Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, October 1, 1963—8:37 p.m.

Tosec 105. USUN please pass Secretary for 3 pm Oct 2 meeting with Buu Hoi.² Ambassador Buu Hoi called on Hilsman Sept 30. Conversation dealt exclusively with internal Viet-Nam situation and US-GVN relations. (Conversations here with Buu Hoi on UN aspects being communicated to you by septel.)³

Hilsman made following major points. Buu Hoi subsequently informed us he had immediately reported by cable to Diem.

1. U.S. opinion had been and remained deeply affected by repressions against religious and student groups which inexplicable to US public in light of major burden we undertaking on side of Vietnamese in effort to win war against Communists.

2. As President said, GVN needs broadest possible political support to win war and therefore should make changes of policy and perhaps personnel. Our own policy insofar as GVN concerned clearly stated by President; we support what furthers war effort; we oppose what hinders it.

3. Rightly or wrongly, GVN’s present image is unfavorable and positive steps must be taken to change it. There should be far less talk on part of GVN personalities and more action. President should now generously dramatize desire for conciliation. Calling Buddhist priests Communists is not answer. Answer lies instead in releasing them and students on wide scale. President should bring eminent individuals into a broadened and rejuvenated cabinet.

In his responses, Buu Hoi indicated religious part of crisis over even before pagoda raids August 20. Crisis had become entirely political and bonzes had overextended position to point where govt had to force showdown to survive. As Buddhist and humanist, Buu Hoi regretted deplorable manner in which pagoda raids carried out. He noted that aged Venerable Khiet had now reversed his position and that by letter of September 27 to Diem Bonze Chau had done same. (For Saigon: Please report text this letter if available.)⁴ While Government’s actions up to and including martial law were excusable on grounds survival, he agreed in large part that now government must start on new basis and that broadening and reform have become utterly essential. Deplored lack trained people in administration and services. Stated current problem boiled down to one of personnel: finding right people and letting them do job without constant interference and favoritism. Hoped that new Assembly would assume active role and thereby reveal to world that changes are occurring. Did not think there would be real problem in overhauling government, but that bringing conviction of change to countryside and outlying areas would, as before, be real difficulty. Said too many projects always remained paper projects, breaking down in implementation.

Buu Hoi queried Hilsman re USG attitude towards Nhu and his departure. Hilsman replied that US officials felt Nhu had made important contribution to strategic hamlet program but that he had apparently become political symbol to many Vietnamese. If this true President Diem should consider Nhu’s future role very carefully. Buu Hoi said Nhu’s talents cannot be spared but that his only ambition was to work in narrowly prescribed field of his interests. Hilsman said that if Nhu’s role was to be limited President might consider how to dramatize this, perhaps through device of period of study abroad concerned with limited role Buu Hoi described.

In separate subsequent private conversation with Department officer, Buu Hoi urged strongly that we bring Diem specific suggestions for government reform in structure and functioning. Wished in particular to suggest (asking this not be repeated as coming from him) that we should work toward elevation of Nguyen Dinh Thuan as Prime Minister actively charged with all affairs of government. Indicated we should under no circumstances, however, mention Thuan or any other name directly to Diem. Buu Hoi feels Diem should play increasingly more distant ruler role, with Nhu’s job defined as something like “Government Planning Director”.

In Secretary’s conversation with Buu Hoi, aside from UN aspects, Secretary might wish range generally over same points covered by Hilsman and perhaps endeavor draw out Buu Hoi further on specific notions government reform. Secretary might wish keep in mind Buu Hoi is prominent scientist in field tropical dermatology and leprosy, whose diplomatic activity only small adjunct to scientific work based in Paris laboratory. Buu Hoi was last in Saigon during August in vain attempt mediate Buddhist crisis but successful effort persuade his mother not commit suicide by fire. He prefers continue to work within existing VN government framework, though is at heart strong opponent many aspects of regime. We do not know to what degree he retains full confidence of Diem and Nhu, although we believe they regard him as too useful and essential to afford lose his services.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central files, SOC 14-1 S VIET-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kattenburg and Hilsman and signed by Ball. Also sent to Saigon and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See Document 168.
3. In telegram 894 to USUN, October 1, the Department sent the Mission at the United Nations a summary of Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland’s conversation with Buu Hoi on U.N. matters affecting South Vietnam. Buu Hoi informed Cleveland that South Vietnam would welcome a visit by an informal group of countries to get the facts on the Buddhist situation. Buu Hoi believed such a visit would have an ameliorating effect on concern about the Buddhist crisis at the United Nations, and hoped Secretary-General U Thant would arrange it. The visit proposal was the result of a genuine desire by South Vietnam to show the world that the Buddhist crisis was over, but Buu Hoi noted the Ceylonese resolution should not be debated until the group returned. The Department of State agreed and suggested to USUN that if U Thant was willing to accept and sponsor the idea, the Mission should discreetly work for postponement of consideration of the Ceylonese resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)

4. In telegram 621 from Saigon, October 2, the Embassy reported as follows:

   “Letter from Thich Tam Chau to Diem has not yet been publicized. CAS has received info evaluated as probably true that for seven or eight days preceding September 24 Chau was hospitalized and being fed intravenously as result his refusal to accept food. While this info does not logically preclude such letter from being written, it would throw doubt on its authenticity or on circumstances under which written.” (Ibid.)