Office of the Historian

162. Memorandum for the Record by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)1

Saigon, October 1, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Farewell Call on Major General Duong Van Minh (Big Minh) 1 October 1963
1.
In the course of my farewell call on General Minh and in response to my questions, the following points came out: (Also present was Colonel Raymond Jones, Assistant J-3, Hq MACV.) [Page 327]
a.
General Minh as always is deeply concerned over the country. He considers that many difficulties remain in the military program. There hasn’t been enough understanding between the population and the armed forces in the field. There is still no unimpeded channel of military command from Saigon to the field. There is divided responsibility between the military commanders and the provincial officials. All of these circumstances make ultimate success doubtful to General Minh.
b.
With regard to the Buddhist difficulties, General Minh considers that the matter is basically a struggle for special privileges between Buddhists and Catholics. Many provincial officials are favoring the Catholics in granting the many forms of government permits controlling commercial transactions, travel, and the like. There has been no obstacle to the practice of the Buddhist religion but individuals have been jailed for contributing money to the Pagodas. General Minh feels that this Buddhist issue has not yet cropped up in the Armed Forces but he is always afraid that it may at any time.
c.
The student riots reflect the resentment of parents for the many forms of injustice perpetrated by the central government. There has been some Communist inspiration behind the demonstrations but the basic cause is this sense of injustice which permeates most of the urban society.
d.
General Minh has no solution for the unhappy conditions which he perceives. He understands the difficulty of the United States in manipulating the aid program to influence the Diem government. It would be tragic, he feels, to retard the military campaign by a cut back in aid. He sees no opposition to the present government which might rally domestic and foreign support.
e.
I told General Minh that he could always communicate with me on any subject through General Harkins.
2.
In summary, General Minh sees his country in chains with no way to shake them off.
M. D. T.2

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71-A-3470, Back-up Documents and Notes, 9/25/63-Trip to SVN. Secret. This was the second private meeting between Taylor and Minh. The first, as Taylor recounts in Swords and Plowshares, pp. 297-298, was on the tennis court at the Saigon Officers Club on September 29 with Secretary McNamara as a spectator. The two Americans were under the impression Minh had an important message for them, but Minh refused to be drawn out by what Taylor later described as “broad hints of our interest in other subjects which we gave him during breaks in the game.” In a memorandum to McNamara, September 30, Taylor explained the misunderstanding as follows:

    “Colonel Jones, one of our tennis players yesterday, at my request, contacted Big Minh last night to probe the situation with him. He reports that Big Minh was confused yesterday as to what was taking place. He gave Jones no impression of having sent word to see you and me. As far as he was concerned, the occasion was simply a game of tennis. He indicated that he has no message to communicate to me now but would be very glad to discuss the military situation at any time. He sees no problem in my calling on him or in his coming to see me.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-186-69)

    ↩
  2. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩