125. Editorial Note
In an October 16, 1961, letter to Chairman Khrushchev, President Kennedy raised the issue of Laos, questioning whether a situation as complex as Berlin could be settled peacefully if one much simpler in many ways, such as Laos, could not. “I do not say that the situation in Laos and the neighboring area must be settled before negotiations begin over Germany and Berlin; but certainly it would greatly improve the atmosphere.” Kennedy noted as well that “the acceleration of attacks on South Viet-Nam, many of them from within Laotian territory, are a very grave threat to peace in that area and to the entire kind of world-wide accommodation you and I recognize to be necessary.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VI, pages 38–44.
[Page 307]Kennedy devoted the greater part of his October 16 letter to Berlin and Germany, largely restating U.S. views on the issue, though emphasizing his willingness to look for a pragmatic resolution with which both sides could live. He agreed to have Ambassador Thompson conduct discussions on the issue with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. In an October 20 letter to General Norstad, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers Europe, Kennedy laid out U.S. policy on military actions in case of a conflict over Berlin. “What I want is a sequence of graduated responses to Soviet/GDR actions in denial of our rights of access.” Kennedyʼs instructions to Norstad indicated that the United States was ready to escalate to “General Nuclear war” to defend its vital interests in Berlin and Germany. For text, see ibid., volume XIV, pages 520–523.
Following incidents on October 22 and 25 in which U.S. personnel were temporarily refused entry to East Berlin and an incident on October 27 when Soviet tanks took up positions for a day opposite U.S. tanks at Checkpoint Charlie, Secretary of State Rusk instructed Thompson to meet with Gromyko and convey Ruskʼs “surprise and chagrin” at the developments, which Rusk found “incomprehensible in light of our talks with him in the US.” Thompson was further to say to Gromyko that he “must surely understand that serious discussions about Germany and Berlin cannot take place under conditions of duress and increased tension.” For text of Ruskʼs instructions, transmitted in telegram 1165 to Moscow, October 28, see ibid., pages 545–547.