Office of the Historian

37. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defenseʼs Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Assistant to the Director for Regional Affairs (Far East), Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (Kent)1

Washington, January 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

  • Your 26 January Memorandum on President Diem2

Thank you for sending me a copy of your thoughtful analysis of President Diem and his relationship to military problems in Vietnam. It has a depth of perception unusual for an American military observer of a political personality!

While you have included some hints of it in your paper, the main U.S. failure in working with President Diem has been our many attempts to squeeze him into an American-type mold labeled “Chief of State.” Most of the Americans who attempted to do this had only the foggiest notion of what is needed in a Chief of State, not only in Vietnam, but elsewhere (including the U.S.). Thus, Diem has come to [Page 67] view most Americans as meddlers and quite naive meddlers. His long talks with U.S. officials, which they find so boring, are usually his attempts to inform them of even the rudiments of local truths.

His real American friends, the ones he trusts, have always been able to speak to him with naked honesty about local problems—as long as they speak from first-hand knowledge. Whenever he has asked my views about a problem I knew little about, I always have told him I would have to look into it first; after I have done so, he has listened intently to what I have said, even when it was unpalatable. His trust and friendship for General Williams was based on this same principle. General O’Daniel arrived at much the same status with Diem. On the other hand, those Americans who just carried tales or seemed to be mere flunkeys for the personal whims of U.S. officials, lost their credibility with Diem—even when he still had an affection for them as old acquaintances. This is hardly unique among leaders of nations.

On page 4, in the last paragraph, you note an adverse reaction in the Vietnamese press to President Kennedyʼs message to Diem. This simply is not true. Yes, there was a bad reaction in the press to U.S. proposals after the Taylor mission. But, these were not reactions to President Kennedyʼs message. They were reactions to a rather naked grab at taking away sovereignty from the Vietnamese, in the terms State instructed Ambassador Nolting to present to Diem. In a top-level meeting, after the Vietnamese reaction was noted in Washington, I pointed out the offending language in the message and asked if it expressed U.S. policy. Our policy-makers (including Secretary Rusk and General Taylor) seemed surprised at the inclusion of the offending phrases, said that this was not U.S. policy, and sent new instructions to Ambassador Nolting correcting the U.S. proposals.3

This is quite different from the picture you have-of a U.S. ultimatum and Diem not budging.

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam #5. Secret.↩
  2. Document 35.↩
  3. Regarding this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Documents 257 ff.↩