320. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)1
Dear Governor Harriman: I thank you for your letter of October 122 on the dangers of over-optimism here and on other matters basic to our operation. Your thoughts were most welcome, and, had we not had unfortunate difficulties relating to Laotian recognition, press problems and border incidents to try to deal with, I would have answered it earlier.
I agree with you that over-optimism is dangerous. I find it difficult at times to be optimistic at all, in face of setbacks, non-activation or poor execution of plans, dissensions among the Vietnamese, and a general stickiness which pervades this place. But, as General Harkins put it the other day, we must “whistle while we work”, for the sake of our own and everyone elseʼs morale here. And we are making progress.
Your inquiry whether the, villagers are being armed fast enough seems to imply that there might not be enough small arms in Viet-Nam to give out rapidly. That is not the case. Supplies of shotguns, carbines, Springfields, grenades and other weapons are more than ample. There are, however, two problems. First, the GVN and local authorities have been reluctant to issue arms to village youths or militia before they have been thoroughly screened and given some [Page 739] training. This slows up the process, though for reasons we cannot really challenge. Second, it is Ngo Dinh Nhuʼs fear that too many arms in a strategic hamlet will make them targets for VC supply operations. He advocates, therefore, that the number of arms in a hamlet be limited to about a dozen and that if the VC attack in numbers too large to be resisted by the hamletʼs defenders, they hide their arms and disperse. We have not followed this concept, however, and in the plans we are now supporting there is provision for equipping two and in some cases three squads (of about 12 men each) of hamlet militia depending on size and location of the hamlet.
The question about arming helicopters and using them on escort missions is being taken care of. As you know, there is now a squadron of HU-1Aʼs here. Each carries a sizeable quantity of rockets and two machine guns, and they have been very busy and effective lately.
I had previously talked on several occasions with General Harkins, along the lines of your misgivings about the “explosion” scheme. He assumes the VC will know in general what is up, but he does not expect them to be able to cope with it. He expects them in many cases to conceal themselves, a standard tactic, but to be unable to operate as effectively during and after the operation as before, because in the meantime the strategic hamlet and the clear-and-hold programs would go forward and forces would be developed to secure the area more permanently. Further, the “explosion” scheme is not conceived as a one-shot operation but rather as a series of measures designed to place RVNAF in a more aggressive posture throughout the country and to show the fence-sitters who has the power. I am not completely convinced of the soundness of the concept, nor of its feasibility. But I can frankly think of no better way to test this governmentʼs will to bring this struggle to a show-down, and this, I think, is becoming psychologically necessary, particularly as regards the GVN armed forces. I share your concern about the need to protect the innocent from injury during military operations insofar as possible, and I can assure you that General Harkins does also.
Administrative support of former VC villages is a problem which grows in proportion to the GVNʼs success. Until our first province rehabilitation operations got started, there was little retaking and little rehabilitation. However, in Binh Duong, where Sunrise is going on, and in Phu Yenʼs operation Sea Swallow, villages have been retaken from the VC, and in these administrative support and institutions have been installed. This will continue as the comprehensive strategic hamlet programs we are beginning to support in the delta areas. All hamlets, even those formerly dominated by the VC, seem to get the same general treatment. The controls in the latter may be a little stronger and last longer, but the plan is that ultimately they, too, will have their own hamlet councils and defense forces. And, we will try very hard to [Page 740] insure that they, too, receive the dispensaries, wells, schools, etc. that are part of our support program and a necessary follow-up to military operations. There is of course a continuing lack of trained administrators and civic action specialists.
Your comments on the GVNʼs image and the need for concrete accomplishments instead of empty claims are well taken. We are aware of this problem which, in fact, was discussed during the last Province Rehabilitation Committee meeting. USIS and MACV psychological warfare people are increasingly involved in advising on and supporting province operations. As you point out, the best propaganda by the GVN will be its concrete accomplishments in the countryside.
I feel we have made considerable headway toward focusing on the social and economic betterment of the villagers, particularly on the organizational aspects. Joe Brent and Rufe Phillips are pushing ahead rapidly and the GVN appears to agree on the importance of these aspects. In connection with the review of next yearʼs military budget we have been careful to retain on the civilian side a sizeable amount for direct counterinsurgency operations. In exploring this generally with Thuan earlier this week, he recognized the importance of this and of earmarking the necessary funds on the GVN side. As you are aware, concrete accomplishments in these areas are directly related to the degree of security in a given area. While we can assure, for example, that the necessary economic and civic action components are included in our province rehabilitation planning, they can only take hold and develop in those areas where GVN clearly exercises control. As the security situation improves we should expect an accelerated and cumulative effect from the economic and civic action measures. We will continue to concentrate on these important areas, which I agree, must go hand-in-hand with the military.
I share your view that it is safer to lean in the direction of emphasizing our problems rather than our successes. After a hard winter, however, it is difficult to restrain feelings and expressions of exhilaration at the first signs of spring. There has been a rather dramatic change in outlook among GVN (and US) officials from the extreme pessimism of a year ago. This, I think, is a good thing and provides considerably more impetus toward uniting and getting the job done. The mood is nevertheless still one of cautious optimism and I do not believe that any of us underestimates the complexity of the task ahead.
I should add that, in general, things seem to be going internally pretty well; the external problems less well (relations with Laos, the Cambodian problem, press relations, etc.). A part of our difficulty in [Page 741] dealing with the latter comes precisely from the increased confidence of the Government, which—they are frank enough to admit—we have helped to create!
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 3A, GVN 1962,RVNAF General. Secret; Official-Informal. According to another copy, the letter was drafted by Barbour and Manfull on November 17. (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: 67 A 677, 350 GVN)↩
- Document 300.↩