Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

246. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, October 14, 1962.

REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13th, REGARDING CUBA AND OTHER SUBJECTS

A week ago Ambassador Dobrynin called my office to say that he understood I was leaving for Africa and would like to have our “long postponed luncheon” before my departure.

I met him at the U.S.S.R. Embassy on 16th Street at 1 p.m. on October 13th. With the exception of an occasional exchange of courtesies at diplomatic functions, this was the first time I had talked with him.

It was a frank, free-wheeling discussion, lasting more than an hour and a half. Dobryninʼs manner was pleasant, with a show of reasonableness and concern about the current drift in Soviet-American relations.

At my first opportunity, I expressed deep disappointment that no more progress had been made in reducing tensions and concern over the consequences of a further decline. I said that since I was speaking wholly unofficially, he should not attempt to read anything into my remarks. I would like to be utterly frank with him.

Almost immediately Dobrynin brought up the question of Cuba and expressed worry and surprise at the intensity of U.S. public reaction.

In response to his question as to why we attached such importance to a relatively small island, I outlined the history of U.S.-Cuban relations and drew a parallel to the situation in 1898, the presence of Spanish misrule, and the U.S. public agitation that abetted the outbreak of war.

When he protested that the Soviet presence in Cuba was no greater provocation than the U.S. presence in Turkey, I pointed out that the present Administration had inherited a status quo that had grown up since the war. In some areas the advantage in this status quo had been with us, in others with Moscow; in still others it was a stand-off.

Our presence in Greece and Turkey, for instance, represented our reaction to Stalinʼs military and political pressures against these two countries following the war. It had become part of a status quo which in all its complexity could safely be changed only by negotiation with reciprocal benefits to each side.

The Kennedy Administration had hoped and expected that we could in fact negotiate a more rational set of relationships, easing the various danger points on a basis of reciprocal action to everyoneʼs benefit.

However, in Cuba the U.S.S.R. had unilaterally altered this status quo by introducing a wholly new element. Our reaction, in these circumstances, should have been foreseeable.

Moreover, many U.S. students of Soviet affairs were soberly convinced that the U.S.S.R. had made this move deliberately to provoke a U.S. military response against Cuba on the theory that this would divert our energies from Berlin, and elsewhere, and enable Soviet spokesmen to charge us with aggression in the UN.

If this kind of thinking had in fact played a part in the Soviet analysis, it was extremely dangerous. If we did move into Cuba in response to some overt act or offensive build-up by the U.S.S.R., a global chain of events might be set in motion which could have catastrophic consequences.

For instance, the Soviets might then be tempted to take what they would term “counter-action” in Berlin and perhaps Turkey; and the United States, by that time in an extremely tense mood, would react with vigor.

The U.S.S.R., in turn, would feel pressed by the Chinese and other extremists to counter our moves, and we would be on our way together down the long slippery slide.

I asked Dobrynin if he had read The Guns of August.¹ He said “only a three-page summary.”

I urged him to read at least the first few chapters in which he would see a pattern of politico-military action and counter-action that could be repeated in the next six months.

In July 1914, men of intelligence in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and England, all quite conscious of the forces which were feeding the approaching holocaust, found themselves enmeshed in internal pressures, commitments and precedents which left them powerless to avoid the inevitable. It would be the greatest folly in history if we were to repeat this insane process in the nuclear age.

Dobrynin asked me what, in the circumstances, I thought could be done in regard to Cuba. Stressing that I was speaking solely as an individual, I suggested three moves that the U.S.S.R. could sponsor to ease the situation.

1. Dobrynin should remind his government of President Kennedyʼs sharp distinction between defensive and offensive weapons in his recent statement. I was particularly concerned on this point because current reports indicated that Soviet shipments were in fact beginning to include weapons which had a clearly offensive capacity.

If this continued, it could produce—with the help of some incident perpetrated perhaps by individuals striving to provoke another “Remember the Maine” incident—the very conflict which the Administration is anxious to avoid. President Kennedy had committed himself to act under certain specific circumstances. This was a clear commitment, and the U.S.S.R. should not take it lightly.

2. From many reports, Castro now had ample defensive arms with which to protect himself from casual landings. The U.S.S.R. should tell him that under present circumstances no more arms will be shipped. The U.S.S.R. should then ask Castro himself to make a statement announcing that the defense of Cuba was assured and that no more arms were needed. Moscow could then inform us that no more arms would be shipped.

3. Castro should be asked by Moscow to state that he has no design on his neighbors, that his entire energies would henceforth be devoted to the economic development of Cuba, and that he sought only peaceful competition with other Latin American nations. His decision not to indulge in further subversion, propaganda, and expansion in neighboring Latin American countries would, of course, have to be confirmed by deeds. However, Soviet assurances on this point would serve to reduce some of the current tensions and give us all a breathing spell.

If some progress along these lines were not possible, I had deep forebodings about the weeks ahead.

To all of this Dobrynin appeared to listen intently. I believe he was impressed.

He answered that in spite of our worries, the U.S.S.R. was not shipping offensive weapons and well understood the dangers of doing so. Moreover, it was unreasonable for the U.S., as a major power, to expect a small, weak country such as Cuba to make such public concessions to U.S. public opinion even though both the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might accept all three points in principle.

Why, he asked repeatedly, do we get so excited about so small a nation? Although the U.S.S.R. could not let Cuba down, they had no desire to complicate the situation further. Was it not possible for us to negotiate a modus vivendi with Castro directly?

I commented that Cuba had initiated the current conflict. Indeed, in 1959 most Americans had strongly applauded Castroʼs revolution. If Dobrynin were misinformed about the types of weapons now arriving in Cuba, it would not be the first time in diplomatic history that this had occurred. As long as Soviet weapons flowed into Cuba and Cuban money was used to subvert Latin American countries which we were striving to assist into the 20th century, the situation would remain dangerously explosive.

I hoped that his government would see the danger and act accordingly to help ease the tensions.

Without directly responding to my remarks, Dobrynin referred to Max Frankelʼs story in the morning Times which cited agitation by various private agencies, Cuban and American, to provoke a “Maine incident” with the connivance of U.S. official groups. I replied that our government would have no part in such an operation, that we were genuinely worried, and that his government should view the situation with serious concern.

Dobrynin then switched the subject: What did I think of a meeting between Khrushchev and the President this fall or early winter?

Speaking purely for myself, I said I felt that such a meeting would be worthwhile only if we could be assured in advance of some areas of agreement. Otherwise it would only result, as had the meeting in June 1961, in a further sharpening of our differences, in a frustration of public hopes, and a strengthening of the extremists in both Russia and America.

Dobrynin said that this was precisely his view; but on what subjects could we agree?

I suggested several possibilities. For instance, the U.S.S.R. could state that it endorsed the Cuban position (along the lines of my suggestion) that no more arms were needed and that no more would be shipped; also that it endorsed the proposed Cuban statement that Cuba would forego expansionist exploits and would henceforth concentrate on internal development.

We should also be able to agree on a nuclear test ban in the atmosphere and under the sea, as well as cooperation between our two governments to conduct research in regard to underground testing, with a report on this subject to be prepared within some stated period. On the basis of this agreement, we could then announce our intention to work together to discourage other nations, including China, from developing nuclear weapons.

Parenthetically, I added that I could not understand the U.S.S.R.ʼs reluctance to deal seriously with arms control and reductions on a broad scale. I said that in February 1957 I had chided Khrushchev about being a poor Marxist, since otherwise he should assume that a capitalist nation such as the U.S. could not agree to arms reduction without facing economic collapse—and should therefore press for an agreement which we could not refuse.²

What, I asked, was holding up the serious, thoughtful negotiations on the broad subject of arms control that most of us hoped would by now be underway? The longer we postponed such discussion, the harder it would be to reach agreement. In the present competition we had all the immediate advantages since our economy had plenty of slack; yet it was a crazy, dangerous contest for all concerned, however you looked at it.

Dobrynin said frankly that in the U.S.S.R., as in the U.S., there were differences of view, that suspicions ran deep, and that no generals ever had enough weapons.

In further references to a meeting between Khrushchev and the President, I suggested that agreement could be reached to put Berlin on ice until we could discuss the situation in a less emotional atmosphere.

Why not frankly say just that? We realized that Khrushchev was in a difficult situation because of his statements four years ago that we would soon be out of Berlin; but surely he must realize that we were totally committed to staying there.

I then urged with great emphasis that the U.S.S.R. should not minimize the depth of this commitment. On the essential point of the U.S. presence in Berlin, we have absolutely no room for maneuver.

The 11,000 Western troops in Berlin had no military significance. They were purely a symbol of our rights there.

If we increased the symbolic number by 5000, the U.S.S.R. would react because the symbol had been changed; just so, our friends would react if we moved the symbol downward by 5000. For this reason, there was no basis for a negotiation of our presence under present conditions.

Even if differences should arise with our allies as to how to respond to “Ulbrichtʼs pressures,” we Americans would be forced to react, alone if necessary—move for move, threat for threat. We had absolutely no alternative. Khrushchev simply must understand this, or there could be a tragedy.

Dobrynin nodded but said nothing.

These were some of the things that could be agreed on in a Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting. They wouldnʼt assure world peace; but they would give both nations a fresh chance and some urgently needed room for maneuver and reduced tensions. Unless some such understandings could be reached, a meeting between the two principals might cause us to lose more ground.

We then talked briefly of Germany as a whole. I said that many of us shared Soviet concern over Germanʼs past tendencies towards aggression, and that “their Germans” were largely Prussians who had traditionally led the parades. Why not get rid of Ulbricht so that we could all talk more reasonably?

Our support of the Common Market and British participation was not only a result of our desire to see the construction of an efficient, united Europe, but because we wanted to see Germany peacefully and politically involved as a member of a united Europe, with Britain—which has great skill in this respect—acting as a balancing force. I stressed that this political objective was also in Moscowʼs ultimate interest.

A re-united, floating Germany, as an (unlikely) alternative, could scarcely resist an effort to bargain Moscow and Washington against each other, with even more unpredictable and potentially explosive results.

We then talked briefly of Afghanistan. I said that if what the U.S.S.R. really wants there is a buffer state, we should work together frankly to this end. The U.S. has absolutely no military objectives there. Indeed, in 1953 when the Afghan government asked us for military equipment and a military training mission, we refused because Afghanistan was traditionally neutral, directly bordering on the U.S.S.R., and under such circumstances a U.S. military mission would be provocative. It was unfortunate that the Soviets had not shown similar restraint in regard to Cuba.

Dobrynin answered that the U.S.S.R. agreed on Afghanistanʼs proper neutral position, but that we Americans were encouraging or at least tolerating Pakistanʼs “belligerent pressures” against Afghanistan. This was bad for everyone and seriously jeopardized the proper buffer-state status of the Afghans. (This was his only barbed comment.)

Finally, we turned to mainland China. I reiterated our intention of defending Taiwan against any Chinese attack and our determination not to allow Chiang to start trouble. Dobrynin said that Chiang was dangerous to all of us; I responded that he was far less so than Ulbricht.

In response to Dobryninʼs questions, I discussed Formosaʼs economic success, its land reform, high literacy, the deep distaste of its people for the mainland government, and their preference even for Japanese rule if they were ever forced to choose between the two.

I said that in my recent visits to Asia I found widespread understanding of the extent of Communist Chinaʼs failure. The hopes created by the “Great Leap Forward” were totally shattered.

Why, therefore, didnʼt the U.S.S.R. really take charge in Hanoi and insist on a live-and-let-live solution in East and Southeast Asia?

Of course, much depended on Laos. This was the test of everyoneʼs intentions.

Dobrynin insisted with vigor that we were incorrect in saying that Moscow had allowed the Vietminh to remain in Laos. According to Soviet information, they were now practically all gone.

Why then, I asked, not allow the ICC to look and see for itself? He said that this could be worked out.

We returned to Chinaʼs future. I pointed out that China, unlike Russia, lacked key natural resources—particularly oil and arable land. Someday the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., working together, could bring effective pressure to bear on China—the U.S.S.R. through oil and the U.S. through food. Why should we delay?

I said we understood that the Soviets were now supplying 70% of Chinaʼs petroleum; he commented “Itʼs more than that,” and he added that oil would soon be flowing directly to China from the “newly discovered unlimited Siberian oil fields only a few hundred kilometers from the Chinese borders.”

I asked if this did not cause concern in Moscow since a successful grab by the Peking government for the new Siberian oil and Siberiaʼs wheat potential could make China self-sufficient. “In that case,” I added facetiously, “we might help guarantee your borders—provided by that time we are on speaking terms, with no Berlin and Cuba to cause us trouble.”

Seriously, I asked, why should we quarrel? Neither we nor the U.S.S.R. can run the world, since it is much too diversified. Burmese want to be Burmese; Brazilians, Brazilians; Japanese, Japanese. No one wants to be run by either Moscow or Washington. Together we cannot only keep the world from exploding; we can create rational relationships that will benefit all of us, eventually even China.

In the course of his many questions and comments, Dobrynin stressed what he called the Soviet Governmentʼs desire for better understanding, its inability to fathom U.S. public opinion, its irritation over the fact that we are constantly saying “wait until after the election—and you are always having elections,” its concern over its own internal needs, and its rejection of my “thesis that the U.S.S.R., Cuba or someone else should make all the concessions.”

Yet I came away feeling that his concern was genuine. Our reactions to Cuba appear to have surprised him, and he is frankly at a loss how to explain them. He returned to this question again and again.

Dobrynin politely asked me about my African trip and said he would look forward to a “further discussion” on my return. This occasion, he said, had been most helpful to him in understanding how “you Americans look at things.”

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/10-1562. Secret. The source text is attached to an October 15 memorandum of transmittal from Bowles to Rusk. Copies were sent to Ball and U. Alexis Johnson.
1. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, New York, 1962.
2. For a short summary of Bowlesʼ conversation with Khrushchev, February 20, 1957, see Chester B. Bowles, Promises to Keep, New York, 1971, p. 252.