Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

35. Draft Memorandum by the Assistant to the Director for Regional Affairs (Far East), Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense (Kent)¹

Washington, January 26, 1962.

SUBJECT

• President Diem

1. Introduction

The outcome in Vietnam depends primarily on the risk analyses and resultant policies of the Communist Bloc and the United States. The current situation is the natural result of the opposed policies, marked by mutual caution. The Communists regulate their attack to preserve its ambiguity and avoid prompting increased external assistance for the GVN, and the U.S. limits its support to avoid being directly involved in combat. While these policies continue, the efficiency with which the GVN conducts the campaign against the Communists is a decisive factor. The effectiveness of the GVN will depend, as long as he remains in office, almost directly on the performance of President Diem. This paper is an analysis of the prospects for success in Vietnam under President Diem.

2. Characteristics

The GVN directly reflects the personal characteristics and philosophy of President Diem. It is allegedly a corrupt government, but charges of high-level corruption have not been substantiated. Corruption may exist, but with the possible exception of Malaya, it is probably the least corrupt government in Southeast Asia. It is certainly authoritarian and over-centralized. It is not a popular government to which the population rallies in spontaneous support. This results in part from President Diemʼs aloof paternalism, and in part from the characteristics of the Vietnamese people. It is not an efficient government, but it has provided for its severest critics a demonstration of progress in the face of adversity. This progress is a testimonial of President Diemʼs ability and a clear indication that South Vietnam would have continued to prosper and develop under his leadership in normal times. The added burden of the growing Communist attack has arrested progress—not the deficiencies of President Diemʼs administration.

President Diem is a man of notable strengths, admired for his austere dedication and courage, but he is also handicapped by several unswerving convictions which are critical weaknesses in the present phase of the emergency. They directly affect his capability to manage the military campaign in Vietnam. Only these weaknesses need be examined for the purposes of this paper.

First, he is psychologically unable to delegate authority. Suspicious of the loyalty of all but a few of those around him, he deprives himself of required assistance and governmental efficiency inevitably suffers. He foregoes the services of able men who have incurred his displeasure and treats subordinates so harshly that they are overawed and afraid to present their views or unpleasant facts. In sum, though outstanding in personal ability, he lacks the characteristic of leadership most vital in the current circumstances—the ability to tap the superior collective capabilities of his subordinates.

He is unable to compromise. This rigidity has lost him the support of nationalist politicians and impeded his conduct of foreign relations. But this characteristic has also been responsible for his most notable achievements in developing and unifying South Vietnam.

He has illusions of omniscience. He is mandarin by training and inheritance. This, coupled with his natural personality, results in a reserve that can not arouse spontaneous public enthusiasm. In the society of Vietnam and during the current emergency, this characteristic may not be as serious a weakness—if a weakness at all—as it is sometimes considered to be by American observers incapable of empathic analysis. However, the real significance of this background is his growing conviction of self-righteousness.

A series of experiences wherein he has rejected advice outright and later been proven right left a lasting impression with Diem. Some observers believe that he now is convinced that he enjoys something close to divine guidance. The following are selected important examples: In 1955, he attacked and won against the sects despite conflicting recommendations of some U.S. advisors. He was undoubtedly aware that General Lawton Collins had at that time recommended his replacement by someone more acceptable to the sects and the French.

He saw the U.S. country team accept during 1960 his long-standing and long-opposed recommendations for the training and support of the Civil Guard along lines emphasizing their military rather than police function. At the same time his equally long-standing plea for increase of the Vietnamese armed forces was recognized. Moreover, for several years he had tried to convince both responsible U.S. officials resident in Vietnam and those who came as visitors that the internal security situation in Vietnam was a grave problem. U.S. actions in 1961 were [a] tacit admission that the threat existed as Diem had contended. And finally, until 1960, in the administration of the Military Assistance Program Diem gained the impression that U.S. officials believed that their problem was to prepare the VN armed forces to resist external aggression in a role consonant with U.S. contingency plans while the problem of counter-insurgency was not a basic U.S. concern. He has long understood and been alert to differences of opinion within the country team. This knowledge of conflicting opinion—even conflicting advice—has affected his evaluation of advice received.

As a result of these experiences, he is cautious of U.S. advice. He is also probably incapable of concluding that the best interests of Vietnam would be served if he relinquished power.

From the attempt by the Chief of the General Staff to overthrow the government soon after Diemʼs appointment as Premier, he has retained the conviction that military authority must be splintered and focused only in his own hands. His survival against coups and plots testifies to the effectiveness of the control that he has maintained, but the development of leadership in the armed forces and their efficient employment have seriously suffered as a result.

He lacks military background. He has had little experience, even by observation, with the proven principles of military management. He has no real conception of staff work. When seeking recommendations from his own military officers he either goes to a selected individual, often heading the last men with whom he has spoken, or has a convention of all the Vietnamese Generals. At these latter formations “face” is at stake and generals of limited ability state sweeping generalities without the benefit of facts that normal staff procedures could develop. The faulty decisions thus derived have deepened Diemʼs mistrust of the ability of his military subordinates.

3. Prospects

The Communist campaign against the GVN is now clearly in a critical phase because a series of reverses suffered by the GVN could cause a collapse of the will to resist before the effects of the measures to improve security now approved are felt. Only effective employment of all available military resources can assure a reasonable chance of GVN survival. Continuation of past practices by President Diem in handling of the military program would almost certainly seal the fate of Vietnam. The absorptive capacity of Vietnam for U.S. aid can only be increased to a limited extent—and that increase depends largely on efficient utilization of the resources being made available by the U.S.

Attention then centers on the possibilities—and methods to realize them—of causing President Diem to accept advice and reforms. Past performance in this regard is not encouraging. The reforms of military significance which are now being urged upon Diem by U.S. representatives are the same ones that have been urged upon him for at least five years. Gradual progress has been made, but significant reform can not yet be identified. There are a series of encouraging signs, but each must be examined closely to determine whether it is a superficial or fundamental change. Unfortunately, the time required to observe reliably whether important changes are actually being made by Diem can not be risked. Recent creation of a national security council has been evaluated as an encouraging sign, but essentially the same body was in existence even before Chief,MAAG first formally proposed it to President Diem 13 April 1960. But its function was then described by participants as one where the “ministers assembled to take notes and not to talk”. At the same time, creation of a central intelligence agency was proposed. It appears that real progress is being made with this vital program though the appointment as chief of the CIA by President Diem of an officer whom he had relieved from responsibility for the delta area, leaves doubt as to whether he will now permit a single effective intelligence agency.

Most discouraging is the matter of delegation of authority to military commanders. Since assignment to the CG Field Command of responsibilities for control of field operations was recommended in 1959, no real control has been delegated. And more important, the position—and personality—of the Chief of the General Staff remain unchanged. As commander of all of the armed forces, his role should be more significant than that of the CG, Field Command. The steadfastly loyal but incompetent incumbent remains, not permitted to retire despite his personal desires, and serving no useful function except to exert a stabilizing influence on younger generals and restrain them from plotting against their superiors. Any real intention to place the military establishment on a sound basis must begin with the appointment of a functioning military chief.

The question of removal of the province chiefs from the chain of command is debatable. Arguments have been presented to support both sides. However, U.S. officials have steadfastly urged over the years that the authority of the province chief be curbed. There is little indication that the U.S. view is now being accepted.

Opinion of U.S. representatives over the years has been divided on the feasibility of exerting pressure on President Diem to cause him to adopt reforms. It has been generally held that an ultimatum to withhold aid could not be effective because Diem, fully aware of U.S. national interests involved in Vietnam, and knowing that the U.S. could not afford to let Vietnam fall, could not be bluffed. Only in the current critical phase has an U.S. ultimatum been credible. It has become credible because only in the present deteriorating situation was it plausible that U.S. officials were convinced that Vietnam would fall unless reforms were made. President Kennedyʼs message to Diem following the Taylor mission² was couched in language that, judging by VN press reaction, was interpreted to be an ultimatum. President Diem did not yield. No fundamental concessions were made, and U.S. officials made clear that no ultimatum was intended. While it can not be assumed that Diem would have yielded had the U.S. position been resolutely maintained, it is highly probable that no future ultimatum would be seriously regarded.

4. Alternatives

A U.S. policy toward Diem based on compulsion through regulation of the level of U.S. assistance can not succeed. The crisis in Vietnam is presently too grave—and time is too limited—to determine whether Diem is now making the substantial changes in his administration that he has through the years declined to make except in superficial form. But changes must be effective if South Vietnam is to have reasonable chances of weathering the current crisis. There are consequently only two general lines of action: (1) to seek replacement of Diem and (2) to seek more effective means of influencing him.

Replacement of Diem would gravely risk chaos at a time when chaos can only benefit the Communists. Though a replacement could be found in Vietnam, as in every nation in every age, the stakes involved in engineering a change that could not be directly controlled to ensure smooth transition are too great to risk now.

Means to influence Diem then must be sought. Two general areas are most promising—to send senior U.S. officials to Vietnam in whom Diem has confidence and to seek to increase his confidence in U.S. advice through gradual but clear demonstration of its value. The first promises most immediate results. On the military side, individual military ability of the senior U.S. military representative is of secondary importance in comparison with his ability to gain quickly the confidence of Diem. Through the years even the most junior member of the MAAG has quickly recognized the deficiencies of the VN military establishment and no unusual qualifications are required to formulate a program for their correction. But the military representative in Vietnam is the member of the country team on whom Diem will most rely. If the military representative is accepted in Diemʼs “inner group” he will have value; if not, he could not succeed though he were a military genius. In the present crisis, selection of an individual whom Diem has known and in whom he already has confidence is the most promising alternative. Regardless of whether an effective senior U.S. military representative is assigned, progress can be made by demonstration that U.S. advice is sound and that recommended methods are applicable in Vietnam. Diem will respond to proven successes, particularly if U.S. proposals are tailored to his situation. For example, with full knowledge that Diem will not accept a proposal concerning the military chain of command that would dangerously increase his vulnerability to a coup, U.S. representatives must tailor their recommendations accordingly. They must seek to include in their recommendations provisions—checks and balances—which are a compromise acceptable to Diem. Otherwise only a paper facade will—as in the past-result.

In these two areas lies the greatest promise of effective U.S. action at present. A third consideration might be to give Diem full ungrudging support of his programs once he has made his decision. Even though he may not have accepted U.S. advice, once he has made his decision he should have full U.S. support. The U.S. cannot now disassociate itself from Diemʼs success or failure. It is in our interest to ensure that he succeeds even in programs which do not fit our conceptions.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Lansdale Files: FRC 63 A 1803, Vietnam . Secret. No addressee indicated. Attached to the source text was a note from Kent to Lansdale stating that Haydn Williams, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Regional Affairs), had requested the paper and asking for Lansdaleʼs comments on the draft.
2. Regarding this issue, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Documents 257 ff.