245. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
955. Embtel 945.1 With expulsion Midthun (following expulsion Commander Smith),2 Embassy now has presumably paid in full for way in which trap was sprung on Nelson Drummond in New York and two Soviet diplomatic officers apprehended, photographed and detained.3 Cost to U.S. Government in terms of deprival specially qualified and trained personnel and impairment of operations of this Embassy is significant.
Fully recognizing the importance to U.S. security of disrupting activities such as those of Drummond, must nonetheless question whether, in fact, Drummond case (which according to news reports has been going on in at least partially controlled fashion for years) could not have been resolved in a way that would meet those security requirements without involving such cost to ourselves.
Apart from the ill effect on Embassy operations and prestige of retaliatoryPNG actions, consideration must also be given to the personal security of Embassy officers who are required in the course of their official duties to be exposed to whatever form of maltreatment the Soviet Secret Police find appropriate or amusing. Given the nature of this society, the Soviets can always beat us in the application of humiliation, force, duress and coercion. Midthun received the most gentle possible kind of treatment. Commander Smith got a small taste of what can happen. Military Attaché officers, because of the nature of their assignments including travel to and in isolated areas, are particularly vulnerable, though this is also true to a lesser extent of non-military as well.
[Page 514]Would hope foregoing considerations could be brought to the attention of all appropriate elements of U.S. Government and kept in mind in the not unlikely event of future cases involving Soviet diplomatic personnel.
As regards our reaction now to Smith and Midthun expulsions, believe Soviets consider balance has been effected. (The circumstances of the Midthun action, i.e., failure thus far to document allegation against him, would indicate they do not want to go beyond simple man-for-man reciprocity by establishing a second full-blown incident.) Department will have noted that two elements of U.S. Government involved in Prokhorov/Vyrodov affairs have been involved in retaliatory actions here: Navy (Smith and Drummond) andFBI (Midthunʼs previous association with the bureau cannot be unknown to the Soviets).
In the circumstances, believe we should not propose further expulsion of Soviets in U.S. in connection this matter since Soviet Government would undoubtedly consider this as opening a new round.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 123-Midthun, Kermit S. Confidential.↩
- Telegram 945, October 12, transmitted the text of note from the Soviet Foreign Ministry requesting Kermit S. Midthun, First Secretary at the Embassy in Moscow, to leave the country for activities incompatible with his status as an accredited diplomat. (Ibid.) A copy of Midthunʼs report on the incident on September 23, which brought this action, was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A-563 from Moscow, October 19. (Ibid.)↩
- On October 2 the U.S. Naval Attaché, Commander Raymond D. Smith, had been forcibly seized, searched, and held for 4-1/2 hours in Leningrad without being able to communicate with the Embassy. Despite an Embassy protest on October 4, Smith was expelled from the Soviet Union. (ALUSNA 031605Z and telegram 849 from Moscow, October 3 and 4; ibid., 120.162261/10-362 and 10-462)↩
- On September 28 Nelson Drummond, a U.S. Navy enlisted man, and two officials from the Soviet U.N. Mission were arrested in Larchmont, New York, with classified documents in their possession. The Department of State summarized the case, in which the Soviet officials were described as “uncooperative” and “resistant,” in telegram 821 to Moscow, October 5. (Ibid., 304.61/10-562)↩