Office of the Historian

164. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Acting Secretary of State1

Washington, October 1, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Possible Political Proposals at the United Nations General Assembly re Viet-Nam

It is possible that during the UNGA consideration of the Ceylonese resolution on human rights in South Viet-Nam2 certain political suggestions regarding Viet-Nam may be made by other delegations. If any formal proposals are made they would, of course, be referred to the Department by USUN for instructions.

It may well be, however, that political suggestions or comments regarding Viet-Nam may be made as obiter dicta in speeches to the General Assembly or during corridor conversations. It would seem desirable that we have approved lines of reply for U.S. representatives to use at their discretion to insure that U.S. views are clearly known before ideas and positions of other delegations crystallize.

The anticipated suggestions from other delegations and proposed U.S. lines of reply are as follows:

1. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam.

Proposed U.S. Response: As President Kennedy stated in December, 1961,3 “The United States, like the Republic of Viet-Nam, remains devoted to the cause of peace and our primary purpose is to help [South Viet-Nam’s]4 people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to [Page 332] destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist [South Viet-Nam’s] defense efforts will no longer be necessary.” Thus, if the Communist regime in Hanoi will cease and desist in its subversive aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States can withdraw its forces from that country.

2. Neutralization of South Viet-Nam

Proposed U.S. Response: Neutralization of South Viet-Nam alone would pave the way for an early Communist take-over of that area. Without external assistance the armed forces of South Viet-Nam could not withstand the aggressive pressures of the much larger armed forces of the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam. Moreover, the Hanoi regime, as is currently obvious, has developed an extensive subversive and guerrilla network in South Viet-Nam which could at any time overthrow the government of a neutral South Viet-Nam.

If there is to be any discussion of the neutralization of Viet-Nam, it can only be in terms of the neutralization of all of Viet-Nam when the Communists in North Viet-Nam are prepared to agree to give up political power and control in their zone.

3. Elections for the Reunification of Viet-Nam

Proposed U.S. Response: We support the position of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam that elections can be held only when there is real assurance that the electorate in North Viet-Nam will be free of coercion.5

  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Organizations and Alignments. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall with the concurrences of Woodruff Wallner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and William B. Buffum, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs. Sent through Harriman.↩
  2. As of October 1, the Ceylonese draft resolution was being modified in informal negotiations. In the resolution, the General Assembly expressed its concern “with the serious violation of the human rights of the vast majority of people” of South Vietnam. The second operative paragraph requested the Secretary-General: “To communicate this res to authorities of South Vietnam, to consult with them with a view to alleviating the situation, to take all appropriate steps to help restore the human rights of the people of SVN, and to keep the GA informed of developments relating to this situation.” The draft resolution was transmitted in telegram 1076 from USUN, October 1. (Ibid., Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)↩
  3. For text of this statement, Kennedy’s part of an exchange of messages with Diem, December 15, 1961, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 801.↩
  4. All brackets are in the source text.↩
  5. Harriman initialed his approval of all three proposals.↩