of troops, radar blips, etc. This could not do any damage, and it might perhaps do some good.

Sir David said that the two big questions were: 1) what the Russians are interested in; and 2) how do we involve our most important allies.

The Secretary said that one thing the British could help with would be to find a way to make it clear to Europe that what the British would like to see is a special relationship between a united Europe and the US—not just between the UK and the US. This matter is much in the French, German and Italian minds. The whole sense of a special relationship is a very dangerous thing.

Sir David said this was one problem in the UK getting into the EEC.

The Secretary said at some time the American people were going to become very sensitive to the notion that we are the gendarmes of the universe, and that the scale of our commitment in Europe is disproportionate to Europeʼs commitment. This is something Europe can correct. It does not make sense for the US to provide both the nuclear and the conventional support.

Sir David said that he would like to go back to procedure on the disarmament side. If Kuznetsov goes on talking to Dean, will we have any clear idea of what the Soviets wish to raise? We should come to some conclusions as to who should talk to the Russians.

The Secretary said that we will get back to Geneva this month, and this would be the best place for this discussion.

Sir David asked if the US had thought of conducting discussions on some other level.

The Secretary replied that we do not wish to get much involved in other questions until Cuba is settled. But once Cuba is settled, we would wish to check with the Soviets on a number of things on which we might make headway. But the procedures would be the normal ones, Geneva on disarmament, possibly one or two more bilateral talks on Berlin, etc.

Sir David said the British were wondering if this were the right approach. They were wondering whether there should not perhaps be a high level US-USSR exchange to see in what areas progress could be made.

The Secretary said he was afraid that a certain untidiness in these soundings was inevitable. Otherwise we would have a terrible problem with our allies.

Sir David said there would be no problem with the British.

The Secretary said no, but there would be with the others, and we did not wish to raise these problems with our allies. He realized that this was not a good time for the British to take on General de Gaulle. Perhaps we could get the Germans to get the French to occupy some of the chairs they had left empty.

Turning back to Lord Homeʼs communication, the Secretary said he was very pleased to see that our general assessments of the post-Cuba situation were very similar.

Sir David said he took it that on Berlin the US would like more time.

The Secretary said that if London has more ideas concerning a NATO-Warsaw Pact arrangement, the US would like to hear them. If the fact is that we remain in Berlin, we could look at various theories as to how we might remain.

Sir David said he understood that at the moment the Secretary would not think we should press the Russians on Berlin if they were prepared to let it alone.

The Secretary said we must not rush to be nice to Khrushchev. He is really out to cut our throats, but on the other hand we donʼt want to push him into a corner.

Sir David said perhaps we had more time than the British paper indicated.

The Secretary said at the moment there were two very big gaps: 1) what would happen in the Mikoyan-Castro meetings; and 2) what would happen concerning the bombers. If these fall into place, other questions could be taken up. If it seems clear that the Soviets have performed and Castro stands in the way and we must, therefore, turn our attention to Castro, we are really going to need help in putting pressure on him. This does not mean shooting but maximum political and economic pressure, and if it comes to this we will need much assistance from our friends in this hemisphere and in NATO.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/11-962. Secret. Drafted by Frank Cash (EUR) and approved in S on November 14. The meeting was held in the Secretaryʼs office.
1. A copy of this undated communication is attached to a November 3 letter from Ormsby Gore to Rusk. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204) In the first 7 paragraphs Home analyzed the situation following the Cuban crisis and in the last 4 he offered specific proposals on Berlin.
2. For text of the Principles Paper, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XV, pp. 69–71.
3. For text of the Brazilian proposal, first submitted on September 20, see U.N. doc. A/C.1/L-312.
4. For documentation on the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement ending the Cuban crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XI.
5. For text of the Soviet proposal on inspection, see U.N. doc. A/4078 (S/4145), Annex 12, January 5, 1959.