319. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1
SUBJECT
- Viet Cong Attacks on Strategic Hamlets
- 1.
- Although the Government of Vietnam publicly announced support of the Strategic Hamlet Program in February 1962, a national plan was not formally approved by the Government until early August. In the interim, the strategic hamlet idea expanded rapidly throughout the country, as a form of inter-province competition, with little planning and less coordination. Numbers appeared to be the prime objective. Many hamlets were improperly constructed and inadequately defended, and little attention was given to the psychological, sociological and economic preparation of the populace, or to the proper qualification of administrative personnel, with the result that a basically sound idea got off to a weak start.
- 2.
- Now, the Government of Vietnamʼs Strategic Hamlet Priority Program, and the related implementing documents, include measures designed to overcome the deficiencies inherent in the initial poorly-coordinated program, and there is evidence of limited progress.
- 3.
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There are now 10,971 localities designated for development as strategic hamlets, of which 3353 are reported as completed. These vary widely in quality, as to the nature of their defenses, the composition of related security forces, and as to the efficiency, competence and dependability of administrative personnel. Of the entire number, probably not more than 600 can be viewed as fulfilling the desired characteristics in terms of equipment, defensive works, security forces and, possibly most important, government.
[Page 737]The number of properly conceived hamlets is now growing at the rate of about 300 per month. There are some 1,897 strategic hamlet kits provided in the current MAP/AID programs; over 1,200 village radios are now installed, and installation of hamlet radios is now beginning at the rate of 1,000 per month.
Kindred to this is the growth in quality of the Self Defense Corps, Civil Guard and Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, all of which contribute in some measure to hamlet security.
Thus it will be seen that the real strength of the program is still more in prospect than in reality. It is only now beginning to be felt, and the statistics with which we have been working to date are not an accurate measure of the durability of the true strategic hamlet but, more accurately, are a reflection of operations of the Viet Cong against all rural localities.
- 4.
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The enclosures present the recent situation graphically. Tab A2 shows the number of attacks on strategic hamlets and other, less secure, localities in the past three months. “Attacks” are characterized as destruction of defenses, assassination of hamlet officials, kidnapping and theft of foodstuffs (Tab B). Strategic hamlets sustained an average of five attacks per week, while other localities were attacked nine times weekly. In the three month period covered about two per cent of hamlets of all types were attacked. Two strategic hamlets were overrun; nine of the less secure localities suffered that fate. The remainder varied from serious depredations in the hamlet, to outright defeat of the Viet Cong, to a stand-off, where both sides lost resources and interest.
In terms of size, six attacks against strategic hamlets exceeded platoon size while twenty-five attacks of platoon or larger composition were reported against the other localities. (Tab C)
It is further of interest to note, in terms of VC tactics, that about eighty per cent (Tab D) of all attacks occurred during hours of darkness. This assumes considerable significance when contemplating reaction time and the use of vehicles or aircraft for reinforcement or support.
In geographic terms, Tab E portrays the areas in which the attacks on strategic hamlets and other localities have occurred. They cover some 23 provinces. Of interest is the fact that during the period there were only 14 attacks against the hamlets in the current GVN/US approved clear and hold operations in Bin Duong, Phu Yen, Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai.
- 5.
- There would seem to be no reason for modifying the views expressed by General Harkins and Ambassador Nolting regarding the long-term virtues of the program. It is only now commencing to mature [Page 738] and the vigorous reactions against it—both reported and forecast—suggest that the Viet Cong also perceive its potential. Certainly the current Viet Cong actions with respect to hamlets, involving terrorism, theft, murder and kidnapping are direct attacks against the people. In this sense they are inconsistent with the avowed communist principle that the affection and confidence of the populace are essential to their program.