Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962

300. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)¹

Washington, October 12, 1962.

Dear Fritz: As you know I remain concerned about the dangers of over-optimism in Viet-Nam. I am well aware that things are much improved since last year and I want you to know again how much credit you and the other members of the Saigon Task Force deserve. Although the tide may be turning in Viet-Nam, there is a danger that certain very serious problems may not be receiving the attention and action which they deserve here in Washington. I think we are by far safer in carrying out the Presidentʼs directive to save Viet-Nam if we lean in the direction of emphasizing our problems rather than our successes. In this connection I would appreciate your full and unvarnished views on the following matters which have come to my attention during and after the Honolulu Meeting.²

1) Are the villagers being armed fast enough? I take it that their priority comes after the Army, the Civil Guard, and the Self Defense Corps, and yet they are the ones who must usually resist the first attack until the Army, Civil Guard or Self Defense Corps can come to their assistance. It is my understanding that in the average village of about 2,000 inhabitants there are approximately 50 Republican Youth who are natives in the village who must resist the first attack and that there are not usually more than 10 rifles of ancient vintage available to them. Secretary McNamara has made it clear that we have plenty of rifles, carbines, etc. I would like to know if we can do more now to arm villagers who have received a reasonable degree of training from Civic Action teams or from the Popular Forces.

2) I gather that there have been delays in the arming of helicopters despite the fact that at the July Honolulu Meeting³ Secretary McNamara said that helicopters should be armed as rapidly as possible. From what I understand, the Air Force prefers the strategy of bombing and strafing an area with fixed-wing aircraft before bringing in helicopters. I also understand that they prefer this method because it would give them a larger role than arming helicopters which do not belong to the Air Force. While bombing and strafing an area before bringing in helicopters may provide greater safety it also runs the risk of killing more innocent Vietnamese. I hope that Major General Rowny, who I understand has recently arrived in Viet-Nam to be in charge of Combat Development and Testing, will push ahead with the arming of helicopters as rapidly as possible. Since the whole doctrine of using helicopters in counter-guerrilla war is now under development, I think that the helicopters should be armed urgently so that we can at least find out whether they won’t give adequate protection to American armed forces personnel without the necessity of saturation bombing and strafing.

3) I was frankly concerned by General Harkins’ presentation of the “Explosion” operation which he is considering. I believe that the VC would be tipped off before such an operation could possibly take place and that it would give them time to make themselves scarce. I am concerned that given the very large numbers and different types of armed forces now operating in Viet-Nam the attempt to carry out such an operation simultaneously throughout Viet-Nam would lead to chaos and the loss of many innocent lives. I fear that after it had occurred the Vietnamese armed forces would be in a weakened condition and that the VC could slip back into their old positions relatively easily. In sum, I am dubious about such an operation and I think that its political implications are so important that it should not be approved without full consultation with the Department of State.

4) I would like your views on whether we are doing everything possible to put in administrative support in villages which have been recently liberated. I realize that in areas like Zone B it is necessary to soften up the Viet Cong by jabbing attacks and serial action and that you canʼt put a team of civil administrators in the middle of a Viet Cong area where they could not survive. However, I hope that every feasible effort is being made to maintain the Vietnamese Governmentʼs presence after the military have swept a village.

5) While I realize that progress is being made in improving the GVNʼs image, for example President Diemʼs speech at the opening of the National Assembly,⁴ I am still concerned that the Viet Cong propaganda machine is more effective. In general I think that the question will be solved through concrete steps taken to help the villagers, while unfounded public claims by the GVN will only hurt their cause. I approve of the many steps being made to get information to the villagers through radios, newspapers, etc., but I think we should make a constant effort to dissuade the GVN from over-optimism and from overstating its case.

In general I feel that we are doing better militarily but that more must be done to help the villagers themselves, not only by arming them more rapidly but also socially and economically. I am aware that AID has revolutionized its procedures, greatly expanded its recruiting, and that it is fortunate in having Rufus Phillips to work under USOM Director Brent in pushing this part of their program vigorously. Nevertheless, the risks are so great that I am still concerned on this question.

I want to assure you that the purpose of this letter is to determine more accurately how I can carry out my job of meeting the Presidentʼs requirements in Viet-Nam and of supporting you on questions where I may be of help in order to carry out his directives.

It was a pleasure to have seen you in Honolulu and I am only sorry that Thai matters prevented us from being able to discuss the situation in Viet-Nam more fully.

Very sincerely yours,

W. Averell Harriman⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 307, Vietnam Correspondence. Secret; Official-Informal. Drafted by Wood.
2. See Document 298.
3. See Document 248.
4. Nolting commented that Diemʼs speech on October 1 and its reception were the “high-water marks” in an increasingly successful attempt to rally Vietnam to a national mobilization. (Telegram 367 from Saigon, October 1; Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-162)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.