Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

127. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts⁰

Washington, November 8, 1961, 6:17 p.m.

CA-414. The following assessment of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU¹ was initially prepared for the presentation to the NATO Council of the United States views on this event. At your discretion, you are authorized to draw on it in discussions with appropriate local officials.

Only time and specific developments will reveal the true significance of this Congress. The following brief analysis is, therefore, only tentative.

1. The general course of the Congress indicated careful advance preparation; Khrushchevʼs dominance in Soviet leadership was readily apparent in the re-endorsement of the basic lines of the 20th Party Congress and in the choice of the focal points for the 22nd Congress. The dominant aspects of the Congress (campaigns against the Stalin era; the anti-party group, Albania and indirectly Communist China; strong reaffirmation of the 20th Congress line; and the lack of emphasis on new Party Program) reflect Khrushchevʼs decision to reassert strongly Moscowʼs primacy in the bloc and the world communist movement.

2. In foreign policy, reaffirmation was given to (a) avoidance of actions entailing a serious risk of nuclear war; (b) endeavors to seek through negotiations with the West agreements favorable to Soviet objectives; (c) assertive Soviet efforts in the underdeveloped areas, and (d) a vigorous “struggle” under “peaceful coexistence” in East-West relations.

3. The moves against Stalinist methods, anti-party group and Albanian leadership were undoubtedly related and have the effect of clarifying Khrushchevʼs personal leadership status. The move to correct the Albanian problem was intended as a thinly veiled challenge to the Chinese Communists within the context of a “domestic” CPSU Congress and Soviet East European considerations (Albania).

4. The open attacks on Stalin and the specific revelations of the brutal acts attributed to his regime have evoked public discussion within the Soviet Union and are likely to result in considerable disorientation and confusion of the Soviet people unless the effects are carefully channeled. These, combined with public discussion in recent years of incompetence and deceptive acts of minor officials, could undermine faith in the Party leadership.

5. The form and method of the Chinese Communist response are still not indicated. One timing factor supporting Khrushchevʼs move may have been Communist Chinaʼs basic internal economic weaknesses at this time. The 22nd Congressʼ developments confirmed earlier indications that the 81 Party Statement of 1960³ was a “papering over” effort required by the failure to achieve a real reconciliation of views.

6. The Party Program was obscured by other events at the Congress. Quite aside from Khrushchevʼs desire to focus attention on other matters, this treatment appears consistent with the fact that the Program was not an inspiring document.

7. It is too early to assess the ultimate effects of the changes in the top Party organs, but Khrushchevʼs pre-eminence has not suffered. While it is clear there is opposition to individual Khrushchev policies, there is no evidence of any organized opposition to Khrushchevʼs leadership as such. An action against the anti-party group will, however, serve as a warning to those who might be tempted to go too far in opposing the specific policies of Khrushchev.

8. The reasons for “lifting” the apparent deadline for a separate German treaty were not clear.⁴ One factor undoubtedly was the apprehension that the USSR and the West were on a collision course. Another factor may well have been the normal evolving of a pre-negotiation position. In any event, the build-up of NATO forces and the firmness of the West on basic principles clearly played an important role. The fact of the existence of discussions with Gromyko afforded Khrushchev the opportunity to lift the deadline without an apparent loss of face.

9. Clearly, Soviet objectives and their determination to achieve those objectives remain undiluted; however, the implications for Western policy as regards intra-bloc and Sino-Soviet ramifications are not fully evident. It is, however, evident that the West must anticipate a continuous application of pressure on sensitive issues and, particularly, must prepare for an increased communist drive in the underdeveloped areas. As regards the Berlin and German problem, there is even a greater need for unity, preparedness and firmness of purpose.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.001/11-861. Confidential. Drafted by Anderson (SOV) on November 7; cleared by Bohlen, RSB, and CA; and approved by Guthrie. Repeated to Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw.
1. October 17-31.
3. See footnote 1, Document 16.
4. Khrushchev told the Congress that if the West showed readiness to settle the “German problem,” then “we shall not insist on the peace treaty being signed necessarily before 31 December 1961.” (Current Weekly Intelligence Review, October 20; Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A) Khrushchev wrote Kennedy in a November 9 letter that “in order to create the best possible conditions for the achievement of an agreed settlement the Soviet Government has decided not to insist that the peace treaty be signed by the end of this year.” In the same letter Khrushchev proposed, since the West had taken issue with his earlier proposal to station a token force of Soviet troops in West Berlin when it became a “free city,” that no Four Power forces be stationed there but instead a UN force be introduced to guarantee the status of the city. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 45–57.