Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

163. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to President Diem¹

Saigon, October 1, 1963.

Dear Mr. President: This letter responds to our conversation after your dinner on 29 September² in which you kindly expressed an interest in receiving my professional comments on the military situation as I observed it during visits in the past week to all the corps and divisions of your Army and to many of the provinces under attack by the Viet Cong. As I mentioned to you, the primary purpose of these visits was to determine the rate of progress being made by our common effort toward victory over the insurgency. I would define victory in this context as being the reduction of the insurgency to proportions manageable by the National Security Forces normally available to your Government.

To keep the length of this letter within bounds, I shall not dwell on the many encouraging indications of military progress since my visit of last September. Certainly, if one looks back to October 1961 when we first discussed the expansion of the U.S. Military Aid and laid the groundwork for the Counterinsurgency Program now in course of implementation, the advances made in defeating the enemy in the field and giving security to the rural population in strategic hamlets testify to the basic soundness of the agreed program. It was not until the recent political disturbances beginning in May and continuing through August and beyond that I personally had any doubt as to the ultimate success of our campaign against the Viet Cong.

Now, as Secretary McNamara has told you, a serious doubt hangs over our hopes for the future. Can we win together in the face of the reaction to the measures taken by your Government against the Buddhists and the students? As a military man I would say that we can win providing there are no further political setbacks. The military indicators are still generally favorable and can be made more so by actions readily within the power of your Government. If you will allow me, I would mention a few of the military actions which I believe necessary for this improvement.

The military situation in the I, II, and III Corps areas is generally good. It is true that there are never enough offensive actions against the enemy to satisfy one who believes that only a ruthless, tireless offensive can win this war. The record of one of the divisions in the III Corps falls notably short of the minimum standard for mobile actions in the field set by your High Command-twenty days out of every thirty. As a result, some of the hard core war zones of the Viet Cong remain virtually untouched. In my opinion, the full potential of the military units in this area is not being exploited.

But as you have recognized, your principal military problems are now in the Delta. I am convinced that your decision last year was sound in giving top priority to resisting the desire of the enemy to cut through to the coast in the II Corps area and thus divide the country. The success in frustrating this tactic was achieved at the expense of the campaign in the south where the Viet Cong have always had their principal sources of strength. Now, I feel sure, the time has come to regroup our forces and place the center of gravity of our efforts in the IV Corps area. You have wisely recognized this need for readjustment by ordering the 9th Division to the south. I feel that other measures with a similar purpose are or soon will be necessary. I have in mind actions such as an overhaul of the hamlet program in such provinces as Long An and Kien Tuong where the work has gone either too fast or too slow-in either case, with the effect of delaying the attainment of an adequate system of completed hamlets meeting the standards set by your Government. Related to the requirements of a successful hamlet program is the need for a methodical clear-and-hold campaign by the tactical units of the IV Corps. I have a feeling that, in the past, there has been an inclination to favor the rapid, sweeping operations which have little permanent effect in securing a base for the erection of secure hamlets.

You know full well the nature of the terrain of the Delta. Even to the casual visitor, it is apparent that we must learn to use the numerous waterways of the region as highways to open up controlled territory and at the same time to interdict the water-borne movement of the enemy. I doubt that we have given enough attention to small boat operations directed at exploiting these waterways in support of the campaign.

The kind of war we are fighting in the Delta is a small unit war, fought principally by small infantry-type organizations. These are the forces which bear the brunt of combat and take the inevitable losses. Yet I found on my recent visit that the infantry companies in the Delta and elsewhere are often less than two-thirds of authorized strength—a hundred men for duty out of a company of an authorized strength of about 150 men. The diversion of military manpower between the point of intake and the front-line is a problem of all armies in time of war. I would suggest that you may desire a close examination of this problem in your Army. Headquarters soldiers do not hurt the Viet Cong—infantrymen with rifles in the jungle do.

In closing, Mr. President, may I give you my most important overall impression? Up to now, the battle against the Viet Cong has seemed endless; no one has been willing to set a date for its successful conclusion. After talking to scores of officers, Vietnamese and American, I am convinced that the Viet Cong insurgency in the north and center can be reduced to little more than sporadic incidents by the end of 1964. The Delta will take longer but should be completed by the end of 1965. But for these predictions to be valid, certain conditions must be met. Your Government should be prepared to energize all agencies, military and civil, to a higher output of activity than up to now. Ineffective commanders and province officials must be replaced as soon as identified. Finally, there should be a restoration of domestic tranquillity on the homefront if political tensions are to be allayed and external criticism is to abate. Conditions are needed for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to an effective campaign directed at the objective, vital to both of us, of defeating the Viet Cong and of restoring peace to your country.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will accept these frank comments as those of an old friend of South Vietnam and an admirer of its courageous resistance to the common enemy. Both of our countries have put too much into this war to be satisfied now with less than a victorious conclusion. I am convinced that the energized program outlined above can achieve the success which we seek.

With respectful regards,

Maxwell D. Taylor³

1. Source: National Defense university, Taylor Papers, T-646-71. Top secret. A typewritten note on the source text reads: “Following Letter from General Taylor to President Diem being delivered 2 October with approval of secretary McNamara and concurrence of Ambassador Lodge.”
2. No contemporary record to this conversation has been found, but Taylor recounts a final meeting in Swords and Plowshares, p. 298.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.