126. Editorial Note
In an October 30, 1961, letter to President Kennedy, Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Seaborg reported that the Commission “as a whole” believed that “in view of the limitations of underground testing and in light of the comprehensive nature of the recent Soviet tests, national security considerations require that the United States embark upon a program of atmospheric testing at the earliest appropriate time.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VII, pages 210–214.
At a National Security Council meeting called on November 2 to discuss resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, Central Intelligence Agency analyses of recent Soviet tests were presented, indicating that there had been 37 or perhaps 39 tests at 3 sites, the largest detonation possibly exceeding 60 megatons. The tests had impressed the intelligence community with their broad nature. In subsequent discussion, [Page 308] Seaborg stated “that if the US tested only underground while the Soviets tested in the atmosphere, we would be in no position to compete with them.” The President indicated his intention to release a statement to the effect that “no decision has yet been made on testing [in the atmosphere], but that authorization has been given to undertake preparation for testing.” For text of the memorandum of the meeting, see ibid., pages 217–222. For text of the Presidentʼs statement released to the press later the same day, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pages 692-693.